Frye v. United States of America
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge David J. Hale on 11/27/2017 - The United States' motion to dismiss (DN 6) is GRANTED. Frye's claims against President Trump and the VA are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate the United States as a defendant. The remaining claims between Frye and Parham are REMANDED to Jefferson Circuit Court. This matter is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket. cc: Counsel, Jefferson County Circuit Court(DAK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
KENNETH FRYE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-303-DJH-CHL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kenneth Frye brought this pro se action in Jefferson County Circuit Court,
naming President Donald Trump and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs as defendants.
(See Docket No. 1-3; D.N. 1-4) The United States removed the case to this Court on behalf of
President Trump and the VA. (D.N. 1) The United States now moves to dismiss the complaint.
(D.N. 6) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the United States’ motion and
decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims between Frye and counterclaimant Eva
Parham.
I.
Frye’s claims appear to arise from a domestic quarrel between Frye and Parham at
Parham’s residence, which resulted in law-enforcement personnel arriving at the scene and
ultimately confiscating Frye’s 9mm handgun. (See D.N. 1-4; see also D.N. 7-1, PageID # 32)
On April 13, 2017, the Louisville VA Medical Center received a one-page letter
addressed to President Donald Trump alongside a state-court civil summons. (D.N. 1-3; D.N. 14) The letter was from Frye, and the summons referred to a civil suit Frye had filed against
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President Trump—in his official capacity—and Parham in Kentucky state court.1 The summons
also named as a defendant “VA Hospital Tort Malpractice Thyroid Surgery.” (See D.N. 1-3,
PageID # 12)
The United States removed the action on behalf of President Trump and the VA on May
16, 2017 (D.N. 1), and now moves to dismiss Frye’s complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (D.N. 6) On June 16,
2017, Parham filed a response to the motion, asking the Court to refrain from dismissing her
state-law counterclaim against Frye (D.N. 7, PageID # 28), which she asserted in her answer in
the state-court action. (See D.N. 7-1) Parham also asks the Court to decline to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining claims between Frye and Parham should the Court grant the
United States’ motion. (D.N. 7, PageID # 29) The United States filed a reply in which it stated
that it had no objection to Parham’s requests. (D.N. 8) Frye did not respond to the United
States’ motion or reply to Parham’s response.
II.
In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. If “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct,” the plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.
The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must provide “more than an
1
Parham is not a named defendant in the underlying action. She is, however, the subject of
factual allegations and has received service of process. (See D.N. 7-1, PageID # 30)
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unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, “a district court must (1) view the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (citing Gunasekera, 551 F.3d at 466).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 519 (1972). Yet “the lenient treatment generally
accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
For example, “the less stringent standard for pro se plaintiffs does not compel courts to conjure
up unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations.” Leisure v. Hogan, 21 F. App’x 277, 278
(6th Cir. 2001). Additionally, a court cannot “create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled
out in his pleading.” Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
A pro se complaint must still contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. See Scheid v. Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). Ultimately, “[c]ourts are not
required to entertain a pro se plaintiff’s claim that “defies comprehension” or allegations that
amount to nothing more than “incoherent ramblings.” Roper v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:09-cv427, 2010 WL 2670827, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2010), report and recommendation adopted,
2010 WL 2670697 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2010) (internal citations omitted).
III.
In his one-page complaint, Frye alleges in support of his claims:
I would like to legally sue the Louisville Sheriff Department for disrespect of a
full bird colonel disabled American veteran . . . [for] bias, prejudice,
discrimination, anxiety provocation[,] threatened to arrest, incompetent incomputs
[sic] . . . regarding a domestic violence of a woman Ms[.] Eva Parham.
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(D.N. 1-4, PageID # 16) After listing facts concerning Parham, the complaint concludes: “Thank
you presidential congressional chain of command resolved plight!!!!” (Id.)
Even when viewed under the less stringent standard afforded to pro se litigants, Frye’s
complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Frye has failed to present
either direct or inferential allegations supporting any claim against either President Trump or the
VA.2 See Scheid, 859 F.2d at 437. Instead, the complaint presents mere ramblings concerning
an interaction with police, a confiscated 9mm handgun, and alleged tortious conduct on the part
of Parham. (See D.N. 1-4) This Court is not required to entertain a pro se plaintiff’s claim that
“defies comprehension” or allegations that amount to nothing more than “incoherent ramblings.”
Roper, 2010 WL 2670827, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2010), report and recommendation adopted,
2010 WL 2670697 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2010) (internal citations omitted).3 Nor is it the Court’s
duty to conjure up unpled allegations for pro se plaintiffs. Leisure, 21 F. App’x at 278. The
Court will accordingly dismiss Frye’s claims against President Trump and the VA.
To the extent that there remain state-law claims between Frye and Parham, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see
also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In the Sixth Circuit, there is “a
strong presumption against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims have
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Nor has Frye presented a viable claim against the “Louisville Sheriff Department,” as he has
not named any law-enforcement agency as a defendant in this matter.
3
Additionally, “[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be
sued . . . , and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define the court’s jurisdiction to
entertain the suit.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). Because the complaint does not mention a waiver of
sovereign immunity, this doctrine would also likely bar Frye’s claims. See, e.g., McCoy v.
Obama, No. 5:11cv1664, 2011 WL 4948778, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2011) (“Plaintiff’s
claims against [Barack Obama] are clearly asserted against him in his official capacity as the
President of the United States. Consequently, Plaintiff must articulate a cause of action in his
Complaint for which the United States has waived its sovereign immunity.”).
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been dismissed”; the Court should retain jurisdiction “‘only in cases where the interests of
judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh [the] concern over
needlessly deciding state law issues.’” Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Columbus, 423 F. App’x
580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir.
2006)). No such extraordinary circumstances are present here. The Court will thus remand the
remaining claims to Jefferson Circuit Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]”); Ross v. Lamberson, 873 F. Supp.
2d 817, 822 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
IV.
Frye’s “complaint is rambling, disjointed, implausible, and fails, as it is required to do, to
contain ‘either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory.’” Watkins v. FBI, No. 3:13CV–204–S, 2013 WL
3324065, at *2 (W.D. Ky. July 1, 2013) (quoting Scheid, 859 F.2d at 426). Accordingly, and the
Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
(1)
The United States’ motion to dismiss (D.N. 6) is GRANTED. Frye’s claims
against President Trump and the VA are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to terminate the United States as a defendant in the record of this matter.
(2)
The remaining claims between Frye and Parham are REMANDED to Jefferson
Circuit Court.
(3)
This matter is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.
November 27, 2017
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David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
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