Moore v. Schaad et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 3/6/2025: The Court will dismiss this action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se (EAS)

Case 3:24-cv-00636-JHM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
JAMES MOORE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-00636-JHM

ROBERT SCHAAD et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff James Moore, a prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
The complaint is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the following
reasons, this action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff identifies himself as a convicted inmate housed at the “Louisville Metro Jail.” He
sues Robert Schaad, his criminal defense attorney; Jan Brightwell, a Jefferson County prosecutor,
and Judith McDonald-Burkman, a Jefferson County Judge. All Defendants are sued in their
individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff states that the above-named Defendants violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights in connection with his criminal conviction and
sentence from July 29, 2021, to May 1, 2024.
First, Plaintiff alleges that Schaad rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by “allow[ing]
the courts to give me 2 years felony sentence for [misdemeanor] charges.” He states, “I served out
2 one year sentence & 2 of those years was for 2 [misdemeanors].”
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Brightwell, a prosecutor for the Commonwealth, “collaborated
with Robert Schaad” to violate his constitutional rights by “threatening me with prison &

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sanctioning me twice by incar[c]erating me for (2) 90 day stints; and 2 years . . . incarcerated
serve out for 2 misdemeanors. (I serve out in D.O.C.)”
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Burkman, the presiding judge over his criminal case,
sentenced him to “2 indeterminate terms in prison for (misdemeanors) which were determinate
sentences[.]” Plaintiff states that he received an “additional prison term,” deliberately imposed by
Brightwell, and was “treated differently because I am a convicted felon under the Equal Protection
Law” and was “sent to prison for [misdemeanors].” He references, “Indictment Nos. 19CR00239
& 19CR003067[;] both were misdemeanors.”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and to “vacate the sentence
& conviction.”
II. STANDARD
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer,
or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the Court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on
other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers,
USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th

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Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d
1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held
to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald
v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law,
causes the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. A
claim under § 1983 must therefore allege two elements: (1) the deprivation of federal statutory or
constitutional rights by (2) a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Absent either element,
no § 1983 claim exists. Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
A. Defendant Schaad
Plaintiff sues Schaad, his criminal defense attorney. It is well-settled that a defense
attorney, regardless of whether he is a public defender or a private attorney, is not a state actor for
purposes of § 1983. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does
not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding.”); Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 F. App’x 163, 165 (6th Cir.
2003) (“[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state
actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against

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Schaad arising out of his role as Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Defendant Brightwell
Plaintiff states that Brightwell was the prosecuting attorney in his criminal proceeding.
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [ ] another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55 (1978)). As a
prosecutor on behalf of the Commonwealth, Brightwell is a state employee or official. Claims
brought against state employees in their official capacities are deemed claims against the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. State officials sued in their official
capacities for monetary damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim for
monetary damages against Brightwell must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
As to Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claim against Brightwell, prosecutors acting in their
roles as advocates, i.e., initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and presenting the
Commonwealth of Kentucky’s case, enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976); Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2004).
Prosecutorial immunity even applies when a prosecutor acts wrongfully or maliciously. Grant v.
Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that prosecutors were absolutely
immune from claim alleging that they conspired to knowingly bring false charges despite claims
of failure to investigate facts and alleged commission of perjury before the grand jury); see also
Ramsey v. Rivard, 694 F. Supp. 3d 955, 977-79 (E.D. Mich. 2023) (malicious prosecution claim

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against prosecutor barred by prosecutorial immunity). Plaintiff’s claim against Brightwell is
therefore barred by prosecutorial immunity, and the individual-capacity claim against her must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. Defendant Burkman
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Burkman, as the presiding judge in his state
criminal proceeding, must also fail. As explained above, state officials sued in their official
capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
Thus, because Plaintiff seeks money damages from a state official in her official capacity, he fails
to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. Therefore, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim for
monetary damages against Burkman must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claim against Burkman also fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. This is because judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for
money damages for all actions taken in their judicial capacity unless those actions are taken in the
absence of any jurisdiction. Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam)). Judicial immunity is embedded in the long-established
principle that “‘a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in [her], [should] be free to act
upon [her] own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to [herself].’” Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872)).
Because Plaintiff’s complaint pertains only to actions taken by Judge Burkman in her judicial
capacity and within her jurisdictional authority, the individual-capacity claim against her is barred
by judicial immunity and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

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D. Challenge to Conviction
Plaintiff alleges that, due to the aforementioned acts by Defendants, his conviction was
unlawful, and he requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated.1 However, Plaintiff cannot
challenge his conviction in this action. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the
Supreme Court held that a state prisoner could not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner showed that the conviction or sentence
had been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. (footnote omitted). This principle holds true whether the
plaintiff seeks damages or equitable relief. Wilkerson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction was reversed on appeal or otherwise invalidated.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations challenging the validity of his conviction fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this action by separate Order.
Date:

March 6, 2025

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4414.015

1
To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint can be read as seeking release from incarceration, such relief is unavailable in a
§ 1983 action. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the
relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment,
his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

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