Heckman v. Cabela's Wholesale, Inc.
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 12/21/17; granting 10 Motion to Remand to Jefferson Circuit Court. cc: Counsel, JCC(DJT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-00512-JHM
PAMELA HECKMAN
PLAINTIFF
V.
CABELA’S WHOLESALE, INC.
D/B/A CABELA’S
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion by Plaintiff, Pamela Heckman, to remand this
action to the Jefferson Circuit Court [DN 10]. This matter is ripe for decision.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the complaint, Plaintiff Heckman, a 60 year-old woman, was employed by
Cabela’s as a systems trainer. (Pl.’s Compl. [DN 1-2] ¶ 7.) Heckman brought the present action
against Cabela’s in Jefferson Circuit Court, asserting claims of age discrimination and
constructive discharge under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS Chapter 344 et seq. (id. ¶ 15–
27) and fraud (id. ¶ 28-31). Cabela’s removed the action to this Court, and Heckman has now
moved to remand the case to state court on the basis that the amount in controversy is less than
the $75,000 threshold required to meet this Court’s jurisdictional requirement for diversity cases.
In support of this argument, Heckman submitted an affidavit and binding stipulation that she
“will neither seek nor accept damages in excess of $75,000.00 for all compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees, exclusive of interest and costs.” [DN 10-1.]
II. DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Removal from state to federal court is proper for “any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Cabela’s removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, claiming that this Court has diversity
jurisdiction over the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Diversity jurisdiction gives “[t]he district
courts . . . original jurisdiction [over] all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of
different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (a)(1).
B. ANALYSIS
It is undisputed that the parties are diverse and that Heckman has stipulated that the
amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. Therefore, the principal issue is whether this
stipulation is sufficient for the Court to remand Heckman’s action to Jefferson Circuit Court.
Courts within the Sixth Circuit have “noted on several recent occasions that postremoval
stipulations reducing the amount in controversy below the jurisdictional threshold are generally
disfavored because” if plaintiffs “were able to defeat jurisdiction by way of a post-removal
stipulation, they could unfairly manipulate proceedings merely because their federal case begins
to look unfavorable.” Gatlin v. Shoe Show, Inc., 2014 WL 3586498, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 21,
2014) (citations and quotations omitted); see Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 872
(6th Cir. 2000); Agri-Power, Inc. v. Majestic JC, LLC, 2013 WL 3280244, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June
27, 2013); Proctor v. Swifty Oil Co., 2012 WL 4593409, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 1, 2012). The
Sixth Circuit has advised that “a post-removal stipulation reducing the amount in controversy to
below the jurisdictional limit does not require remand to state court.” Rogers, 230 F.3d at 872.
“However, where a state prevents a plaintiff from pleading a specific amount of damages,” as
Kentucky does, “and the plaintiff provides specific information about the amount in controversy
for the first time in a stipulation, this district views such stipulations as a clarification of the
2
amount in controversy rather than a reduction of such.” Agri-Power, 2013 WL 3280244, at *3
(citing Proctor, 2012 WL 4593409, at *3) (emphasis in original). Therefore, a plaintiff may
submit a stipulation that will destroy the amount in controversy requirement for the purposes of
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id.
When a plaintiff chooses to submit a stipulation as to the amount in controversy, the
stipulation must be unequivocal in order to “limit the amount of recoverable damages and
warrant remand. Proctor, 2012 WL 4593409, at *3 (citing Egan v. Premier Scales & Sys., 237
F. Supp. 2d 774, 778 (W.D. Ky. 2002)); Agri-Power, 2013 WL 3280244, at *3. This district
“has recognized that a plaintiff may stipulate that it neither seeks, nor will accept, damages in an
amount greater than $75,000, and that such a stipulation will” be sufficiently unequivocal to
destroy diversity jurisdiction. Agri-Power, 2013 WL 3280244, at *3 (emphasis added).1
Heckman’s stipulation in this case meets this standard. Heckman used language nearly
identical to that found in the aforementioned cases, as she states that she “will neither seek nor
accept damages in excess of $75,000.00 for all compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
attorney’s fees, exclusive of interest and costs.” [DN 10-1.] See Leavell v. Cabela’s Wholesale,
Inc., 2015 WL 9009009, at *2–*3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 15, 2015) (Court lacked jurisdiction when
plaintiff stipulated that she “will neither seek nor accept damages in excess of $75,000”).
Furthermore, Heckman, as did the plaintiff in Leavell, took great pains to notify the Court that
she believes that her stipulation is both unequivocal and binding, stating in relevant part: “I
further understand that this Affidavit and Binding Stipulation constitutes a waiver of any rights I
1
Defendant’s reliance on Blocker v. PPG Indus., Inc., 2017 WL 3431136, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2017), is
misplaced. In contrast to the present case, the plaintiff in Blocker alleged in her complaint that each of her claims
sought up to $75,000. Id. at *1. The district court in Blocker held that because plaintiff’s stipulation was not the first
statement of the amount in controversy, it could not be considered a clarification of the damages she sought rather
than a reduction as in the cases cited above. Id.
3
may have to seek and/or accept damages in excess of the amount stated in paragraph 2.” [DN
10-1.]
Because the stipulation effectively limits the amount in controversy to a sum below
$75,000 and is both unequivocal and binding, the Court finds Heckman’s stipulation to be valid
and enforceable. Therefore, this action will be remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that motion by Plaintiff,
Pamela Heckman, to remand this action to the Jefferson Circuit Court [DN 10] is GRANTED.
cc: counsel of record
Jefferson Circuit Court
December 21, 2017
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?