Green v. Halbleib et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 4/27/2018; Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (DN 6 , 8 ) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint (DN 1 ) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendant's Motion to Supplement (DN 9 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (DN 18 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. cc: Michael John Green, pro se; Counsel; American Tax Funding, LLC (CDF) Modified distribution on 4/27/2018 (CDF).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-00619-GNS

MICHAEL JOHN GREEN

PLAINTIFF

v.
EDITH FRICK HALBLEIB, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (DN 6, 8), and
Defendant’s Motion to Supplement (DN 9). The motions are ripe for adjudication. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

American Tax Funding, LLC (“ATF”) filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court in 2008 to
foreclose a tax lien it held on Plaintiff Michael Green’s (“Plaintiff”) real property.

(Def.

Halbleib’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1, DN 8-2 [hereinafter State Court Docket]).1 Plaintiff
attempted to delay the sale of his property by filing five bankruptcy petitions and initiating
multiple federal lawsuits against various individuals—including Defendants in this action, James
Ballinger (“Ballinger”), an attorney representing ATF, and Edith Halbleib (“Halbleib”), the
Jefferson County Master Commissioner (collectively “Defendants”)—but his property was
ultimately sold at a master commissioner sale. See, e.g., In re Green, No. 16-33165-THF
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Jan 6, 2017); Green v. Edwards, No. 3:12-cv-358-S (W.D. Ky. Aug. 3, 2012).
One of the lawsuits Plaintiff filed against Ballinger is currently pending before another judge in

1

The Court may rely on public records in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint. See Bassett
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
1

the Western District of Kentucky. See Complaint at 1, Green v. Bornstein, No. 3:17-cv-00201DJH-DW (W.D. Ky. Apr. 4, 2017) (DN 1).
Once his property was sold, Plaintiff brought the instant pro se action. Though not
entirely clear, the Complaint appears to challenge the state court’s judgment regarding the sale of
his property and to allege that Defendants’ conduct throughout the foreclosure proceedings
violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. (See Compl. 1-4,
DN 1). For instance, he claims that the purpose of his suit “to show [that Defendants used]
illegal tactics to achieve a false judgment . . . .” (Compl. 1). He further alleges that Halbleib
took various illegal actions such as using information concerning “child arearment [sic]
payments with involvement with children [sic]” during the proceedings and making him wait
“fifteen minutes” before beginning a scheduled meeting. (Compl. 1-4).
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. (Def. Halbleib’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss
4-6, DN 8-1 [hereinafter Def. Halbleib’s Mot. Dismiss]; Def. Ballinger’s Mot. Dismiss 1-4, DN
6). Further, by separate motion, Ballinger asked the Court to sanction Plaintiff for continually
filing frivolous lawsuits against him by dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.

(Def.

Ballinger’s Mot. Dismiss 9-10). Defendants’ motions are ripe for adjudication.
II.

JURISDICTION

This action arises under the laws of the United States, and this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
III.
A.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that: (1) pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it; and (2) it fails to state a

2

claim on which relief can be granted. (Def. Halbleib’s Mot. Dismiss 4-6; Def. Ballinger’s Mot.
Dismiss 1-4). The Court will address each argument in turn.
1.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants argue that, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the Complaint. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district
courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions and orders. See Rooker v.
Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In
assessing the doctrine’s applicability, courts determine whether the federal claim is inextricably
intertwined with the state court judgment—i.e., whether “the federal claim succeeds only to the
extent that the state court wrongfully decided the issues before it.” Hutcherson v. Lauderdale
Cty., 326 F.3d 747, 756 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Here, the Complaint appears—at least at times—to challenge the state court judgment.2
For example, it states that the purpose of this action is “to correct the false judgment against
Plaintiff . . . .” (Compl. 1). In addition, the Complaint appears to take issue with certain of the
Master Commissioner’s decisions throughout the foreclosure proceedings, including the
determination whether the statute of limitations precluded the sale. (See Compl. 2 (alleging that
Halbleib committed error when she ignored “proof of legal statutes of limitations [sic]”)). As a
result, to the extent Plaintiff is challenging state court decisions and orders related to his
foreclosure proceedings rather than Defendants’ alleged misconduct throughout said
proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. See Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that Rooker-Feldman does

2

Plaintiff’s vague allegations make it difficult to tell exactly what he is challenging.
3

not deprive courts of jurisdiction to hear claims related to state court proceedings when the
source of the alleged injury arises from some conduct independent of the judgment itself).
2.

Failure to State a Claim

Defendants also argue that the Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must
contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Traverse Bay Area
Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). When assessing a claim’s plausibility, the Court must
assume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party, but need not assume the truth of legal conclusions. Total Benefits
Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). A claim is plausible when the complaint “contain[s] direct or inferential
allegations respecting all” of the claim’s elements; on the other hand, a claim is implausible
when the complaint simply recites the claim’s elements. See 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship v.
Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2013); Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill.
Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007).
The Court agrees that the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for a violation of
Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights. To establish a violation of substantive due process, a
plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant deprived him of a “protected liberty or
property interest” in a manner that “contravene[s] the notions of due process.” Wojcik v. City of
Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In his Complaint, however,
Plaintiff has only asserts vague complaints about specific instances of Defendants’ conduct, none
of which appear to have deprived him of a liberty or property interest. For instance, although the

4

Complaint charges Halbleib with allegedly using information related to his “child arearment [sic]
payments” in the course of the foreclosure proceedings, he fails to indicate how the use of such
information deprived him of due process. (Compl. 2). Similarly, while Plaintiff alleges that
Halbleib “avoid[ed] federal civil suits delivered to her in person,” he does not identify what suits
she avoided, how she avoided them, or a resulting injury. (Compl. 2). With respect to claims
against Ballinger, the Complaint appears to only allege that “Ballinger (Defendant) has lied in
court . . . .” (Compl. 3). None these allegations—nor any of the others contained in the
Complaint—state a claim on which relief can be granted.
B.

Ballinger’s Motion for Sanctions

In his motion, Ballinger asks the Court to sanction Plaintiff by dismissing the Complaint
with prejudice. To support his position, Ballinger notes that Plaintiff has filed a number of
frivolous lawsuits against him based on the foreclosure proceedings—including one that is
currently pending in this district—and that Ballinger “should not be required to expend his time
and resources [defending] frivolous case after frivolous case.” (Def. Ballinger’s Mot. Dismiss
9).
The Sixth Circuit has held that “a district court may use its inherent power to dismiss
with prejudice (as a sanction for misconduct) even a case over which it lacks jurisdiction . . . .”
Mitan v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 23 F. App’x 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Caribbean Broad.
Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Such a remedy is
appropriate to prevent abuse of the legal process and to “protect the orderly administration of
justice and to maintain the authority and dignity of the court . . . .” Id.
The Court will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff has now filed three
separate lawsuits related to his foreclosure proceedings in—and attempted to remove one state-

5

court suit to—federal court.

Except for the one currently pending, each action has been

dismissed on the ground that it raised implausible and frivolous claims. See Green v. Bornstein,
No. 3:17-CV-201-DJH-DW, 2017 WL 4875280 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 26, 2017); Green v. Bornstein,
No. 3:17-cv-00201-DJH (W.D. Ky. filed Apr. 4, 2017); Am. Tax Funding, LLC v. Green, No.
3:16-CV-00013-TBR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33771, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 16, 2016)
(remanding suit brought by ATF against Plaintiff in state court); Green v. Ballinger, No. 3:15CV-178-JGH, 2015 WL 1401404, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 2015) (dismissing claims against
Ballinger related to the foreclosure proceedings for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
Plaintiff’s conduct is interfering with the administration of justice, and dismissal of the
Complaint with prejudice is therefore warranted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (DN 6, 8) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s

Complaint (DN 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.

Defendant’s Motion to Supplement (DN 9) is GRANTED.

3.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (DN 18) is DENIED AS MOOT.

Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
April 27, 2018

cc:

counsel of record
Michael John Green, pro se

6