Rodriguez v. Airington et al
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 11/22/2017: The Court will dismiss this action by separate order. cc: Plaintiff (pro se), Defendants (JBM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV-P375-JHM
FRANCISCO G. RODRIGUEZ
PLAINTIFF
v.
DAVID AIRINGTON et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Francisco G. Rodriguez filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims upon
initial screening.
I.
Plaintiff is a convicted inmate at the Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR). He sues David
Airington, whom he identifies as a prison mailroom clerk at KSR, and Aaron Smith, the KSR
Warden, in their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff states, “On June 28, 2016 a civil action was filed against me, ‘by the victim of
the criminal case for which I am serving time[.]’” He reports that a complaint, summons, and
letter from a guardian ad litem were mailed to him at KSR via registered mail. Plaintiff states
that Airington “intercepted the legal mail from Christian Circuit Court and the guardian ad
litem.” He represents that Airington “signed the green return receipt card – then he returned the
mail to the Christian Circuit Court Clerk without contacting or locating me in the prison and
informing me of receipt of registered mail in my name[.]” Plaintiff states that the green receipt
card was filed in the Christian Circuit Court. He maintains that “the court thereby entered a
judgment against me for default for failure to defend the lawsuit – for failure to answer the
complaint – the court entered a judgment for . . . one million five hundred thousand dollars
against me.”
Plaintiff further asserts that he filed a grievance concerning the incident. He states,
“They responded that the Court Clerk put the wrong inmate number on the green card – the
number was not a inmate ID number – but was the Christian Circuit Court case number.”
Plaintiff maintains that he “appealed to the Warden and Commissioners – they concurred with
the prison.” Plaintiff states that KSR has a practice of locating an inmate if it receives mail
without a prisoner identification number. He states, “They lied about this incident.”
Plaintiff reports that he appealed the default judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals
and the appeal is pending. He states, “This is a denial of access to the courts action . . . where
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to my right by failing to allow service of process by
the Christian Circuit Court – thereby causing a one and a half million dollar judgment to be
imposed against me . . . .”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages; injunctive relief in the
form of “no retaliatory actions/properly retrain”; and requests to “have DOC clarify matter w/ Ky
Court of Appeals.”
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
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immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a
claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a
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pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.
Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 821 (1977). This right, however, is not without limit. In order to state a viable claim for
interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must show actual injury. Dellis v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351
(1996)). “An inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his
prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That would
be the precise analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the
inadequacy of the prison infirmary.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). “‘Meaningful
access to the courts is the touchstone,’ and the inmate therefore must go one step further and
demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his
efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has strictly limited the types of cases for which there
may be an actual injury:
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform
themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from
shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it
requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to
attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to
challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of
any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and
perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and
incarceration.
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Id. at 355 (emphasis added). “Thus, a prisoner’s right to access the courts extends to direct
appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175
F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to defend against a civil action
resulting in a civil judgment being entered against him. Plaintiff does not allege an injury to a
direct appeal of his sentence, a habeas corpus petition, or a civil rights claim related to his
conditions of confinement. He, therefore, fails to state a constitutional violation under § 1983,
and his claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See Cooper v. Bender, No. 2:12-cv-03934-WMA-JHE, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45393, *7 (N.D.
Ala. Feb. 20, 2014) (finding that access-to-courts claim based on default judgment entered
against inmate in a divorce case failed “because Plaintiff alleges no facts demonstrating he
suffered an actual injury to qualifying litigation”), report and recommendation adopted by
Cooper v. Bender, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44500 (N.D. Ala., Mar. 31, 2014); Wilson v. Andison,
No. 2:06-cv-10794, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19951, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2006) (“Because
the materials were intended to help Plaintiff with commercial matters and not to challenge his
conviction or to assert a violation of constitutional rights, Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts
was not violated.”)
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order.
Date:
November 22, 2017
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4414.010
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