Wimsatt v. Charter Communications, LLC

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 1/25/2018; For the reasons stated, the court will GRANT the Defendants Partial Motion to Dismiss. The court will DISMISS Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint only to the extent that it states a claim for sexual orientation discrimination. An order will be entered in accordance with this opinion.cc:counsel (ARM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
BRYNN WIMSATT

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-cv-402-CRS

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on motion of Defendant, Charter Communications, LLC,
for partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). For the reasons stated, the partial motion to dismiss will be GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, Brynn Wimsatt (“Wimsatt”), was hired by the Defendant, Charter

Communications, LLC (“Charter”), in 2008. (DN 1, ¶ 9.) Wimsatt claims that throughout her
employment, she was paid less and denied promotions because of her status as an African
American homosexual female. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 13.) In July of 2017, Wimsatt filed a Complaint
against Charter alleging race, gender, and sexual orientation discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. (DN 1.) Charter now moves this court to dismiss Count I of the
Complaint, to the extent that it attempts to allege a claim of sexual orientation discrimination, for
failure to state a claim. (DN 9.)
II.

DISCUSSION
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the plaintiff’s] claim
which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.” Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 - 46 (1957)).
Even accepting the Plaintiff’s alleged facts as true, Wimsatt has failed to state an
actionable claim for sexual orientation discrimination. The Sixth Circuit unequivocally has held
that, “harassment or discrimination based upon a person’s sexual orientation cannot form the
basis of a cognizable claim.” Kasich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012).
Despite such binding precedent, the Plaintiff urges this court to “adopt the persuasive rulings in
Hively1 and other jurisdictions and find that Wimsatt’s claim of discrimination based on her
sexual orientation necessarily is a claim of sex discrimination.” (DN 14, 6.)
The Plaintiff’s argument to adopt the rulings of other circuits cannot succeed, as this
court is required to follow the binding precedent of the Sixth Circuit. See Kindred Hosps. Ltd.
P'ship v. McDonald, 2008 WL 4165271, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2008) (“While it is certainly
possible that courts in other circuits might reach different results in a similar situation, this Court
is bound by Sixth Circuit law.”). The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Kasich that sexual orientation
discrimination is not a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII is binding on this court.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s sexual orientation discrimination claim will be dismissed.

1

Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).

-2-

III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court will GRANT the Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss.

The court will DISMISS Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint only to the extent that it states a claim
for sexual orientation discrimination.
An order will be entered in accordance with this opinion.

January 25, 2018

C al R Smpo I , ei J d e
h r s . i sn I Sno u g
e
I
r
U i dSae Ds i C ut
nt tt ir t o r
e
s tc

-3-