Hernandez-Matta v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay on 3/28/2018: The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. A final judgment will be entered separately. cc: counsel (JM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-145-CHL

VICTOR MANUEL HERNANDEZ-MATTA,

Plaintiff,

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of plaintiff Victor Manuel Hernandez-Matta
(“plaintiff”).

In his complaint, plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). See 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g) (2012) (“Any
individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security . . . may obtain a
review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him
of notice of such decision . . . .”). Plaintiff filed a Fact and Law Summary (DN 15). The
Commissioner also filed a Fact and Law Summary (DN 21).
The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to enter judgment in
this case with direct review by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed
(DN 14.) Therefore, this matter is ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, the final
decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits on June 24,

2013 and for supplemental social security income on February 6, 2015. (R. 14, 96, 113.) In both

1

applications, plaintiff alleged disability beginning on January 1, 2010; plaintiff later amended his
alleged onset date to February 28, 2015. (Id. at 14.)
On June 23, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Steven Collins (“the ALJ”) conducted a
hearing in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiff appeared via video teleconference and was represented
by John Sharpensteen. Linda Jones, a vocational expert, also testified at the hearing. In a
decision dated November 2, 2016, the ALJ engaged in the five-step evaluation process
promulgated by the Commissioner to determine whether an individual is disabled. In doing so,
the ALJ made these findings.
1.

Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through

December 31, 2019. (Id. at 16.)
2.

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 28, 2015,

the alleged onset date. (Id.)
3.

Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: morbid obesity; degenerative disc

disease; sleep apnea; anxiety/depression; peripheral vascular disease; asthma; hypertension;
hypertensive heart disease; and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. (Id.)
4.

Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets

or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 17.)
5.

Plaintiff has the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work

except occasional lifting/carrying up to twenty pounds and frequent lifting/carrying up to ten
pounds. Plaintiff would sit six of eight hours and stand/walk two of eight hours. Plaintiff could
occasionally use the lower extremities for pushing and pulling. Plaintiff could occasionally climb
2

ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Plaintiff could occasionally stoop,
kneel, and crouch, but never crawl. Plaintiff could frequently balance. Plaintiff should avoid
concentrated exposure to extremes of heart and pulmonary irritants to include fumes, odors, dust,
gases, and poor ventilation. Plaintiff should avoid all exposure to hazards including unprotected
heights and dangerous machinery. Plaintiff could frequently handle with the bilateral upper
extremities. Plaintiff cannot drive. Plaintiff has the ability for frequent cervical flexion with the
neck. Plaintiff is capable of simple, routine tasks involving simple work related decisions with
few, if any, work place changes. Plaintiff cannot perform fast-paced production requirements.
Plaintiff can have occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers, but no contact with public.
(Id. at 19.)
6.

Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 26.)

7.

Plaintiff was born on September 15, 1970 and was 44 years old, which is defined

as a younger individual age 45-49, on the alleged disability onset date. (Id.)
8.

Plaintiff has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in

English. (Id.)
9.

Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant
is “not disabled,” whether or not plaintiff has transferable job skills. (Id.)
10.

Considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that he can perform. (Id.)
11.

Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,

from February 28, 2015, through the date of this decision. (Id. at 27.)
3

Plaintiff timely requested an appeal to the Appeals Council on or about November 23,
2016. (Id. at 9-10.) On January 17, 2017, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff=s request for
review.

(Id. at 2.)

At that point, the ALJ=s decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 422.210(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (discussing
finality of the Commissioner’s decision). Plaintiff filed this action on March 9, 2017.
II.

DISCUSSION
The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance and supplemental

social security benefits to persons with disabilities. Social Security Act, Disability Insurance
Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34 (2012); Social Security Act, Supplemental Social Security
Income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (2012). An individual shall be considered disabled if “he is
unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).
A.

Standard of Review

In conducting its review, the Court Amay not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in
evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.@ Garner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 745
F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1972)). Rather,
the Court’s review is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final decision of the
Commissioner are supported by Asubstantial evidence@ and that the correct legal standards were
applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2013);
Cole v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011). If the answer is Ayes,@ then the
4

Court may not even inquire as to whether the record could support a decision the other way. Smith
v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989).
ASubstantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate
to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.@
Cotton v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Casey v. Sec’y
of Health and Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Therefore, A[a] reviewing court will affirm the Commissioner=s decision if it is based on
substantial evidence, even if substantial evidence would also have supported the opposite
conclusion.@ Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 374.
B.

Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that set forth a five-step sequential
evaluation process that an ALJ must follow in evaluating a disability claim. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:
1)

Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If
the answer is “yes,” the claimant is not disabled. If the
answer is “no,” proceed to the next step.

2)

Does the claimant have a medically determinable
impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the
duration requirement and significantly limits his or her
ability to perform basic work activities? If the answer is
“no,” the claimant is not disabled. If the answer is “yes,”
proceed to the next step.

3)

Does the claimant have an impairment that meets or
medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment within
Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 of this chapter? If the
answer is “yes,” the claimant is disabled. If the answer is
“no,” proceed to the next step.

5

4)

Does the claimant have the RFC to return to his or her past
relevant work? If the answer is “yes,” then the claimant is
not disabled. If the answer is “no,” proceed to the next
step.

5)

Even if the claimant cannot perform past relevant work,
does the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work
experience allow him or her to perform a significant
number of jobs in the national economy? If the answer is
“yes,” the claimant is not disabled. If the answer is “no,”
the claimant is disabled.

Id.
The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps. Jordan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 422-23 (6th Cir. 2008).

The burden shifts to the

Commissioner at the fifth step to prove that there are available jobs in the national economy that
the claimant is capable of performing. Id. at 423. The claimant, however, always retains the
burden of proving lack of RFC. Herr v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 1999).
C.

Plaintiff’s Contentions

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in two ways. First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred
by failing to analyze the opinion evidence in accordance with Agency policy, regulations, and
Sixth Circuit precedent. Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to account for his
non-severe impairments as required by Agency policy and regulations. The Court will address
each contention below, beginning with the second one.
1.

Non-severe impairments

The ALJ found that plaintiff had several non-severe impairments.

An impairment is

considered non-severe if it minimally affects the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities.
Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 862 (6th Cir. 1988); Farris v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
6

773 F.2d 85, 89-90 (6th Cir. 1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a).

With respect to carpal

tunnel syndrome, the ALJ found that it, along with a diagnosis of trigger finger of the right and
middle finger, pain in left wrist, and other disturbances of skin sensation, would no more than
minimally affect plaintiff’s ability to work, and, in conjunction, would limit plaintiff to frequent
handling with the bilateral upper extremities and frequent cervical flexion of the neck; this is
consistent with the RFC. (R. 19 [ability to frequently handle with bilateral upper extremities as
well as ability for frequent cervical neck flexion included in RFC]); Maziarz v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Since the Secretary properly could consider
claimant's cervical condition in determining whether claimant retained sufficient residual
functional capacity to allow him to perform substantial gainful activity, the Secretary's failure to
find that claimant's cervical condition constituted a severe impairment could not constitute
reversible error.”). With respect to the diagnosis of schizophrenia, the ALJ find no supporting
evidence for this condition. With respect to anemia, diabetes mellitus, vitamin D deficiency,
neuropathy, arthritis, chronic migraine, and low vitamin B 12 levels, the ALJ found that they
appear to be medically managed and did not rise to the level of severe impairments.
The mere diagnosis of a condition says nothing about the severity of an impairment.
Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.3d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988). And, it is plaintiff’s burden to prove the
severity of an impairment. Id. While plaintiff’s brief states that the ALJ erred by failing to
account for these non-severe impairments, it does not provide any argument with respect to
same. In fact, that entire section appears to be missing from plaintiff’s brief. Issues addressed in
a “perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation are deemed
waived.” See United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 567 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting McPherson v.
7

Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 996-96 (6th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, the
Court declines to guess what plaintiff’s contentions are with respect to this issue. Therefore, the
Court concludes that plaintiff has not carried his burden on this issue and is not entitled to a
remand on this basis.
2.

ALJ’s treatment of opinion evidence

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in his treatment of the opinion as follows: (1) failure to
give “good/specific/supported reasons” for rejecting the opinions of treating physician Dr.
Ramona Coffie and examining psychologist Dr. Gregory Lynch; and (2) assigning great weight
to the opinions of Dr. Lynch and the state agency consulting psychologist, Dr. Kay Barnfield, but
then failing to explain why he did not adopt all of the limitations included in their opinions. (DN
15-1 at 8, 12.)
The RFC finding is the ALJ=s ultimate determination of what a claimant can still do in a
work setting despite his physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1545(a), 404.1546,
416.945(a), 416.946. The RFC finding is based on a consideration of medical source statements
and all other evidence, medical and non-medical, in the record.

20 C.F.R. '' 404.1529,

404.1545(a), 404.1546, 416.929, 416.945(a), 416.946. Thus, in making the RFC finding, the
ALJ must (1) assign weight to the medical source statements in the record; and also (2) consider
the descriptions and observations of the claimant’s limitations as a result of the impairments
from the claimant and the claimant’s family and friends.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3),

416.945(a)(3). Plaintiff’s arguments are directed at (1).
The source of a medical opinion dictates the process by which the ALJ gives it weight.
Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Treating sources must be given controlling weight if the opinion is
8

(1) “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques”; and
(2) “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Id. (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the treating source is not given
controlling weight, then the “opinion is weighed based on the length, frequency, nature, and
extent of the treatment relationship, as well as the treating source’s area of specialty and the
degree to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and is supported by relevant
evidence.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6)). Whatever weight the ALJ accords a
treating source’s opinion, he or she must set forth “good reasons” for doing so. Wilson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The regulation requires the agency to
‘give good reasons’ for not giving weight to a treating physician in the context of a disability
determination.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Opinions from examining and non-

examining medical sources are assessed under these same guidelines (i.e., examining
relationship, specialization, consistency, and supportability), but are never assessed for
controlling weight. Id. Finally, while opinions from treating, examining, and non-examining
medical sources must be considered in determining RFC, the ALJ is ultimately responsible for
the RFC finding. 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(e); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2.
a.

Dr. Coffie

Dr. Coffie completed a physical capabilities assessment. (R. 826-27.) She opined,
among other things, that plaintiff would require a cane to stand/walk; could sit/stand/walk two
hours in an eight hour day; could frequently lift less than five pounds and occasionally lift ten
pounds; could occasionally balance; and would need to sit quietly to rest or lie down at
unpredictable internals three or four times a day for about thirty minutes. (Id.) The ALJ gave Dr.
9

Coffie’s opinions only partial weight because of Dr. Coffie’s heavy reliance on plaintiff’s
subjective complaints, the short duration of the treating relationship (about three months), and
limited objective evidence. Specifically, the ALJ accepted that plaintiff had a limited ability to
stand/walk, but that the limitations in sitting and lifting appeared excessive. The ALJ also found
that the need for unscheduled breaks to be somewhat inconsistent with plaintiff’s apparent
positive response to continuous positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) and medication.
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by giving Dr. Coffie’s opinions partial weight solely
because Dr. Coffie relied heavily on plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Plaintiff further asserts
that Dr. Coffie’s opinion was based on clinical findings, treatment history, subjective reports,
and her own medical expertise as to what those findings meant in the context of plaintiff’s
impairments. This is the extent of plaintiff’s argument. This argument fails for several reasons.
First, plaintiff is incorrect. The ALJ cited two other reasons for giving Dr. Coffie’s
opinions partial weight:

the short duration of the treating relationship at the time of the

assessment (3 months)1 and limited objective evidence. “While this stated reason may be brief,
it reaches several of the factors that an ALJ must consider when determining what weight to give
a non-controlling opinion by a treating source, including: the length of the treatment relationship
and the frequency of examination, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i); the nature and extent of the
treatment relationship, § 404.1527(d)(2)(ii); and the supportability of the opinion, §
404.1527(d)(3).” Allen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2009).
Second, the ALJ then went on to discuss why he rejected some of the limitations imposed
by Dr. Coffie. The Court acknowledges that the ALJ’s analysis could have been more detailed.

1

As plaintiff points out, Dr. Coffie conducted four examinations prior to completing the physical capabilities
assessment. (DN 15-1 at 8-9.)

10

For example, the ALJ could have gone the next step and, in addition to noting that Dr. Coffie
ordered MRIs of the lumbar and cervical spine and the results of same, stated that those MRIs
did not support the extreme limitations that she assessed. Ultimately, however, “there was some
effort to identify the specific discrepancies and to explain why []the treating physician’s
conclusion [got] the short end of the stick.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543,
552 (6th Cir. 2010). For example, the ALJ noted that, at a January 2016 examination by Dr.
Coffie, she noted that plaintiff had normal gait and was able to stand without difficulty. (R. 22.)
Moreover, the ALJ did impose significant limitations on plaintiff’s RFC based on Dr. Coffie’s
opinions – for example, the ALJ limited him to standing/walking two hours and found that he
could never crawl.
Finally, the Court notes that plaintiff does not point to any objective medical evidence to
support Dr. Coffie’s assessed limitations, in particular that he required an assistive walking
device, was limited to sitting two hours in an eight hour day, or would need to sit quietly to rest
or lie down at unpredictable levels three or four times a day for about thirty minutes. See Wilson
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (“An ALJ must give the opinion of a
treating source controlling weight if he finds the opinion well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the] case record.”) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Instead, plaintiff only generally asserts that Dr. Coffie’s opinion was based on clinical findings,
treatment history, and her own medical expertise, but does not say how those findings and
history support the assessed limitations. Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and
11

severity of limitations caused by her impairments . . . .”). Therefore, the Court concludes that the
ALJ’s decision to only partially credit Dr. Coffie’s opinion was supported by substantial
evidence.
b.

Dr. Lynch

Dr. Lynch performed a one-time psychological examination of plaintiff. Dr. Lynch
opined that plaintiff had (1) slight limitations in his capacity to understand, remember, and carry
out instructions towards performance of simple repetitive tasks; (2) slight limitations in his
capacity to sustain attention and concentration towards performance of simple repetitive tasks;
(3) moderate limitations in his ability to tolerate stress and pressure of day-to-day employment;
and (4) moderate to marked limitations in his capacity to respond appropriately to supervision,
coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting. (R. 518-19.)

Dr. Lynch was not a treating

physician; therefore his opinion was not entitled to controlling weight or any weight at all.
Nonetheless, the ALJ was required weigh the opinion in light of the examining relationship,
specialization, consistency, and supportability of same.
The ALJ gave Dr. Lynch’s opinions great weight with the exception of the marked
limitation in plaintiff’s capacity to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work
pressures in a work setting. Specifically, the ALJ found that, although Dr. Lynch noted a
“moderate to marked” limitation in this regard, nothing more than a moderate limitation was
supported by the record.

(Id. at 519.) The ALJ further found that, despite his impairments,

plaintiff retained the ability to perform simple, routine tasks involving simple work related
decisions with few, if any, work place changes; cannot perform fast-paced production

12

requirements; and can only have occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers, but no
contact with the public.
There is evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusion.

In his step three

analysis, the ALJ noted moderate difficulties in social functioning. The ALJ noted that plaintiff
reported texting, using Facebook, spending time at the house of his best friend’s daughter,
calling others, and going out on his own. (R. 18). The ALK pointed out that plaintiff had some
difficulty getting along with family, but denied problems with others. (Id.) The ALJ also
recognized that plaintiff had some difficulty with authority figures, but that he had never been let
go from a job because of problems getting along with others. (Id.) Moreover, in assessing
plaintiff’s RFC at step four, the ALJ noted plaintiff’s mental health treatment at Communicare.
Specifically, the ALJ noted, among other things, that he participated in individual and group
therapy; that his mental status examination reflected adequate attention and concentration; and
that during a treatment planning session, he indicated that he had trouble focusing and would get
side-tracked during a conversation. (Id. at 23.) By April 2016, however, the ALJ noted that
records reflect that plaintiff reported doing much better. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that the record supports Dr. Lynch’s conclusion that he has moderate to
marked limitations in his ability to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work
pressures in a work setting. In particular, plaintiff asserts that while treating with Communicare,
he reported difficulty getting along with his former boss and coworkers. (Id. at 818.) On
January 18, 2016, records indicated that plaintiff had ongoing and/or variably severe deficits in
interpersonal relationships, ability to engage in socially constructive activity, and ability to
maintain responsibilities; records also indicated that plaintiff had significant deterioration in the
13

ability to fulfill responsibilities and obligations to job, school, self, or significant others, and
these may be avoided or neglected on some occasions. (Id. at 821.) Plaintiff argues that this
evidence demonstrates marked limitations and was not addressed by the ALJ.

Plaintiff’s

arguments fail for two reasons.
First, “[a]lthough required to develop the record fully and fairly, an ALJ is not required to
discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence does not
indicate that it was not considered.” Dykes ex rel. Brymer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 112 F. App'x
463, 467 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000)). Thus, the
fact that the ALJ did not discuss every single record is not reversible error.
Second, it is the ALJ’s responsibility to resolve any conflicts in the record. See Martin v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 170 F. App'x 369, 373 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (“The ALJ
had the duty to resolve conflicts in medical evidence . . . .”). The ALJ, as noted above, pointed
to evidence in the record that supported his conclusion that plaintiff has no more than moderate
limitations in responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a work
setting. That plaintiff has pointed to other records that, in his opinion, appear to conflict with the
ALJ’s finding (or support a marked limitation) does not constitute error. This is because
“[s]ubstantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to
support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.”
Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). In short, the
Court is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, and the
Court concludes that it does here.

14

Finally, plaintiff argues, in a summary fashion, that the ALJ did not adopt Dr. Lynch’s
opinion regarding plaintiff’s moderate limitations in handling stress and pressure of day-to-day
employment. Plaintiff does not explain, however, how this is inconsistent with the mental
limitations included in the RFC, specifically the limitation of simple, routine tasks involving
simple work-related decisions with few, if any, work place changes, as well as a prohibition on
fast-paced production requirements.

Nor does plaintiff explain how moderate limitations

preclude him from working at all, which is his burden to show. Therefore, plaintiff’s argument
with respect to this issue fails as well.
c.

Dr. Barnfield

The Court will not repeat all of non-examining state agency doctor Dr. Barnfield’s
opinions here, as plaintiff only takes issue with one. Specifically, plaintiff points out that,
despite giving Dr. Barnfield’s opinions great weight, the ALJ did not adopt one of the limitations
imposed by Dr. Barnfield. Specifically, Dr. Barnfield opined that plaintiff can only sustain
attention for periods of two-hour segments for simple tasks involving minimal variation and little
independent judgment. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to explain these omissions.
Plaintiff, citing to case law addressing the requirements for addressing opinions of
treating physicians, states that, once the ALJ accepts a medical opinion, he must include the
established limitations in the RFC finding or explain why they were excluded. Notably, plaintiff
does not cite to any case law that suggests the assigned RFC in this case is incompatible with
sustaining attention for periods of two-hour segments for simple tasks involving minimal
variation and little independent judgment. Cf. Bond v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:15-CV-204TRM-SKL, 2016 WL 7799316, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. June 14, 2016), report and recommendation
15

adopted, No. 1:15-CV-204, 2016 WL 4548440 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2016) (“The ALJ also
included in her RFC determination that Plaintiff was limited to simple, routine and repetitive
tasks . . . which accommodates Dr. Neboschick's opinions that Plaintiff could understand and
remember simple instructions; sustain attention for simple, structured tasks for periods of twohour segments; and make simple work-related decisions and accommodates Dr. de la Torre's
opinions that Plaintiff could understand, remember, and carry out simple and one to four step
detailed tasks; concentrate and persist for a two-hour time period in an eight-hour workday with
customary breaks; and independently set practical goals.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
Moreover, even though the ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Barnfield’s opinions, he was not
required to incorporate every single one of them into the RFC finding. See, e.g., Reeves v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App'x 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015) (unpublished opinion) (“Even where
an ALJ provides ‘great weight’ to an opinion, there is no requirement that an ALJ adopt a state
agency psychologist's opinions verbatim; nor is the ALJ required to adopt the state agency
psychologist's limitations wholesale.”).

And plaintiff has not shown how his mental RFC

limitations were otherwise not supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, plaintiff’s

arguments with respect to this issue also fail.
III.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is ORDERED as

follows:
(1) The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED and this
action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
16

(2) A final judgment will be entered separately.

cc: Counsel of record

Colin Lindsay, MagistrateJudge
United States District Court

March 28, 2018

17