Carman v. Burlew et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. For the reasons herein, on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants; KY AG (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
JASON SCOTT CARMAN

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15CV-P114-JHM

JUDGE NICK BURLEW et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff Jason Scott Carman’s pro se
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that
follow, the complaint will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Daviess County Detention Center, brings
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights action against Daviess County District Court Judge Nick
Burlew, Daviess County Prosecutor Bruce Kuegel, and a Daviess County “clerk, Chritina
Maffet.” He sues each Defendant in his or her official capacity.
According to the complaint, on June 13, 2014, Plaintiff went before Judge Burlew on two
counts of first-degree wanton endangerment. Judge Burlew ordered Plaintiff to undergo a Drug
& Alcohol Assessment and to comply with the recommendation of the Assessment. Plaintiff
asserts that upon compliance, the wanton endangerment charges were to be dropped to
misdemeanors. Plaintiff advises that the judge “layed me over 2 August the 8th to make sure I
complied.”

Plaintiff additionally reports, however, that also on June 13, 2014, the judge’s “clerk
chritina moffet made a mistage [and] sent my charges up stairs, It’s is nown that she made the
mistake. The grand Jury indited me on it two month’s later.” Plaintiff asserts that his civil rights
were violated because he never had an “Examaning trail [and] [] never waved my right’s to the
grand Jury.”
Plaintiff reports that his name was never placed on the docket for August 8th, but that on
February 11, 2015, “Heather Black Burn filed a Reprimanding Hereing to have it sent Back
Down stairs [and] Bruce Kuegal wouldn’t allow this to Happen. The victom also wanted this to
Be Keept A mistaminer.” Plaintiff states that he has the videotape of his June 13th court
appearance, confirming that his case was supposed to be kept a misdemeanor. He also states that
the “clerk thought i waved my Rights and that wasn’t the case so Due to Human error, I’m fixing
2 Have to sign years of my Life Away.” He cites to “Case # 14-cr-00661,” which is presumably
his pending state-court criminal action.
As relief in the complaint, Plaintiff seeks damages and “[r]elease from illegal detention.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.

2

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this duty to be less
stringent “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518
F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district

3

court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff sues Defendants, all state officials, in their official capacity.
A. Claim for Damages
State officials sued in their official capacity for damages are absolutely immune from
liability under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“This [Eleventh Amendment] bar remains in effect when
State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.”); Boone v. Kentucky, 72 F. App’x
306, 307 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiff’s] request for monetary relief against the prosecutors in their
official capacities is deemed to be a suit against the state and also barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.”); Bennett v. Thorburn, No. 86-1307, 1988 WL 27524, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 31,
1988) (concluding that an official capacity suit against a judge who presided over state court
litigation was barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Cope v. Jeferson Cty. Circuit Court, No.
3:15CV-P254-TBR, 2015 WL 5437130, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 15, 2015) (finding that damages
against a Kentucky circuit court clerk in official capacity barred by Eleventh Amendment
because circuit court “’clerks are state officers whose duties are coextensive with the
Commonwealth . . . .’”) (quoting Ky. Rev. Stat. § 30A.010). Further, Defendants sued in their
official capacity for damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir.
1994).

4

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacity for damages
will be dismissed for seeking monetary relief from Defendants who are immune from such relief
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Claim for Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff also seeks “[r]elease from illegal Detention” in Daviess Circuit Court case # 14cr-00661. “[A] federal court should not interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding
except in the rare situation where an injunction is necessary to prevent great and immediate
irreparable injury.” Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). “Younger abstention in civil cases requires the satisfaction of three
elements. Federal courts should abstain when (1) state proceedings are pending; (2) the state
proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings will afford the
plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.” Hayse v. Wethington, 110
F.3d 18, 20 (6th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff reports that he is a pretrial detainee and that his criminal case is in the state
circuit court. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has an important state interest in adjudicating
that matter. Plaintiff has failed to articulate any reason to believe that the Kentucky state courts
will not fully and fairly litigate his claims. If he is convicted in the trial court, he still has a
number of state court remedies available to him, including appeals to the Kentucky Court of
Appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court as well as state post-conviction motions. In light of
the available avenues through which to raise a constitutional challenge, this Court will not
interfere with an on-going Kentucky state court proceeding. Plaintiff has failed to show that the
state courts are unable to adjudicate his claims at this time.

5

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this action by separate Order.
Date: January 26, 2016

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky
4414.005

6