Vincent v. Henderson County Detention Center

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. The Court will dismiss this action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendant (EM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
CLARENCE VERNON VINCENT
v.

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15CV-P94-JHM

HENDERSON CNTY. DET. CTR.

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff Clarence Vernon Vincent filed a pro se complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1).
However, Plaintiff failed to file page six of the complaint form. Thus, he failed to state
the relief he seeks in this action and failed to sign the complaint under penalty of perjury. On
July 30, 2015, the Court ordered Plaintiff to complete and submit page six of the court-approved
form for filing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 within 30 days of entry of the Order and
mailed the Order to Plaintiff at his Bullitt County Detention Center address (DN 9). This Order
was returned to the Court marked “Return To Sender, Inmate Not Here” and “Return to Sender,
Refused, Unable to Forward” (DN 10). A review of the docket in this case reveals that Plaintiff
has taken no action in this case since April 13, 2015, when he filed the documents which
initiated this action.
Upon filing the instant action, Plaintiff assumed the responsibility to keep this Court
advised of his current address and to actively litigate his claims. See Local Rule 5.2(d) (“All pro
se litigants must provide written notice of a change of address to the Clerk and to the opposing
party or the opposing party’s counsel. Failure to notify the Clerk of an address change may
result in the dismissal of the litigant’s case or other appropriate sanctions.”). Because Plaintiff
has not provided any notice of an address change to the Court, neither orders or notices from
this Court nor filings by Defendants can be served on him.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal
of an action if a Plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See Jourdan
v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the
district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). Although federal courts afford pro se
litigants some leniency on matters that require legal sophistication, such as formal pleading rules,
the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and other procedures readily
understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay or failure to pursue a
case. Id. at 110. “As this court has noted, the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se
litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily
understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than
a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d at 110). “Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that courts
have an inherent power to manage their own affairs and may dismiss a case sua sponte for lack
of prosecution.” Lyons-Bey v. Pennell, 93 F. App’x 732, 733 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with LR 5.2(d) and has failed to take any action in
this case subsequent to filing the documents initiating this action, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff has abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action. The Court will dismiss the action
by separate Order.
Date:

September 16, 2015

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4414.003

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