Morris v. Coyettee et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Judge David J. Hale on 2/26/2018; For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this action. The Court will enter a separate Order of dismissal consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.cc:Pro-Se Pla., Dfts. (ARM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CLIFFORD D. MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-P21-DJH

DANIEL COYETTEE, et al.,

Defendants.
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a pro se civil rights action brought by a prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff Clifford D. Morris leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This
matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth
below, the action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff brings this action against four employees of the Louisville, Kentucky Public
Defender’s Office in their official capacities – Daniel Coyettee, Director1; L. Smith, Assistant
Director; A. Ray, “Forming/Attorney;” and Kalson Chan, “Public Defender.”
In his complaint, Plaintiff writes as follows:
I made complaints to District Court Judge . . . on several appearances. She said
Kalson C. would represent me correctly. (A) I explain that I need following filed
Aug 2016: compency test, fast speedy trial, waive all hearing move courts pick
jury to resolve case’s. (B) I ask over over to receive copies Grievances request
and Prea Interview all medical records plus all times been to ER over past year.
(C) April 2017 I made lots of requests for p/c motion be filed and often
throughout incarceration since November 22, 2016. (D) On my circuit and
district case’s Kalson refused uphold my 4 Amendment and 8 Amendment C/R
for legal work and be housed out of harm’s way. Staff have broken my bones 6
times since 11-23-16 and keep my property away since May 2017. And lots often
abuse disrespectful Co’s torcher my bones and soul. Violated my 4 and 8th
Amendment (complaint Bar Ass.).
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It appears to the Court that Plaintiff has misspelled the name of this Defendant. The actual name of the Executive
Director of the Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defender Corporation is Daniel T. Goyette.

I made complaints L. Smith . . . of poor service and my rights violated by Kalson
Chan. Smith upheld violation over and over. This violates my rights to move
courts for compency test, fast speedy trial, waive all hearing move pick jury,
complaint Bar.
Daniel C. Director aviated to talk with me me. I always request each time talked
to Smith, Ray, Chan to inform him of my case’s and of abuse that torcher’s my
soul. This violates my 8th and 4th Amendment C/R. (complaints Bar Ass. Twice).
Angela R. Forming of Kalson Chan I let her know that he did not do anything ask
of him. Compencey test, fast speedy, move to pre K jury resolve both cases. A)
Informed Ray that that 1-26-17 Judge disappeared as I explained abuse and of
poor services of Chan on case’s. I told of eating dinner CO’s assaults me picking
me up by throat slamming serious injurys from teeth to back hip ribs mouth etc.
B) being suicide watch March 2nd get stomped broken bones over request copy
stated need p/c. I talk to her several times from 2-19 till 3-2 about for safety while
housed suicide watch OPT2. (C) I stated that I should been sent KCPC for
compency test like I asked of Chan to file motion Aug 2016 over and over. I
stated that I need new attorney to her and following motion . . . Violates 4th and
8th Amendment.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and “to preserve complaints
to Judges and KCPC, A/C/L/U, Inter/Affairs.”
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, while liberal, this
standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Columbia
Nat. Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court’s duty “does not require
[it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979),
or to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th
Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
“Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for
deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d
340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

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committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502,
504 (6th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Chan fails because it is firmly established that a
public defender does not act under color of state law for purposes of §1983 “while performing a
lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 F. App’x 163, 165 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a
state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.”) This is true even when a
criminal defense attorney’s defective performance results in the unconstitutional deprivation of
an accused criminal defendant’s liberty. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 329, n.6
(1983); see also, e.g., Floyd v. Cty. of Kent, 454 F. App’x 493, 497 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding
public defender not liable for ineffective assistance of counsel under § 1983); Bomer v.
Mueckenheim, 75 F. App’x 998, 999 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding criminal defendant’s appellate
attorney was not liable for ineffective assistance of counsel under § 1983).
Plaintiff’s claims against the other Defendants fail because Plaintiff’s complaint suggests
that he seeks to hold them liable as the supervisors of Defendant Chan. However, the doctrine
of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to
impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);
Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d416, 421
(6th Cir. 1984).

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this action. The Court will enter a
separate Order of dismissal consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Date:

February 26, 2018

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4415.011

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