Jackson v. Coyne et al

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 1/16/2018 denying 20 Motion for Default Judgment. Defendants SHALL, by January 25, 2018, file a supplemental brief. Jackson SHALL HAVE until February 8, 2018 to respond to Defendants supplemental brief. cc: Counsel, plaintiff pro se(KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-00174-TBR
MARK A. JACKSON,

PLAINTIFF

v.
JAMES COYNE, et. al.,

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on two pending motions. First, Defendants James Coyne
and Heather Horn filed a motion for summary judgment, [DN 17.] Plaintiff Mark Johnson
responded, [DN 24], and Defendants replied, [DN 25.] Second, Plaintiff filed a motion for
default judgment, [DN 20], to which Defendants responded, [DN 23.] For the reasons discussed
in detail below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment, but will defer its
ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pending further briefing from the parties.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Mark Jackson, a pro se prisoner, brought the instant lawsuit alleging that
Defendants, who are employed at the Kentucky State Reformatory (“KSR”), violated his rights
by improperly reading his legal mail, including court documents, outside of his presence. [DN 1.]
A. Summary Judgment
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the sole grounds that Jackson failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. [DN 17 at 2–3.] The Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 requires a prisoner to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing any action
“with respect to prison conditions” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). That exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
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involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); accord Freeman v. Francis, 196
F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion is mandatory and the remedies provided “need not
meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, or effective.’ ” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524,
122 S.Ct. 983 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). “Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with [the prison’s] deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006).
In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Jackson argues that he did file
a grievance on January 26, 2017, but that he withdrew the grievance when he was threatened by
an inmate grievance aide, Howard Hawkins, who “stated he would cause harm to plaintiff if he
didn’t sign grievance and dismiss.” [DN 24 at 1.] According to Jackson, he “was unable to use
the grievance procedure or appeal due to threats and his life [being] in danger.” [Id. at 2.]
Jackson made this same argument in his Complaint, in which he stated that he “filed a grievance
and was forced to withdraw it due to threats.” [DN 1 at 5.] Jackson claims that, after he withdrew
his grievance, he attempted to contact the Ombudsman’s office for the Kentucky Department of
Corrections, but that he never received a response. [Id.]
The Supreme Court of the United States recently identified certain circumstances under
which the exhaustion requirement of “§ 1997e(a) poses no bar” to a prisoner’s lawsuit. Ross v.
Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1860 (2016). Among these circumstances is when the administrative
procedure becomes effectively “unavailable” to prisoners because “prison administrators
thwart[ed] inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. Here, because Jackson alleges that he withdrew his
grievance due to threats to his bodily safety, Ross may apply.

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In their reply, however, Defendants argue that the alleged threat “did not come from
Corrections staff. Rather, Plaintiff claims that a fellow inmate in the position of grievance aide
threatened him. A threat from a fellow inmate does not excuse the requirement that Plaintiff
exhaust his administrative remedies.” [DN 25 at 2.] In other words, Defendants argue that an
inmate working as a grievance aide does not equate to a “prison administrator” thwarting
Jackson’s attempt to file a grievance. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 160. However, at this time, the Court
feels that it has insufficient information to make this determination. Accordingly, Defendants
shall, by January 25, 2018, present additional evidence by way of affidavit and any supporting
documentary evidence explaining the position of “grievance aide” at KSR and the extent to
which grievance aides may act as agents of KSR. Jackson shall have until February 8, 2018 to
respond to Defendants. The Court will defer ruling on Defendants’ summary judgment motion
until after this additional briefing has concluded.
B. Default Judgment
Two days after Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, Jackson filed a
motion for default judgment. [DN 17; DN 20.] Therein, Jackson argues that Defendants failed to
file an answer in the case. [DN 20 at 2.] It is true, as Jackson argues, that Defendants never
answered. However, they did not completely “fail[] to plead or otherwise defend” the action, as
is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Instead,
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 provides that “a party may file a
motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(b). In INVST Financial Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
explained that
the phrase “at any time” has since been given a literal construction. In First
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20
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L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of a
defendant who had not filed an answer, even though the litigation was six years
old when defendant filed the motion for summary judgment.
INVST Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 403 (6th Cir. 1987).
Accordingly, the fact that Defendants did not file an answer does not entitle Jackson to a default
judgment in this case, where Defendants instead appeared in and defended the case against them
through a motion for summary judgment, [DN 17.]
It is correct, as Defendants explain in their motion, that their summary judgment motion
was originally sent to an incorrect address; however, the next day, Defendants became aware of
Jackson’s change of address and filed a notice advising the Court that they sent copies of their
motion to Jackson’s updated address. [DN 18.] Understandably, Jackson likely did not receive
those copies until after he filed his default judgment motion due to the time it took for him to
receive his mail in prison. However, because Defendants did appear in the case before Jackson’s
default judgment motion was filed, the Court will deny Jackson’s motion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, [DN 20], is DENIED.
(2) The Court will defer ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, [DN 17],
pending further briefing by the parties.
(3) Defendants SHALL, by January 25, 2018, file a supplemental brief containing
additional evidence by way of affidavit and any supporting documentary evidence
explaining the position of “grievance aide” at KSR and the extent to which grievance
aides may act as agents of KSR.

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(4) Jackson SHALL HAVE until February 8, 2018 to respond to Defendants’ supplemental
brief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
cc:

January 16, 2018

Counsel
Plaintiff, pro se

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