Hampton et al v. Daviess County Detention Center et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 11/20/12; The Court will dismiss this action by separate order.cc:Plaintiff (pro se), Defendants, DCA (JBM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
VINCENT HAMPTON
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:12CV-P125-M
DAVIESS COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Vincent Hampton, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1 This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons set forth below, the
action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Daviess County Detention Center (DCDC), sues
DCDC, its medical staff, and Southern Health Partners. He alleges that in April 2012 he “came
down with a really bad itch all over [his] body.” He states that about a week later “medical”
gave him some small packets of hydrocortisone cream but did not test him. After using up the
packets and still having the itch, he was brought back to “medical” which again did not test him
but gave him some A & D ointment and medical soap. He alleges that he itched so badly that he
could not sleep at night and that he continued to fill out medical forms “for the next 3 or 4
months and they never tested me for nothing.” He further states, “I received medical powder,
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The complaint also was signed by and listed as an additional plaintiff Preston Tyrell
Williams. However, absolutely none of the allegations in the complaint pertained to Williams,
Williams did not respond to the notice of deficiency regarding submitting an application to
proceed without prepayment of fees, and Plaintiff has indicated to the Court that Williams has
been transferred and his whereabouts are unknown. Consequently, the Court does not consider
Williams to be a Plaintiff in this action.
my wife brought me soap, lotion, bodywash all of which didn’t help me after I was told I had
exama.” He continues, “Once I use all of what my wife brought me I started growing little
bumps on my genatles and anus. I reported back to medical for the 10 or 11 time in which they
told me I had the early stage of Herpes.” Plaintiff states that this information required him to
phone his wife to tell her about the herpes. He states he still itched but was told “they couldn’t
treat me for the Herps.” Finally, he told “the staff” that he thought he had scabies, and on July
27 he was tested and found positive for scabies. He requests $1,350,000 in damages.
II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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“Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished. A sentenced inmate, on
the other hand, may be punished, although that punishment may not be ‘cruel and unusual’ under
the Eighth Amendment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979). “Although the Eighth
Amendment’s protections apply specifically to post-conviction inmates, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment operates to guarantee those same protections to pretrial detainees
as well.” Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005).
“The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from ‘unnecessarily and wantonly
inflicting pain’ on prisoners by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’ towards the inmate’s serious
medical needs.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The Fourteenth Amendment “affords pretrial
detainees a due process right to adequate medical treatment that is analogous to the Eighth
Amendment rights of prisoners.” Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 382 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2004). Thus, although the Eighth Amendment is not directly applicable to Plaintiff as a
pretrial detainee, its deliberate indifference standard is to be applied under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A claim of deliberate indifference has both an objective and subjective component.
Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008). The objective component requires an inmate
to show that the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and poses “a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the subjective
component, an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials had “a sufficiently culpable state of
mind,” i.e., the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id.
Assuming that scabies is a sufficiently serious medical condition, the Court finds that the
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complaint fails to allege deliberate indifference. The standard applied in reviewing the actions
of prison doctors and medical staff in this type of case is deferential. Inmates of Allegheny Cnty.
Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). Courts will generally refrain from “second
guessing” the adequacy of a particular course of treatment where a prisoner has received some
medical attention and the dispute concerns the adequacy of that treatment. Westlake v. Lucas,
537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976); Bisgeier v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 380 F. App’x 505, 508
(6th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff only evidences a disagreement with his medical care. The fact that some months
later it appears that he was tested for and diagnosed with scabies does not transform Plaintiff’s
disagreement with Defendants’ prior diagnosis and treatment plan into a constitutional issue.
Moreover, even if the failure to test for scabies earlier could be considered malpractice,
“[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim with regard to his
medical claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will by separate Order dismiss this action.
Date:
November 20, 2012
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Daviess County Attorney
4414.009
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