Skaggs v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl on 9/21/2018: The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is GRANTED for the Commissioner cc: counsel (JM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-00037-HBB
BRENDA SKAGGS

PLAINTIFF

VS.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Brenda Skaggs (APlaintiff@) seeking judicial
review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff has
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (DN 16) and, in response, Defendant has filed a Fact
and Law Summary (DN 22).

For the reasons that follow, judgment is granted for the

Commissioner.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties have consented to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case,
including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of judgment, with direct review by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 13). By Order entered April 16,
2018 (DN 14), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless a written
request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was filed.

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FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Security Income on June 2, 2014 (Tr. 16, 318-25, 326-31). Plaintiff alleged that she became
disabled on February 5, 2014 as a result of herniated disc disease in the back and
joint/deteriorating bone disease in the upper body and neck (Tr. 16, 385). Administrative Law
Judge Teresa A. Kroenecke (AALJ@) conducted a video hearing from Louisville, Kentucky on May
23, 2017 (Tr. 16, ). Plaintiff and her non-attorney representative, John R. Sharpensteen, III,
participated from Elizabethtown, Kentucky (Id.). William R. Harpool, an impartial vocational
expert, also participated and testified during the hearing (Id.).
In a decision dated July 14, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirement of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2018 (Tr. 19). The ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff’s adult disability claim pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation process
promulgated by the Commissioner (Tr. 16-32). At the first step, the ALJ found that although
Plaintiff attempted to work from April 2016 to about September 2016 at the LG&E Power Plant,
this work activity was an unsuccessful work attempt (Id.). Therefore, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 5, 2014, the alleged onset date (Id.).
At the second step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
lumbar degenerative disc disease, cervical degenerative disc disease, and non-dominant left
shoulder degenerative joint disease (Tr. 19). The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff=s previously
diagnosed adjustment disorder is a non-severe mental impairment because it causes no more than
minimal limitations in her ability to perform basic work activities (Tr. 19-20). At the third step,

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the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Tr. 20-21).
At the fourth step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following residual functional capacity
(“RFC”):
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that since
February 5, 2014, the claimant has the residual functional capacity
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except her pushing/pulling with her non-dominant left
upper extremity is limited to occasionally and only occasional
overhead reaching with her left upper extremity. The claimant is
limited to no more than occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, crawling, and climbing of ramps and stairs but no
climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She is limited to no
exposure to vibration or to hazards, such as unprotected heights
and/or moving mechanical parts. The claimant is allowed to
alternate into the sitting position from the standing position and/or
from walking every 30-45 minutes for 2-3 minutes while at her
workstation. Further, the claimant is allowed to alternate into the
standing position from the sitting position every 30-45 minutes for
2-3 minutes while at her workstation.
(Tr. 21). Relying on testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable
to perform any of her past relevant work (Tr. 28).
The ALJ proceeded to the fifth step where he classified Plaintiff as closely approaching
advanced age (age 50-54) prior to the May 23, 2017 administrative hearing (Tr. 29). The ALJ
classified Plaintiff as advanced age (age 55 or older) beginning May 23, 2017, because she turned
age 55 on June 11, 2017 (Id.). The ALJ found Plaintiff has a limited education and is able to
communicate in English (Id.). The ALJ indicated that transferability of job skills was not an issue
in this case because Plaintiff’s past relevant work was unskilled (Tr. 30). The ALJ concluded that
prior to May 23, 2017, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that Plaintiff could have performed given her age, education, work experience, and RFC (Tr.
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30-31).

The ALJ also found Plaintiff was disabled beginning May 23, 2017 pursuant to

Medical-Vocational Rule 202.01 (Tr. 31). Thus, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not
disabled prior to May 23, 2017, but became disabled on that date and has remained disabled
through the date of the decision, July 14, 2017 (Tr. 31-32).
Plaintiff timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ=s decision (Tr.
316-17). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff=s request for review (Tr. 1-4).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard of Review
Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final
decision of the Commissioner are supported by Asubstantial evidence,@ 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton
v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d
680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Landsaw v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). ASubstantial evidence exists when
a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion,
even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.@ Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting
Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a
case for substantial evidence, the Court Amay not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in
evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.@ Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964
F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).
As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff=s request for review of the
ALJ=s decision (Tr. 1-4). At that point, the ALJ=s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (finality of
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the Commissioner’s decision). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the decision of the ALJ, not the
Appeals Council, and the evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ rendered
the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d
146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-696 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Commissioner’s Sequential Evaluation Process
The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (Title II
Disability Insurance Benefits), 1381 et seq. (Title XVI Supplemental Security Income). The term
Adisability@ is defined as an
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12)
months.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (Title II), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Title XVI); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a),
416.905(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923
(6th Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential
evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See AEvaluation of disability in general,@ 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:
1)

Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?

2)

Does the claimant have a medically determinable
impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the
duration requirement and significantly limits his or her
ability to do basic work activities?

3)

Does the claimant have an impairment that meets or
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medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment within
Appendix 1?
4)

Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to
return to his or her past relevant work?

5)

Does the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,
education, and past work experience allow him or her to
perform a significant number of jobs in the national
economy?

Here, at the fifth step, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled prior to May 23, 2017. However,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff became disabled on May 23, 2017 and has continued to be disabled
through the date of the decision.
Challenged Findings
Plaintiff disagrees with Finding No. 5 which sets forth the ALJ’s RFC assessment (DN
16-1 PageID # 630, 638-42). Plaintiff also disagrees with Finding No. 10 which sets forth the
ALJ’s conclusion that prior to May 23, 2017, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in
the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed considering her age, education, prior
work experience, and RFC (Id. PageID # 630, 642-44).
A.
1.

The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff points out that Social Security Ruling 96-8p (“SSR 96-8p”) required the ALJ to
individually assess her maximum capacity to perform each exertional (lifting, carrying, standing,
walking, sitting, pushing, and pulling), and non-exertional (manipulative, postural, visual,
communicative, and mental functions) work-related activity when assessing her RFC (DN 16-1
PageID # 638-642). Plaintiff acknowledges that the RFC indicates she can perform light work
with limitations including alternating “into the sitting position from the standing position and/or
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from walking every 30-45 minutes for 2-3 minutes while at her workstation” and alternating “into
the standing position from the sitting position every 30-45 minutes for 2-3 minutes while at her
workstation” (Id. citing Tr. 21). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not comply with SSR 96-8p
because the RFC fails to indicate the maximum number of hours that Plaintiff can sit and
stand/walk in an eight-hour workday (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that there is insufficient evidence in
the record to conclude she was capable of standing or walking for a total of six hours in an
eight-hour workday, as required to perform light work (Id. citing SSR 83-10). Plaintiff believes
there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that she is limited to no more than
about two hours walking and standing in an eight-hour workday which is consistent with sedentary
work (Id. citing SSR 83-10). Plaintiff argues that if she is limited to sedentary work then
Medical-Vocational Guideline 201.09 requires a finding of disabled as of her alleged onset date
because she was closely approaching advanced age, had a limited education, and had unskilled
work experience (Id.).
Defendant points out that the ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a range of light
work with several restrictions, including being allowed to alternate into the sitting position from
the standing position and/or from walking every 30 to 45 minutes for 2 to 3 minutes while at her
workstation; and being allowed to alternate into the standing position from the sitting position
every 30 to 45 minutes for 2 to 3 minutes while at her workstation (DN 22 PageID # 657-58).
Defendant asserts that the ALJ considered all of the evidence in the record and accounted for all of
Plaintiff’s credibly-established limitations in the RFC assessment which is supported by
substantial evidence in the record (Id. PageID # 657-60). Further, Defenant argues that even if
the Court disagrees with the ALJ’s resolution of the factual issues and would resolve the disputed
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factual issues differently, her decision must be affirmed because she supported the decision with
substantial evidence (Id.).
2.

Discussion

The residual functional capacity finding is the Administrative Law Judge=s ultimate
determination of what a claimant can do despite his or her physical and mental limitations. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1546, 416.945(a), 416.946. The Administrative Law Judge makes
this finding based on a consideration of medical source statements and all other evidence in the
case record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 404.1545(a), 404.1546, 416.929, 416.945(a), 416.946;
Social Security Ruling 96-5p; Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Thus, in making the residual
functional capacity finding the Administrative Law Judge must necessarily assign weight to the
medical source statements in the record and assess the credibility of the claimant’s subjective
allegations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 404.1529; Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
The Sixth Circuit has observed that “SSR 96–8p requires an ALJ to individually assess the
exertional (lifting, carrying, standing, walking, sitting, pushing, and pulling), and non-exertional
(manipulative, postural, visual, communicative, and mental functions) capacities of the claimant in
determining a claimant's RFC.” Delgado v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 30 F. App’x 542, 547 (6th Cir.
2002) (citations omitted). Further, SSR 96-8p explains that the ALJ should “describe how the
evidence supports her conclusions. Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 729 (6th
Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The Glossary to SSR 83-10 provides the following pertinent
definition:
2. Light work. The regulations define light work as lifting no more
than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted in a
particular light job may be very little, a job is in this category when
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it requires a good deal of walking or standing--the primary
difference between sedentary and most light jobs. A job is also in
this category when it involves sitting most of the time but with some
pushing and pulling of arm-hand or leg-foot controls, which require
greater exertion than in sedentary work; e.g., mattress sewing
machine operator, motor-grader operator, and road-roller operator
(skilled and semiskilled jobs in these particular instances).
Relatively few unskilled light jobs are performed in a seated
position.
“Frequent” means occurring from one-third to two-thirds of the
time. Since frequent lifting or carrying requires being on one's feet
up to two-thirds of a workday, the full range of light work
requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of
approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Sitting may
occur intermittently during the remaining time. The lifting
requirement for the majority of light jobs can be accomplished with
occasional, rather than frequent, stooping. Many unskilled light
jobs are performed primarily in one location, with the ability to
stand being more critical than the ability to walk. They require use
of arms and hands to grasp and to hold and turn objects, and they
generally do not require use of the fingers for fine activities to the
extent required in much sedentary work.
1983 WL 31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983) (emphasis added).
The ALJ’s RFC assessment indicates that Plaintiff has the ability to perform a range of
light work with several restrictions (Tr. 21). Notably, the RFC assessment does not include a
restriction on the total number of hours that Plaintiff can stand and walk but it does articulate a
restriction that allows her to alternate between the sitting and standing possitions (Tr. 21). The
ALJ explained that she added this sit/stand option in consideration of Plaintiff’s testimony of
needing to change positions between sitting and standing due to increased neck, back, and left
upper extremity pain if she stays in one position for too long (Tr. 27). Thus, the ALJ found
Plaintiff is able to stand and walk, off and on, for a total of approximately six hours of an
eight-hour workday provided she “is allowed to alternate into the sitting position from the standing
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position and/or from walking every 30-45 minutes for 2-3 minutes while at her workstation” and
she “is allowed to alternate into the standing position from the sitting position every 30-45 minutes
for 2-3 minutes while at her workstation” (Tr. 21). Clearly, the ALJ individually assessed
Plaintiff’s exertional capacities to stand, walk, and sit as required by SSR 96-8p. Moreover, the
ALJ described how the evidence supports her conclusions with regard to these exertional
capacities (Tr. 21-28). Thus, the ALJ’s RFC assessment comports with applicable law.
Plaintiff has pointed out some evidence in the record that supports a finding that she is
limited to standing and walking no more than two hours in an eight-hour day. However, the
question before the Court is whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in
the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Smith v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 108
(6th Cir. 1989) (citing Mullen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. 800 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1986).
If the answer to the above question is Ayes,@ then the Court may not even inquire whether the
record could support a decision the other way. Smith, 893 F.2d at 108 (citing Crisp v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 790 F.2d 450, 453 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1986)). After reviewing the record, the
Court concludes that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief with regard to her challenge to Finding No. 5.
B.
Next, Plaintiff challenges Finding No. 10 which sets forth the ALJ’s conclusion that prior
to May 23, 2017, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff could have performed considering her age, education, prior work experience, and RFC
(DN 16-1 PageID # 630, 642-44 citing Finding No. 10). Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s conclusion is
not supported by substantial evidence because certain limitations in the assessed RFC are
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incompatible with descriptions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles about the three
representative jobs identified in Finding No. 10 (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff is referring to the
following restrictions in the RFC: occasionally pushing/pulling with her non-dominant left upper
extremity, occasional overhead reaching with her left upper extremity, and no exposure to
vibration (Id. citing Tr. 21). The three representative occupations in Finding No. 10 are inspector
(DOT No. 727.687-54), assembler (DOT No. 706.684-042), and office helper (DOT No.
239.567-010) (Id. citing Tr. 30). Plaintiff asserts that the DOT descriptions indicate all three jobs
require frequent reaching and handling as well as manual dexterity, and as such could not be
performed by her (Id.).
Defendant responds by pointing out that the ALJ asked the vocational expert (“VE”) a
series of hypothetical questions, one of which included the sit/stand option, occasional
pushing/pulling with her non-dominant left upper extremity, occasional overhead reaching with
her left upper extremity, and no exposure to vibration (DN 22 PageID # 660-63 citing Tr. 30,
69-71). Defendant points out that the VE responded by identifying the representative occupations
of inspecting (170,000 jobs in the national economy), assembler (175,000 jobs in the national
economy), and office worker/helper (160,000 jobs in the national economy) (Id. citing Tr. 69-71).
Further, the VE explained that these numbers reflected the reduction resulting from inclusion of
the sit/stand option (Id. citing Tr. 71). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s challenge overlooks the
the ALJ’s explanation why she accepted the VE’s testimony about these three occupations (Id.
citing Tr. 30-31). Defendant points out that the ALJ’s actions comport with applicable law and
the VE’s testimony provides substantial evidence to support Finding No. 10 (Id.).

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2.

Discussion

At the fifth step, the Commissioner has the burden of demonstrating a significant number
of jobs exist in the local, regional and national economies that the claimant can perform, given
his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g), 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g); Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
974 F.2d 680, 684 (6th Cir. 1992); Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990); Allen
v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1980).

When a claimant=s age, education, previous

work experience, and residual functional capacity coincide with all of the criteria of a particular
Grid Rule in Appendix 2 of the regulations, referred to as the medical-vocational guidelines, the
Commissioner may rely on that Grid Rule to meet this burden.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569,

416.969; Grid Rule 200.00; Born v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th
Cir. 1990); Moon, 923 F.2d at 1181.

However, if a claimant=s age, education, previous work

experience, and residual functional capacity do not coincide with all the criteria of a particular
Grid Rule, the Commissioner is limited to using the Grid Rule as a framework in the decision
making process and must make a non-guideline determination based on the testimony of a
vocational expert. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(e), 416.966(e); Born, 923 F.2d at 1174; Varley v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987); Kirk v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983).
In Barker v. Shalala, the Sixth Circuit noted an ALJ may take administrative notice of job
data in the DOT and four other sources referred to in the Social Security regulations. 40 F.3d 789,
795 (6th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d), 416.966(d). The Barker court observed that the
DOT contains a disclaimer indicating “that it provides only ‘composite descriptions of
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occupations as they may typically occur’” and that the descriptions in the DOT “‘may not coincide
with a specific job as actually performed in a particular establishment or any given industry.’” Id.
at 795. The Sixth Circuit recognized that the DOT is not a comprehensive listing of all jobs but,
rather, is a “selective sampling of 75,000 job sites out of many millions of work places in the
United States.”

Id.

Further, the Barker Court observed that the regulations specifically

contemplate use of a vocational expert to determine “complex issues concerning the
characteristics of specific occupations.” Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(e), 416.966(e). In Conn v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., the Sixth Circuit held that an ALJ may rely on testimony from a
vocational expert “even if it is inconsistent with the job descriptions” set forth in the DOT. 51
F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 1995).
Social Security Ruling 00-4p imposes on the ALJ an affirmative duty to ask the vocational
expert whether there is a conflict between the vocational expert=s testimony and information in the
DOT. 2000 WL 1898704, at *4 (Dec. 4, 2000). If there appears to be a conflict, the ALJ will
elicit from the vocational expert an explanation for the conflict. Id. The ALJ will resolve the
conflict by deciding whether the explanation given by the vocational expert is reasonable and
provides a basis for relying on the vocational expert=s testimony rather than the DOT information.
Id.
During the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the VE a series of hypothetical questions,
the second of which included the sit/stand option, occasional pushing/pulling with her
non-dominant left upper extremity, occasional overhead reaching with her left upper extremity,
and no exposure to vibration (Tr. 69-71). The VE responded to the second hypothetical question
by identifying the representative occupations of inspecting (170,000 jobs in the national
13

economy), assembler (175,000 jobs in the national economy), and office worker/helper (160,000
jobs in the national economy) (Tr. 71). The VE explained that these numbers reflected the
reduction resulting from inclusion of the sit/stand option (Id.). In the context of complying with
SSR 00-4p, the ALJ asked whether the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT (Tr. 72).
The VE provided an explanation for the difference between his testimony and information in the
DOT (Id.).
In the decision, the ALJ noted that the VE’s testimony departed from information in the
DOT, which did not explicitly contemplate a sit-stand option and/or limitations of occasional
pushing/pulling with non-dominant left upper extremity and occasional overhead reaching with
left upper extremity (Tr. 30-31). The ALJ then explained, “I accept the testimony of the
vocational expert based on his professional education, training, experience and explanation that
the occupations identified above and the numbers of jobs stated for those occupations, which are
net following slight reductions from the total number of otherwise existing jobs in those
occupations to account for the effect of inclusion of these limitations in the above stated residual
functional capacity (Testimony of vocational expert and Exhibit 14E)” 1 (Tr. 31). Thus, the
ALJ’s decision to accept the VE’s testimony regarding the three representative occupations
comports with applicable law. Moreover, the Court concludes that the VE’s testimony constitutes
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination in Finding No. 10 that prior to May 23,
2017, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
could have performed considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC.

1 Exhibit 14E is the VE’s resume (Tr. 421-22).

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is GRANTED for the Commissioner.

September 21, 2018

Copies:

Counsel

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