Akins v. Miller

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge David J. Hale. Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Separate Order of dismissal to be entered. cc: plaintiff pro se, def (JAC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
DERRICK D’KEITH AKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-P138-DJH

NATHANAEL YENO MILLER,

Defendant.
* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Derrick D’Keith Akins filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is now before the Court on initial review of the action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon review, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will
dismiss the action.
I. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections. He
sues Nathanael Yeno Miller in his individual capacity. He identifies Defendant as a public
defender in Louisville, Kentucky. He states that he believes that his “constitutional rights to
have fair and proper counsel was and has been violated.” He maintains that Defendant “refused
to work on my case after being presented with information that detective Omar Lee lied and gave
false testimony on a suppression hearing.” Plaintiff further states that Defendant “told me that he
would not prosue any motion on my behalf that there was nothing which could be done. Stating
all my concerns where nothing more than triveal.” He reports that Defendant told him that he
did not care if he filed a RCr 11.42 motion asserting ineffective assistance of counsel “due to Mr.
Miller failure to follow-up on pro se motion which I had filed with the courts on behalf of

myself. In fact he told me that he did in any shape form of fashion care if there was a ruling or if
the judge ruled on my motions.”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
II. STANDARD
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). When
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court
must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district

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court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a
claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a
pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law,
causes the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. A
claim under § 1983 must therefore allege two elements: (1) the deprivation of federal statutory
or constitutional rights (2) committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Absent
either element, no § 1983 claim exists. Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983. Public defenders are not liable to suit under
§ 1983 because public defenders do not act under color of state law when representing indigent
clients in criminal proceedings. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions

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as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court will enter a separate Order of dismissal.
Date:

July 17, 2017

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4415.010

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