Buford v. Bolton

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge David J. Hale on 6/28/2018 - Plaintiff's claims alleging denial of due process and cruel and unusual punishment are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will enter a separate Order Directing Service and Scheduling Order governing the claims that have been permitted to proceed. cc: Plaintiff pro se, Jefferson County Attorney, Defendant (DAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
RANDALL PAUL BUFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-P25-DJH

MARK BOLTON,

Defendant.
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Randall Paul Buford filed the instant pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss some of Plaintiff’s claims and allow some of
his claims to proceed.
I.
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC). He
sues LMDC Director Mark Bolton in his individual and official capacities.
In his first claim, Plaintiff states that his “right to freedom of religion was violated by not
allowing me to practice the dietary guidelines set forth in Judeism.” He maintains that this began
when he arrived at LMDC and continues to the present. He reports that he converted to Judaism
in 2011 and that Judaism calls for a kosher diet. Plaintiff states, “LMDC offers a Kosher diet,
and per the handbook states ‘Special diets will be provided for inmates whose religous beliefs
require the adherence to religous dietary law when approved by the LMDC Chaplain. The
Chaplain will verify and confirm the religous diet needs.’” Plaintiff asserts that upon arrival at
LMDC he listed his religion as Judaism and that it is “noted in my medical records w/ a copy

sent to the Chaplain.” He states, “The defendant violated my rights by not ensuring that his staff
allowed me the freedom to practice my religion as my religion calls for.”
In his second claim, Plaintiff also asserts that his “right to redress of grievances and due
process have been violated by my attempts to correct the injustices going on through the inmate
grievance procedure.” Plaintiff states that he has written three unanswered formal grievances
and “an abundance” of informal grievances. He states, “The defendant violated my rights by not
enforcing and overseeing his staff were doing their job properly.”
Further, in his third claim, Plaintiff maintains that his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment has been violated “by the many meals I’ve had to go without because I was
refused the opportunity to eat b/c what I was being given was not adequate or within the
guidelines set forth by the dietician.” He continues, “Because of the fight being put up by
LMDC regarding my Kosher [diet] I was placed on a vegetarian diet by medical as it is the
closest to Kosher possible.” Plaintiff reports that he has been told “to eat it or do without.” He
states, “There was times everything was mixed together like slop. Proteins taken off the tray
with no replacement.” Plaintiff concludes, “The defendant violated my rights by not ensuring his
staff handle this and fix this. The defendant’s actions has led to me being inhumanely treated
and all of these are interrelated.”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief.
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
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immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a
claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).

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To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a
pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.
A. Denial of religious freedom
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bolton has violated his right to freedom of religion by
denying him kosher meals. Construing the complaint liberally, as the Court is required to do at
this stage, the Court will allow Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment and Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claims to proceed against Defendant in
his individual and official capacities. In so doing, the Court passes no judgment on their merit or
ultimate outcome.
B. Denial of due process
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant violated his right to due process by denying his
“attempts to correct the injustices going on through the inmate grievance procedures.” However,
there is “no constitutionally protected due process interest in unfettered access to a prison
grievance procedure.” Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005).
By the same token, a plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against a prison official based solely on
his or her denial of the plaintiff’s grievance. “The ‘denial of administrative grievances or the
failure to act’ by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under § 1983.” Grinter
v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th
Cir. 1999)). “The mere denial of a prisoner’s grievance states no claim of constitutional
dimension.” Alder v. Corr. Med. Servs., 73 F. App’x 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff’s
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claim is against the subjects of his or her grievances, not those who merely decided whether to
grant or deny the grievances. See Skinner v. Govorchin, 463 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“Skinner’s complaint regarding Wolfenbarger’s denial of Skinner’s grievance appeal, it is clear,
fails to state a claim.”); Lee v. Mich. Parole Bd., 104 F. App’x 490, 493 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Section
1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a defendant denied an administrative
grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance.”); Nwaebo v. HawkSawyer, 83 F. App’x 85, 86 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Simpson v. Overton, 79 F. App’x 117, 120
(6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he denial of an appeal cannot in itself constitute sufficient personal
involvement to state a claim for a constitutional violation.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant based on the denial of his grievances will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. Cruel and unusual punishment
Plaintiff further claims that the denial of a kosher diet violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.1 The Eighth Amendment prohibits, among other things, “deprivations of
essential food, medical care, or sanitation.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981). The
law is clear that state officials are required to provide prisoners “adequate food.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). More specifically, the Eighth Amendment requires that
inmates be provided well-balanced, nutritious meals sufficient to preserve health. Green v.
Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1986). In general, complaints about the preparation or

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Plaintiff does not indicate in the complaint form whether he is a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate.
“[S]tate pretrial detainees are shielded from cruel and unusual punishments by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause,” while convicted inmates are protected by the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2006) (footnote and citations omitted). For the purposes
of initial review, however, this is largely a distinction without a difference because the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides pretrial detainees with rights analogous to those under the Eighth Amendment, and
the same analysis applies to both. See Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001).
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quality of prison food are “far removed from Eighth Amendment concerns.” Cunningham v.
Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1977). Moreover, “[i]f the prisoner’s diet . . . is sufficient
to sustain the prisoner in good health, no constitutional right has been violated.” Alexander v.
Carrick, 31 F. App’x 176, 179 (6th Cir. 2002).
In a similar case from a sister district, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the
Eighth Amendment by serving him regular meals instead of kosher meals for several weeks.
Mobley v. Smith, No. 4:05-cv-153, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40229, at *3-4 (W.D. Mich. June 4,
2007). The court concluded that such allegations failed to establish an Eighth Amendment
claim because the plaintiff was not denied food. The Court found as follows:
[P]laintiff’s complaint does not allege that he was denied food, or . . . even that he
was denied wholesome or nutritionally adequate food. Instead, plaintiff alleges
that he ate only fruits and vegetables solely because of his religious preference for
a kosher diet. Although such an allegation might state a claim for violation of the
First Amendment’s free exercise clause, an allegation that a prisoner has elected
not to consume the “whole meals” provided by the prison - solely and because of
his religious preference - does not state a claim for violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
Id. at *16-17.
Here, while Plaintiff complains of missed meals, meals where “everything was mixed
together like slop[,]” and meals lacking protein, he does not assert that he was denied adequate
nutrition to maintain his health or that he has lost weight or suffered any other adverse physical
effects. “Absent contentions such as these, there is nothing factual from which the Court can
reasonably infer that the food plaintiff is being served falls below the constitutional nutritional
floor . . . [and therefore] fail to state a § 1983 claim.” Montague v. Schofield, No. 2:14-cv-292,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53208, at *33-34 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2015); see also Turner v. Welkal,
No. 3:12-cv-0915, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12659, *27-28 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 2014) (“The
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court concludes that the plaintiff’s factual allegations concerning missed meals and being served
food that did not comport with his religious convictions, construed as true, fail to establish a
violation of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.”). The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations
concern complaints about the quality of the food served to him. The allegations are not
sufficient to establish that the food was nutritionally inadequate so as to rise to a violation of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Accordingly, the claim will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IV.
For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims alleging denial of due process and cruel and
unusual punishment are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court will enter a separate Order Directing Service and Scheduling Order governing
the claims that have been permitted to proceed.
Date:

June 28, 2018

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
Jefferson County Attorney
4415.010

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