Crawford v. Walker et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 1/4/2018; For the foregoing reasons, this action will be dismissed by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants; Jefferson County Attorney (CDR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
JAMAL RASHAD CRAWFORD
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-P618-TBR

KATREESE WALKER et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Jamal Rashad Crawford, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis civil-rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on
other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the
complaint will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections
(LMDC). He sues LMDC Classification Supervisor Katreese Walker in her individual and
official capacities. He also sues LMDC Director Mark Bolton or his designee in his official
capacity.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Walker denied him copies of legal documents, violating
his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He asserts: “When Katreese Walker instructed
employees of the [LMDC] to deny me copies of foregoing legal pro se motions which were in
the form of a defense within state court, she denied me Due Process access to the courts which
was in direct violation of my 14th Amendment right.” He alleges that Defendant Walker has
caused him “to appear in an unprofessional manner before state court. I’m impacted daily by the

humiliation felt. My motions were said to be an exparte communication being that copies
weren’t sent to the proper parties involved.”
As relief, Plaintiff asks for monetary and punitive damages.
II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City
of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Although the complaint refers to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, “[t]o sustain a
claim under section 1983 based on denial of copying privileges, an inmate must show that the
denial prevented him from exercising his constitutional right of access to the courts.” Kendrick v.
Bland, 586 F. Supp. 1536, 1554 (W.D. Ky. 1984). “The First Amendment protects an inmate’s
right to access to the courts, but not necessarily his access to all the legal assistance or materials

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he may desire.” Tinch v. Huggins, No. 99-3436, 2000 WL 178418, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000)
(citing Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also Courtemanche v. Gregels,
79 F. App’x 115, 117 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he right of access does not include a per se right to
photocopies in whatever amount a prisoner requests.”).
In order to state a claim for interference with access to the courts, a plaintiff must show
an actual injury. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). “[A]n
inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library
or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That would be the precise
analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the inadequacy of the
prison infirmary.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). “‘[M]eaningful access to the
courts is the touchstone,’ and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that
the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue
a legal claim.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Examples of actual prejudice to pending or
contemplated litigation include having a case dismissed, being unable to file a complaint, and
missing a court-imposed deadline.” Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that “the underlying cause of action . . . is an
element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the
official acts frustrating the litigation.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The
Court held in Christopher that, “[l]ike any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause
of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give
fair notice to a defendant.” Id. at 416.
In the present case, Plaintiff fails to allege actual injury or prejudice to a qualifying
pending legal action or state how any legal action in which he is involved was hindered.

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Plaintiff’s allegation that he felt “humiliation” when his motions were said to be ex parte does
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that he was
denied copies fails to state a constitutional violation and will be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this action will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:

January 4, 2018

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Jefferson County Attorney
4413.009

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