Ferguson v. Louisville Metro Department of Corrections

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 9/22/2017: Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with a straightforward Order of this Court 4 or take any action in response to the Court's Order, the Court concludes that he has abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff (pro se), Defendant (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
JAMES CALVIN RODGERS FERGUSON
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV-383-JHM

LOUISVILLE METRO DEP’T OF CORR.

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff filed a pro se civil-rights action alleging that he was wrongfully arrested and
robbed by the arresting officer (DN 1). Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee for this action, but
instead filed a non-prisoner application to proceed without prepayment of fees (application)
(DN 3). However, Plaintiff failed to properly complete the application. The application wholly
fails to contain sufficient financial information for the Court to make a determination as to
whether Plaintiff is entitled to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Therefore, on July
17, 2017, the Court entered an Order (DN 4) denying Plaintiff’s application to proceed without
prepayment of the fees and ordering Plaintiff within 30 days of entry of the Order to either
(1) pay the filing fee or (2) file a fully completed application to proceed without prepayment of
the filing fee. The Order warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Order would result in
dismissal of this action. Almost two months have passed since the entry of the Order, and
Plaintiff has not responded to the Order or taken any action in this case.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal
of an action if a Plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See Jourdan
v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the
district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). Although federal courts afford pro se
litigants some leniency on matters that require legal sophistication, such as formal pleading rules,

the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and other procedures readily
understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay or failure to pursue a
case. Id. at 110. “As this court has noted, the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se
litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily
understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than
a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d at 110). “Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that courts
have an inherent power to manage their own affairs and may dismiss a case sua sponte for lack
of prosecution.” Lyons-Bey v. Pennell, 93 F. App’x 732, 733 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with a straightforward Order of this Court
(DN 4) or take any action in response to the Court’s Order, the Court concludes that he has
abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the action by
separate Order.
Date:

September 22, 2017

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4414.003

2