Lewis v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government et al
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Greg N. Stivers on 10/30/2020. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (DN 27 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Louisville Department of Corrections and Defendant Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government are DISMISSED.cc: counsel cc: Counsel(JWM)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-00071-GNS-CHL
TROY LEWIS
PLAINTIFF
v.
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY
METRO GOVERNMENT, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DN 27). This matter is
ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
In 2016, Plaintiff Troy Lewis (“Lewis”) was a pretrial detainee housed at the Community
Corrections Center (“CCC”) facility operated by Defendant Louisville Metro Department of
Corrections, (“LMDC”). (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 36, DN 1-1). LDMC is a department of Defendant
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (“Louisville Metro”). Lewis alleges that another
inmate, Defendant Kenneth McBride (“McBride”), was at CCC during the same time period and
“routinely bullied other individuals housed within [the facility] . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 38). According
to Lewis, there was minimal supervision at that facility, and “McBride would routinely masturbate
in other people’s rack(s), turn the television off, etc. . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 39-40).
On or about December 26, 2016, McBride allegedly directed another inmate to perform
oral sex on him in Lewis’ presence. (Compl. ¶ 41). When Lewis tried to leave the area, there
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allegedly was a verbal exchange between Lewis and McBride, and McBride attacked Lewis.
(Compl. ¶ 42). Corrections officers intervened and put Lewis and McBride in separate rooms.
(Compl. ¶ 44). While in one of those rooms, McBride allegedly yelled threats of harm towards
Lewis and his family, and then McBride later told Lewis that he “would be ‘touched in jail’ in
every cell he was placed . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 46). As a result of that incident, both McBride and
Lewis were transferred to Metro Corrections Jail Complex (“MCJC”), which is another LMDC
facility, and a “keep-from” order was put in place to prohibit any further contact between them in
accordance with LMDC policies. (Compl. ¶¶ 47-48). Despite that order, Lewis alleges that
McBride continued to make threats. (Compl. ¶ 49).
Following breakfast on the morning of December 31, 2016, a corrections officer allegedly
took Lewis to the fourth floor of the MCJC and placed Lewis in a cell with about 30 other inmates.
(Compl. ¶ 50). McBride and at least four other inmates allegedly attacked Lewis in that cell, and
Lewis’ efforts to summon assistance from corrections officers was unsuccessful. (Compl. ¶¶ 5153). During the attacked, Lewis lost consciousness. (Compl. ¶ 55). Lewis also alleges that other
inmates affiliated with McBride attacked Lewis on subsequent occasions. (Compl. ¶ 55).
On December 26, 2017, Lewis filed a lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court (Kentucky) against
Louisville Metro, LDMC, various named corrections officers employed by LDMC (sued in their
individual capacities), McBride, and four unknown inmates. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-32). In the Complaint,
Lewis asserted a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims of negligence,
negligence supervision, negligence per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Compl. ¶¶ 57-96).
Subsequently, January 2, 2018, Lewis filed the Amended Complaint in Jefferson Circuit
Court in which he named eight additional corrections officers as Defendants. (Am. Comp. ¶¶ 3-
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10, DN 1-1). Lewis also reasserted his causes of action against those new Defendants. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 1-2).
On February 5, 2018, Defendants removed the lawsuit to this Court. (Notice Removal, DN
1). Subsequently, on September 3, 2019, Lewis moved for leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint, which the Court granted on November 7, 2019. (Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Second Am.
Compl., DN 21; Order, DN 23). In the Second Amended Complaint, Lewis dropped claims against
some individual Defendants but also named an additional eleven corrections officers as
Defendants:
Brandon Bolton, James Cox, Jimmy Crawford, Jeffrey Edens, Ashley Harris,
Timothy Huber, Richard Longoria, Andrew McCullough, Carlos Montano, Ella Thomas, and Carl
Williams (collectively “Individual Defendants”). (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-26, 29-31, DN 24).
The Second Amended Complaint asserted the same original causes of action against Individual
Defendants. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2).
Louisville Metro and Individual Defendants moved to dismiss the claims asserted against
them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, DN 27). Individual Defendants
contend that Lewis’ claims are time barred because the claims asserted against them in the Second
Amended Complaint do not relate back to the original Complaint. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss 3-7, DN 27-1). Louisville Metro also argues that LDMC should be dismissed because it
is not a proper party, that Lewis failed to state a Monell claim, and that Lewis’ state law claims
against Louisville Metro are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp.
Mot. Dismiss 7-11).
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II.
JURISDICTION
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of this matter based upon federal question
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In addition, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint is subject to dismissal if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accepting
“as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences therein.” Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41
F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976)).
The nonmoving party, however, must plead more than bare legal conclusions. See Lillard v. Shelby
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
“[the] complaint must contain (1) ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more
than ‘a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a
‘right to relief above a speculative level.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478,
488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The pleading
need not contain detailed factual allegations, but the nonmoving party must allege facts that, when
“accepted as true . . . ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citation omitted).
IV.
A.
DISCUSSION
Statute of Limitations
Individual Defendants move to dismiss Lewis’ claims as time barred. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp.
Mot. Dismiss 3-7). As the Sixth Circuit has noted:
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“Generally, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), which considers only the allegations in
the complaint, is an ‘inappropriate vehicle’ for dismissing a claim based upon a
statute of limitations.” And that is because a plaintiff has no obligation under Rule
8 to plead compliance with the statute of limitations. Instead, the burden of
pleading, and proving, [an] affirmative defense . . . rests with the defendant.
Michalak v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 604 F. App’x 492, 493 (internal citations omitted) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1)).
1.
Federal Claims
Individual Defendants move to dismiss Lewis’ Section 1983 claim based on the statute of
limitations. Because Congress did not impose a statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims,
federal courts look to the state’s personal injury statute of limitations. See Collard v. Ky. Bd. of
Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 180-81 (6th Cir. 1990). Under Kentucky law, that limitations period is
one year. See id. at 181-82 (discussing the application of KRS 413.140(1).
In contrast, federal law determines when the statute of limitation accrues. See Sharpe v.
Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 266 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted) (citing Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 267 (1985); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1986)). “The statute of
limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which
is the basis of his action. A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have
discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792,
794 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273). “In applying a discovery accrual rule . . .
discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other elements of the claim, is what starts the clock.”
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). Thus, “[a] plaintiff’s action accrues when he discovers
that he has been injured, not when he determines that the injury was unlawful.” Amini v. Oberlin
Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Thelen v. Marc’s Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264,
267 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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Lewis argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to the incomplete
responses provided by LMDC to his Open Records requests. (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 1214, DN 32). Equitable tolling allows a federal court “to toll a statute of limitations when a litigant’s
failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that
litigant’s control.” Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citation omitted). To determine whether equitable tolling is available to a
plaintiff, a court considers five factors:
(1) the plaintiff’s lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the plaintiff’s lack of
constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) the plaintiff’s diligence in
pursuing [his] rights; (4) an absence of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) the
plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement.
Id. at 719 (citation omitted). Not all of these considerations may be material in every case, nor is
the list exhaustive. See Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d
552, 561 (6th Cir.2000). Equitable tolling is necessarily a case-by-case determination. See id.
(citation omitted). The plaintiff carries the burden of establishing his entitlement to equitable
tolling. See Jackson, 751 F.3d at 718-19 (citation omitted).
As noted in Lewis’ response, he made efforts to try to identify the LMDC employees
working at the time of the attacks by making multiple Open Records requests in October and
December 2017, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot.
Dismiss 6-7). There are factual issues that cannot be resolved at this stage as to the accuracy of
responses provided by the LDMC/Louisville Metro to the Open Records requests. Nevertheless,
it appears that Lewis was diligently attempting to determine the proper defendants to this action
and that there is a colorable argument that Lewis’ efforts were thwarted by the incomplete or
inaccurate responses provided to his Open Records requests. Accordingly, the Court will deny the
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motion to dismiss as the federal claims due to equitable tolling.1 See B.L. v. Schuhmann, 380 F.
Supp. 3d 614, 644 (W.D. Ky. 2019) (denying a motion to dismiss when there were issues of fact
regarding the applicability of equitable tolling).
2.
State Claims
Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Lewis’ state law claims against
Individual Defendants as untimely due to a one-year statute of limitations under Kentucky law.
(Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3-7). Summarizing Kentucky law, this Court has explained:
“[T]he discovery rule provides that a cause of action accrues when the injury is, or
should have been, discovered.” “[T]he discovery rule does not operate to toll the
statute of limitations to allow an injured plaintiff to discover the identity of the
wrongdoer unless there is fraudulent concealment or a misrepresentation by the
defendant of his role in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.” “A person who has
knowledge of an injury is put on ‘notice to investigate’ and discover, within the
statutory time constraints, the identity of the tortfeasor.”
Jeffries v. Thermal Fischer Sci., No. 1:07CV-192-JHM, 2009 WL 3807103, at *3 (W.D. Ky.
Nov. 12, 2009) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (citation omitted).
Like federal law, however, Kentucky law recognizes equitable tolling. “Equitable tolling
pauses the running of, or tolls, a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights
diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.”
Williams v. Hawkins, 594 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Ky. 2020) (quoting Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572
U.S. 1, 10 (2014)). For equitable tolling to apply, a plaintiff must prove that: “(1) [he] ‘has been
pursuing [his] rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [his] way.”
Id. at 194 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
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While Lewis also argues that his claims against New Defendants relate back pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(c), it is unnecessary to address this argument if the statute of limitations is equitably
tolled. (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 14-16).
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As with Lewis’ federal claims, it appears that he was diligently attempting to identify the
proper defendants allegedly responsible for his injuries. Because of the incomplete or inaccurate
responses to his Open Records requests, he was not otherwise able to identify Individual
Defendants prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. While Individual Defendants would
dispute the sufficiency of Lewis’ efforts to identify them, that factual dispute makes it
inappropriate for the Court to dismiss the state law claims at this time. The motion will be denied
on this basis.
B.
Proper Party
Defendants also move to dismiss the claims asserted against the LDMC as an improper
party. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 7-8). The real party in interest, however, is Louisville
Metro, which is already a party to this action, and LMDC “is not an entity subject to suit under
[Section] 1983.” Splunge v. Louisville Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:15-CV-P783-GNS, 2016 WL 715763,
at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 22, 2016) (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994));
see also Whitehead v. Schwartz, No. 3:18CV-00311-JHM, 2019 WL 2518457, at *1 (W.D. Ky.
June 18, 2019) (citing Splunge, 2016 WL 715763, at *2). Accordingly, LDMC will be dismissed
as a party to this action.
C.
Monell Claim
Louisville Metro also challenges the sufficiency of the allegations by Lewis seeking to
impose liability on it for the actions of its employees under Section 1983. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp.
Mot. Dismiss 8-9). When a Section 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must
analyze two distinct issues: “(1) whether plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation,
and (2) if so, whether the [municipality] is responsible for that violation.” Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) (citations omitted).
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“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell
v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282,
286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). “[T]he touchstone
of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of
the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the
municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988)
(quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)). To demonstrate municipal
liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the
municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.”
Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d
358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
In the instant, Lewis has not alleged that a policy or custom caused the Louisville Metro
employees’ actions or inactions in this case. Rather, he only alleges “[t]hat the deliberate
indifference of the LMDC Defendants elevated their commissions and/or omissions to the level of
custom and/or policy of Louisville Metro and LMDC . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 94). This scant allegation,
however, is simply insufficient. See, e.g., Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating . . . the existence
of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” (citation omitted)). Lewis
has not provided any factual basis concerning any Louisville Metro custom or policy, that any
applicable policy is illegal, or that there is a policy of inadequate training, supervision, etc. See
Wallace v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, No. 3:13CV-1053-S, 2014 WL 29593, at *2
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 3, 2014) (“[T]he mere allegation that an injury occurred at the hands of police
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officers does not ipso facto state a claim against the municipality employing them.”). Because
Lewis has failed to sufficiently plead a claim against Louisville Metro, the motion will be granted
on this basis.
D.
State Law/Sovereign Immunity
Finally, Louisville Metro seeks dismissal of any state law claims asserted against it based
on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 9-11). As Lewis notes
in his response, however, he has not asserted any state law claims against Louisville Metro. (Pl.’s
Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 22-23). Accordingly, the motion will be denied on this basis.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss (DN 27) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Louisville Department of Corrections and Defendant Louisville/Jefferson
County Metro Government are DISMISSED.
October 30, 2020
cc:
counsel of record
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