Odom v. Bolton et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 8/17/2017. Plaintiff's official-capacity claim against Bolton and claim against "Internal Affairs" are DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate "Internal Affairs." cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants; Jefferson Co. Atty. (RLK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV-P398-CRS
GLENNTORENELL ODOM

PLAINTIFF

v.
MARK BOLTON et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Glenntorenell Odom filed the instant pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This matter is before the Court upon initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons stated below, the Court will
dismiss some claims and allow others to proceed for further development.
I.
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Louisville Metro Department of
Corrections (LMDC), sues the following Defendants: Mark Bolton,1 the Director of LMDC;
Officers Pinnick, Berry, Wiggins, Elmore, and Harmon; Classification Officer Troutman;
Classification Supervisor Flener; and “Internal Affairs” at LMDC. He sues all Defendants in
their individual capacities only, with the exception of Bolton, whom he sues in both his
individual and official capacity.
Plaintiff alleges that he reported to LMDC officers that another inmate had been attacked
by other inmates. He states that he placed conflicts against the attackers to avoid being housed
with them and that “ofc. Pinnick, Berry, Wiggins, Elmore, and Harman were present during this

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Plaintiff spells this Defendant’s name both “Bolten” and “Bolton” in the complaint. The Court takes judicial
notice that the Director of LMDC is Mark Bolton and will use the correct spelling of his name herein.

‘keep-away’ process.” However, according to the complaint, one of the attackers was later
placed in the same dorm with Plaintiff. He reports that he complained about the placement to
Bolton, Flener, and Troutman and requested to be moved but that his requests were ignored.
Plaintiff states that one day Harmon left Plaintiff and the attacker unattended in the gym despite
Plaintiff’s request to Harmon for the attacker not to be allowed to go to the gym with him.
Plaintiff states that the inmate then “sucker-punched plaintiff knocking him unconscious for
nearly fifteen (15) minutes.”
Plaintiff states that “Internal Affairs has recommended that Plaintiff be released from jail
(I.A. personally recommended such to Plaintiff’s prosecutor) or transferred to another facility but
the Classification defendants denied such transfer.” Plaintiff states that he still has headaches
and blurred vision. He maintains that he still receives threats and that “specific inmates continue
to throw feces and urine at him . . . because the attackers gang members are being reminded that
Plaintiff is the cause of the incident being brought to the officer’s attention.” He states that he
continues to tell Defendants “that he is being threatened/attacked and has to go to court around
the attackers family members and gang members but the defendants simply do not care.”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and transfer to another
facility.
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604.
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In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
III.
The Court construes the complaint as alleging 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of failure to
protect in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
Official-capacity claim against Bolton
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
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“[S]tate pretrial detainees are shielded from cruel and unusual punishments by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, which provides similar if not greater protections than the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause”
found in the Eighth Amendment applicable to convicted inmates. Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir.
2006) (footnote and citations omitted).
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Suing employees in their official capacities is the equivalent of suing their employer. Lambert v.
Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2008); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir.
1994); Smallwood v. Jefferson Cty. Gov’t, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). Therefore,
the Court construes Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Bolton as brought against his
employer, Louisville Metro Government. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality,
this Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a
constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will first address
the second issue, i.e., whether the municipality is responsible for the alleged constitutional
violation.
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is
a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889
(6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal
policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular
injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The policy or
custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the
liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that Bolton failed to protect him from injury.
However, he does not allege that any action or inaction of Bolton occurred as a result of a policy
or custom implemented or endorsed by Louisville Metro Government. The complaint alleges
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isolated occurrences affecting only Plaintiff. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th
Cir. 1999) (“No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event
for which the county is not responsible.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim
against Bolton will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Claim against Internal Affairs
Plaintiff also sues “Internal Affairs,” which the Court construes as the Internal Affairs
Department at LMDC. The only reference in the complaint to the Internal Affairs Department is
Plaintiff’s allegation that “Internal Affairs has recommended that Plaintiff be released from jail
(I.A. personally recommended such to Plaintiff’s prosecutor) or transferred to another facility but
the Classification defendants denied such transfer.” Because Plaintiff alleges that the Internal
Affairs Department recommended his release or transfer, it is unclear what claim Plaintiff is
seeking to bring against it.
In any event, this Defendant is subject to dismissal because a jail or prison department is
not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 196 F.
App’x 350 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a state prison’s medical department is not a “person”
under § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the Internal Affairs Department must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Claims against Defendants in their individual capacities
Upon review, the Court will allow Plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claims to proceed against
Bolton, Pinnick, Berry, Wiggins, Elmore, Harmon, Troutman, and Flener in their individual
capacities. In allowing the claims to continue, the Court makes no judgment on their ultimate
merit.

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IV.
For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Bolton and claim
against “Internal Affairs” are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate “Internal Affairs” as a party to this
action.
The Court will enter a separate Order Directing Service and Scheduling Order governing
the claims that have been permitted to proceed.
Date:

August 17, 2017

C al R Smpo I , ei J d e
h r s . i sn I Sno u g
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U i dSae Ds i C ut
nt tt ir t o r
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cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Jefferson County Attorney
4411.010

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