Mullins v. Smith et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 7/5/2017: KSR and the claims against it are DISMISSED; The official-capacity claims seeking monetary damages against Defendants Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard are DISMISSED; The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate KSR as a Defendant in this action. The following claims shall proceed: The official-capacity claim for injunctive relief alleging a failure to protect against Defendants Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard; and the individual-capacity claim for failure to protect against Defendants Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard seeking damages and injunctive relief. The Court will enter a separate Order Regarding Service and Scheduling Order governing the development of the continuing claims. cc: Plaintiff (pro se), Defendants (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
JESSIE MULLINS
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-P128-JHM

AARON SMITH et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jessie Mullins, a prisoner presently incarcerated in the Kentucky State
Reformatory (KSR), filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for
initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007). For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss KSR and the claims against it and
dismiss the official-capacity claims for monetary damages against Defendants Smith, St. Clair,
and Ballard. The remaining failure-to-protect claims will proceed against Defendants Smith, St.
Clair, and Ballard.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff identifies the following four Defendants in this action: (1) KSR; (2) Aaron
Smith, the Warden at KSR; (3) Travis St. Clair, Sr., a Captain at KSR; and (4) Rodney Ballard,
the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC). Plaintiff sues
Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, punitive
damages, recovery of costs, and to be “[p]rotect[ed] from Assault.”
Plaintiff describes himself as having “one leg or limb missing” and being “medically
disabled.” He states that on the morning of December 9, 2016, two “Caucasian inmate’s
assaulted [him] with a wooden cane’s while [he] was sleeping in [his] bed in the DAL Dorm A,

bed 9.” According to Plaintiff, one cane used in the assault broke in half and was left on the
floor. Plaintiff states that it was “ultimately discovered” that the cane belonged to “the Next
door inmate.” Plaintiff states that his “assailants took that cane and assaulted [him] with it.”
According to Plaintiff, during the assault another inmate started yelling which alerted Unit
Administrator (UA) Grieves prompting him to inquire as to what happened. Plaintiff represents
that he informed UA Grieves that he had been assaulted and showed UA Grieves his bleeding
head. Plaintiff states that he was taken to the segregation medical unit, treated, and had pictures
taken of his head, and he was then released back to his “bed area.”
Plaintiff states that the “DAL does not have hourly security supervision because of
220 Guards are short at KSR.” Specifically, according to Plaintiff, there are no guards on duty in
the DAL dorm on Friday and Saturday. Plaintiff states that general population inmates “walk
freely in and out of the DAL without impairment.” Plaintiff contends that this lack of guards
places him and other inmates “at high risk to be assaulted.”
Plaintiff states that on December 23, 2016, he filed a grievance about the lack of security
and the fact that he had been assaulted. Apparently in response to the grievance, Defendant St.
Clair stated that the “DAL security officer is not responsible for violence that may occur between
inmates” and that an officer was assigned to DAL. Plaintiff comments that Defendant St. Clair
failed to state that the officer on duty was also “working [the] Segregation Unit.” According to
Plaintiff, upon review of the grievance, Defendant Smith concurred with Defendant St. Clair.
Plaintiff states that Defendant Ballard does “not care about Personal Safety or Protection from
Inmate Assault at [KSR]. He do not care and look the other way. . . . KSR is a battlefield daily.”
Plaintiff further states that “[s]ecurity at KSR is very bad and they do not Applying the Standards
policy of [KDOC].”
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Plaintiff lists several assertions about the security conditions at KSR which he asserts
contributed to him being assaulted. These include the following: (1) KSR fails to separate “the
particularly violent or vulnerable, though prison officials are required always to separate inmate
that are in a gangs”; (2) KSR fails to “provide adequate supervision of inmates”; (3) KSR overly
relies on “open dormitory housing”; (4) KSR is overcrowded; (5) KSR fails to “take corrective
action in response to high rates of assault or to particular patterns of Assault”; (6) KSR places
inmates in reasonable fear for their safety because of the pervasive violence; (7) KSR has a very
high rate of assault, and Defendant Smith ‘look[s] the other way”; and (8) inmates incarcerated at
KSR are “routinely subjected to violence, extortion, and Assault” which the guards are aware of
but fail to respond to or ask Defendant Ballard for more guards.
Plaintiff fails to state what claims he is asserting. Notwithstanding this failure, the Court
construes the complaint as alleging a failure-to-protect claim against all Defendants.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608.
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a
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claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Nat.
Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court’s duty “does not require [it]
to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create
a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential
claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Kentucky State Reformatory
Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely
provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. As such, it has two basic
requirements: (1) the deprivation of federal statutory or constitutional rights by (2) a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). KSR is part of the KDOC. The KDOC is a
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department within the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See
Exec. Order No. 2004-730 (July 9, 2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 12.250. A state and its agencies,
however, are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Crockett v. Turney Ctr. Indus. Prison, No. 96-6067, 1997 WL
436563, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 1997) (“The prison is a state agency . . . . A state agency is not
considered a ‘person’ subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Because KSR is not a “person”
under § 1983, the Court will dismiss the claims against KSR.
Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment1 acts as a bar to all claims for relief against KSR.
A state and its agencies, such as KSR, may not be sued in federal court, regardless of the relief
sought, unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment or
Congress has overridden it. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 144-46 (1993); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119-24
(1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 78l, 781-82 (l978). In enacting § l983, Congress did not
intend to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the states. Whittington v. Milby,
928 F.2d l88, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (l979)). “[T]he
Eleventh Amendment is a true jurisdictional bar” to such claims. Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes,
784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss KSR and all claims against KSR.

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“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own
citizens, [the Supreme Court] has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63
(1974).
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B. Official-Capacity Claims for Damages against Defendants Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard
The official-capacity claims for damages against Defendants Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard
will be dismissed on two bases. First, Defendants, as state officials and employees sued in their
official capacity for damages, are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability under the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169
(1985) (“This [Eleventh Amendment] bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for
damages in their official capacity.”). Second, these Defendants are not “persons” subject to suit
within the meaning of § 1983 when sued in their official capacity for monetary damages. Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. at 71 (concluding that a state, its agencies, and its officials
sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not considered persons for the purpose
of a § 1983 claim.
Consequently, the § 1983 official-capacity claims for monetary damages against
Defendants Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard must be dismissed.
C. Remaining Claims
Upon consideration, the Court will allow the failure-to-protect claim against Defendants
Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard in their individual capacities for damages and injunctive relief and
in their official capacity for injunctive relief to proceed.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth more fully above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently
advised, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1) That KSR and the claims against it are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) since Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to this

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Defendant and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) since Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a
Defendant who is immune from such relief; and
(2) That the official-capacity claims seeking monetary damages against Defendants
Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) since
Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to these Defendants and
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) since Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from Defendants who
are immune from such relief.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate KSR as a Defendant in this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following claims shall proceed:
(1) The official-capacity claim for injunctive relief alleging a failure to protect against
Defendants Smith, St. Clair, and Ballard; and
(2) The individual-capacity claim for failure to protect against Defendants Smith,
St. Clair, and Ballard seeking damages and injunctive relief.
The Court will enter a separate Order Regarding Service and Scheduling Order governing
the development of the continuing claims. In permitting these claims to continue, the Court
passes no judgment on the merit and ultimate outcome of the action.
Date:

July 5, 2017

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4414.003

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