Strategic Marketing Services, LLC v. Skelton

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 7/20/17; denying 26 Motion for Reconsideration. cc: Counsel, Daniel Skelton(2 addresses and email) (DJT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-00231-TBR
STRATEGIC MARKETING SERVICES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.
DANIEL SKELTON,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Strategic Marketing Services, LLC filed this action against Daniel Skelton, a
former employee, bringing a host of claims arising from an employment agreement
between them.

Earlier in this litigation, Strategic Marketing Services requested a

preliminary injunction to enforce noncompetition, nonsolicitation, nondisclosure, and
nonrecruitment clauses in that agreement. After holding a hearing and balancing the
equities, the Court issued the sought-after injunction. Now, Skelton asks the Court to
modify the injunction to allow him to compete with Strategic Marketing Services in the
Florida. Strategic Marketing Services opposes that motion.
The Court has inherent authority to modify or dissolve its preliminary injunctions.
Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 907 F. Supp. 263, 265 (N.D. Ohio 1995). Of
course, that does not “mean that the parties may duel and re-duel over the merits of the
original injunction.” LFP IP, LLC v. Hustler Cincinnati, Inc., 810 F.3d 424, 426 (6th Cir.
2016) (citing Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647
(1961)). Instead, to obtain modification or dissolution of a preliminary injunction, the
movant “must demonstrate significant ‘changes in fact, law, or circumstance since the
previous ruling.’” Gooch v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 414 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Gill v. Monroe Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 873 F.2d 647, 648 (2d Cir. 1989)); see
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also 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2961 (3d ed.),
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017).
Here, Skelton presses two points which, according to him, warrant modification
of the preliminary injunction. He first argues that the Court ought to construe the
employment agreement according to North Carolina or California law. [See R. 26 at 2–5
(Motion to Modify Preliminary Injunction).] But the plain language of the agreement
calls for the application of Kentucky law, [R. 1-1 at 9, ¶ 24 (Employment Agreement)],
and the Court is not free to disregard that provision, see Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc. v.
Griffin, 970 F. Supp. 2d 700, 707–11 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (discussing how Kentucky
analyzes and enforces contractual choice-of-law provisions). Skelton then attacks the
noncompetition clause as too broad because it prohibits him from offering products (i.e.,
lead-generation using internet-based services) not included in Strategic Marketing
Services’ product portfolio. [See R. 27 at 1–2 (Supplemental Brief).] Nonetheless, the
record belies the factual underpinning of that assertion. [See R. 29-6 at 1 (Example
Marketing Campaign).]
The Court empathizes with the hardship that Skelton has experienced as a result
of the preliminary injunction. His original filings in this case presented questions which
the Court has worked diligently to resolve. The Court has reviewed its earlier opinion in
light of any new or better arguments that Skelton has made, including those discussed
above. It is satisfied with its original judgment and does not consider further explanation
or discussion of the case to be necessary. The Court stands by its original decision for the
reasons stated then.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Skelton’s Motion to Modify, [R. 26], is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
cc:

July 20, 2017

Counsel of Record
Daniel Skelton
279 Leese Dr.
St. Johns, Florida 32259
[phone]
Daniel Skelton
12700 Bartram Park Blvd 2111
Jacksonville, Florida 32258
[phone]
[e-mail]

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