McCormick v. Nurse Kendra et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 10/5/2016: Plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint 14 is GRANTED. The individual-capacity claims against Defendants HCDC and SHP are DISMISSED; All of the official-c apacity claims against Defendant HCDC, with the exception of the polyester-uniform claim, are DISMISSED; all of the official-capacity claims against Defendant SHP are DISMISSED; The individual- capacity claim against Defendant Miles for verbal hara ssment is DISMISSED; SHP is DISMISSED from this action. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to remove SHP as a Defendant from the docket of this case; The Court will enter a separate Scheduling Order directing service and governing the development of the continuing claims. cc: Plaintiff (pro se); Defendants (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
DAMON McCORMICK
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16CV-P17-JHM

NURSE KENDRA et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Damon McCormick, a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). The Court performed initial review of the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), and dismissed the
claims against Defendants in their official capacities and allowed Plaintiff 30 days to amend the
complaint to name Defendants in their individual capacities, if he so chose (DN 8). Thereafter,
on July 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (first amended complaint) (DN 9). In the
first amended complaint, he names the same five Defendants that he named in the original
complaint, sues them in their individual capacities, and essentially restates the same facts alleged
in his original complaint.
On September 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint
(second amended complaint) (DN 14). In the motion, Plaintiff seeks to add two new Defendants
to this action, Henderson County Detention Center (HCDC) and Southern Health Partners
(SHP).1 Therein he sets forth claims against these two Defendants. Upon consideration,
Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint (DN 14) is GRANTED.

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According to SHP’s website, http://www.southernhealthpartners.com/about, SHP is a private corporation that is “a
leading provider of affordable medical, dental, and mental health services to inmates in county and city jail
facilities.”

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to add HCDC and SHP as Defendants to the docket
of this case.
The first amended complaint (DN 9) and the second amended complaint (DN 14) are
presently before the Court for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601. For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the following
claims: (1) the individual-capacity claims against Defendants HCDC and SHP; (2) all of the
official-capacity claims against Defendant HCDC, with the exception of the polyester-uniform
claim; (3) all of the official-capacity claims against Defendant SHP; and (4) the individualcapacity claim against Defendant Miles for verbal harassment. The remaining claims will be
allowed to proceed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff names seven Defendants in the two amended complaints. He identifies the
Defendants as follows: (1) Nurse Kendra, a nurse employed by SHP; (2) Nurse Miles, a nurse
employed by SHP; (3) Colonel Gibson, an employee of the HCDC; (4) Nurse Lea, a nurse
employed by SHP; (5) Nurse Henrietta, a nurse employed by SHP; (6) HCDC; and (7) SHP.
Plaintiff states that he sues Defendants HCDC and SHP in their individual and official capacities.
He sues the remaining Defendants in only their individual capacities. As relief, Plaintiff seeks
monetary and punitive damages.
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the HCDC where the alleged events about which he complains
occurred. According to the allegations contained in the first amended complaint, Plaintiff has
been confined to a wheelchair for over two years. Plaintiff complains that on or about January
17th,2 Defendant Kendra placed him in a cell for detox, which was not handicap accessible “even
though [he] provided a clean urine sample to the Medical Dept.” Plaintiff states that Defendant
2

Plaintiff fails to specify a year.

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Kendra took away his wheelchair, and he was required to “scoot on [his] behind across the floor
to get [his] meals and medicine.” According to Plaintiff, there was no bunk in that cell. Plaintiff
states that all of the jail medical staff, with the exception of Defendant Miles, would come into
his cell to give him his meals and medication.
According to Plaintiff, on or about “January 19th or 20th during pill call [Defendant]
Miles told [him he] would have to stand up on [his] feet or [he] would not receive [his]
medicine.” When Plaintiff informed Defendant Miles that he could not stand, Plaintiff states that
Defendant Miles left without giving him his medication. Plaintiff asserts that he takes
medication for high blood pressure and seizures. Plaintiff states that at this point he had missed
several days of his medication because of Defendant Miles, so when Defendant Miles returned to
the cell, Plaintiff attempted to stand up. According to Plaintiff, when he did so, his “right knee
snapped, popped real loud and buckled.” Plaintiff states that he was screaming in pain, but
Defendant Miles refused to give him his medication and left. Plaintiff states that 12 hours later
Defendant Miles returned, refused to give Plaintiff his medication because he would not stand,
and refused to examine Plaintiff’s knee even though Plaintiff informed Defendant Miles that he
thought he had broken something in his knee. Plaintiff states that whenever Defendant Miles
works, he and Correctional Officer Payne laugh and tell Plaintiff that “they won this wheelchair
dispute and that he was going to get [Plaintiff’s] chair taken for good very soon.”
Plaintiff states that the medical and jail staff know of his knee problems and that he has
“been scheduled for some time to have 2 total knee replacements by Doctor Reid Wilson.”
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Lea, despite knowledge of Plaintiff’s knee problems, “keeps
telling [Defendant] Gibson there is nothing wrong with [Plaintiff’s] knees.” Plaintiff states that
Defendant Lea ‘constantly is denying [him] use of this wheelchair and after a period of time

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giving it back. And medical will not approve of [him] using [his] personal wheelchair. Wich
[his] Doctor prescribed and [his] insurance paid for, because of [his] knee problems.”
Plaintiff states that he suffers from seizures and that he is supposed to take two different
medications for his seizures. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Kendra and Lea “are only giving
[him] one of them.” According to Plaintiff, he has had seven seizures since arriving at the
HCDC. Still, according to Plaintiff, no one will examine him or treat him for the seizures, and
Defendants Kendra and Lea refuse to get his medical records about his seizures or give him his
seizure medication.
On or about January 27th, according to Plaintiff, he was placed in a different cell, cell
#524, by Defendant Kendra, and his wheelchair was returned to him. Plaintiff states that the new
cell is not handicap accessible. Plaintiff states that he “asked Col. Gibson and her Deputies
repeatedly and Medical Staff repeatedly” for about a week for a shower chair. Plaintiff states
that they all denied his request. So, Plaintiff states, “[a]fter a few days [he] had to take a shower
without one . . . holding onto the shower head with one hand.” According to Plaintiff, while he
was showering he had a seizure. Plaintiff states that he “woke up in the shower floor with [his]
left knee throbbing real bad, this being Feb 2nd.” According to Plaintiff, he subsequently got the
attention of “2 different deputies and a nurse” who all informed him “to put in a sick call slip
cause it was not an emergency.” Plaintiff states that “[a]while later [Defendant] Gibson came to
the panhole and [Plaintiff] started hollering at her about [his] injury.” According to Plaintiff, this
resulted in Defendant Gibson putting him in isolation “and [Defendant] Lea refused to take a
look at [his] knee or treat [him] for [his] seizures. No medical attention at all.”
Plaintiff states that he also suffers from “acid reflux and erosion of the esophagus.” He
states that he has been treated for this condition in the past, but presently the jail’s “Medical

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Dept., . . . at behest of [Defendant] Kendra will not treat [him] for it anymore. Regardless of
how much pain [he is] in.”
According to Plaintiff, on or about February 12th, he had “2 seizures back to back
injuring [his] right shoulder pretty bad in the first one. [Defendant] Henrietta refused to examine
[his] shoulder and took [his] wheelchair from [him]. In a punitive manner.” According to
Plaintiff, Defendant Henrietta told him that this would stop the seizures.
Further, Plaintiff states that he is allergic to polyester, yet “[j]ail uniforms are 67%
polyester.” Plaintiff states that he has “open wounds and scabs all over [his] body from
scratching.” According to Plaintiff, he has received treatment for this in the past, but the medical
department, “namely [Defendants] Lea and Kendra refuse to treat it now.”
According to Plaintiff, Defendants Kendra, Lea, Miles and Henrietta have “taken [his]
wheelchair and given it back many times; thinking its funny and making light of [his] disability.”
In the second amended complaint, as to HCDC, Plaintiff states that “Jail officials must
meet the needs of prisoners with disabilities and furnish the assistance that they require in order
to live a minimally decent life in Jail or prison.” Plaintiff states that on January 17th he was in a
cell “which was not handicap accessible.” He further states that guards took away his wheelchair
and made him “scoot on his behind across the floor for many days to get his meals and
medicine.” He states that there was no bunk in the cell. Plaintiff states again the alleged incident
in which Defendant Miles made him stand up to get his medication and Plaintiff’s knee buckled
causing Plaintiff to fall to the floor. Plaintiff states that none of the cells he was placed in at
HCDC was handicap accessible, the shower was not accessible, and he was denied “other
handicaps needs.” He states that his wheelchair was taken away “and given back like a game
and thinking its funny and making fun of his disability.”

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As to SHP, Plaintiff states that it “is the medical provider for” HCDC. He sets forth
some law about the “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Further,
Plaintiff states that on or about January 19th or 20th, he “was order by Guard to stand up and his
right knee snapped, popped real loud and buckled to the floor.” Plaintiff states that medical
refused “any treatment at all.” Plaintiff states that he suffers from seizures and needs two
medications, but the nurse would only give him one medication. Plaintiff states that medical
refused to “order a showering chair or any handicap needs.” Plaintiff further states that he has
“open wounds and scabs all over his body from scratching, [but] medical refuses to treat him for
these conditions.” Plaintiff concludes, “Medical was making fun at plaintiff disability and would
not help him at all.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if it determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604. A claim is
legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
90 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

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“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court’s duty “does not
require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979),
or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the district court “to explore exhaustively
all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Claims Against HCDC and SHP
1. Individual-Capacity Claims
Individual-capacity suits, also known as personal-capacity suits, “seek to impose
individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Hafer
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). The individual-capacity designation is not applicable to a
Defendant which is not an individual since no personal liability is involved.
Accordingly, the individual-capacity claims against HCDC and SHP will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.

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2. Official-Capacity Claims
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). HCDC is
not a “person” subject to suit; thus, suing Defendant HCDC is the equivalent of suing Henderson
County. See Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov.
6, 2000) (finding that the jail “is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”); Matthews v. Jones,
35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (advising that since the county police department is not an
entity which may be sued, the county is the proper party); Bradford v. Hammond,
No. Civ.A.3:05CVP459-H, 2005 WL 2739154, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2005) (construing a
claim against Louisville Metro Corrections as one brought against Louisville/Jefferson County
Metro Government).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so,
whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The same municipal-liability analysis applies to § 1983 claims
against a private corporation like Defendant SHP. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d
810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (“‘Monell involved a municipal corporation, but every circuit to
consider the issue has extended the holding to private corporations as well.’”) (quoting Harvey v.
Harvey, 949 F. 2d 1127, 1129 (11th Cir. 1992)). Liability must be based on a policy or custom
of the contracted private entity or “the inadequacy of [an employee’s] training.” Id. at 817;
Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (“CMS’s [Correctional
Medical Systems, Inc.,] liability must also be premised on some policy that caused a deprivation

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of [plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights.”). The Court will first address the second issue, i.e.,
whether Defendants are responsible for the alleged constitutional violations.
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor--or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 691; Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282,
286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). “The ‘official
policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees
of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which
the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is
a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 694; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty.,
Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). Simply stated, “a plaintiff must ‘identify the policy,
connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of
the execution of that policy.’” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other
grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The policy or custom
“must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a
government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Cty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).
In the instant case, with the exception of the claim against HCDC regarding the wearing
of a polyester uniform to which he is allergic, Plaintiff has not alleged that a municipal policy or
custom of Henderson County or a policy or custom of SHP caused any of his alleged harm.

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With the exception of the polyester-uniform claim, nothing in the complaint demonstrates any
purported wrongdoing occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by
either Henderson County or SHP.
Accordingly, the claim regarding the wearing of a polyester uniform will proceed against
Defendant HCDC. The remaining official-capacity claims against HCDC will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Further, all of the official-capacity
claims against SHP will be dismissed. There being no remaining claims against SHP, it will be
dismissed from this action.
B. Claims Against the Individual Defendants
1. Handicap Cell
Plaintiff asserts that he is handicapped and confined to a wheelchair due to a lack of an
ability to ambulate. He states that he was denied a handicap cell. The Court will construe this
claim as being brought under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff brings this claim against
Defendants Kendra and Gibson in their individual capacities.
Upon consideration, the Court will allow this Eighth Amendment claim for failure to
provide Plaintiff with a handicap cell to proceed against Defendants Kendra and Gibson in their
individual capacities.
2. Wheelchair
Plaintiff asserts that he is disabled and needs a wheelchair. He states that on occasion he
was denied a wheelchair sometimes apparently sadistically. The Court will construe this claim
as being brought under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff brings this claim against Defendants
Kendra, Miles, Lea, Gibson, and Henrietta in their individual capacities.

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Upon consideration, the Court will allow this Eighth Amendment claim for failure to
provide Plaintiff with a wheelchair to proceed against Defendants Kendra, Miles, Lea, Gibson,
and Henrietta in their individual capacities.
3. Shower Chair
Plaintiff asserts that despite his handicap, he was denied a shower chair when he was
moved to cell #524. The Court will construe this claim as being brought under the Eighth
Amendment. Plaintiff brings this claim against Defendants Gibson in her individual capacity.
Upon consideration, the Court will allow this Eighth Amendment claim for failure to
provide Plaintiff with a shower chair to proceed against Defendant Gibson in her individual
capacity.
4. Medical Treatment
a. Knee Pain
Plaintiff states that he injured his knee of two separate occasions. The first injury
occurred on January 19th or 20th when Plaintiff states that he attempted to walk to get his
medication because Defendant Miles refused to bring Plaintiff’s medication to him. Plaintiff
states that his “right knee snapped, popped real loud and buckled.” Plaintiff alleges that even
though he was screaming in paint, Defendant Miles refused to treat him.
The second knee injury about which Plaintiff complains occurred on February 2nd. As to
this event, Plaintiff states that he had a seizure in the shower and “woke up in the shower floor
with [his] left knee throbbing real bad.” He asserts that Defendants Lea and Gibson denied him
medical treatment for this injury. The Court construes this claim as being brought under the
Eighth Amendment.

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Upon consideration, the Court will allow these Eighth Amendment claims for failure to
treat Plaintiff’s knee injuries to proceed against Defendants Miles, Lea, and Gibson in their
individual capacities.
b. Seizures
Plaintiff states that he suffers from seizures for which he must take two medications. He
claims that was denied one of these medications by Defendants Kendra and Lea. He further
states that he has had seizures which have resulted in injury because of this failure to provide
him with his seizure medications. He brings these claims against Defendants Kendra and Lea in
their individual capacities. The Court construes this claim as being brought under the Eighth
Amendment.
Upon consideration, the Court will allow this Eighth Amendment claim for failure to treat
Plaintiff’s seizures to proceed against Defendants Kendra and Lea in their individual capacities.
c. Open Wounds and Itching
Plaintiff contends that as a result of having to wear a uniform which contains polyester, a
fabric to which he has an allergy, he has open wounds and scabs from scratching. He states that
he has received treatment for this in the past, but that now Defendants Kendra and Lea refuse to
treat him for this condition. The Court construes this claim as being brought under the Eighth
Amendment.
Upon consideration, the Court will allow this Eighth Amendment claim for failure to treat
Plaintiff’s open wounds and itching to proceed against Defendants Kendra and Lea in their
individual capacities.

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d. Acid Reflux
Plaintiff states that he suffers from acid reflux which is painful and causes constant
burning in his stomach and throat. He states that he received treatment for this in the past, but
that now Defendant Kendra refuses to treat him for this condition. The Court construes this
claim as being brought under the Eighth Amendment.
Upon consideration, the Court will allow this Eighth Amendment claim for failure to treat
Plaintiff’s acid reflux to proceed against Defendant Kendra in her individual capacity.
5. Verbal Harassment
Plaintiff states that Defendant Miles makes fun of his disability. Threats and verbal
harassment do not give rise to a constitutional violation. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th
Cir. 1987); see also Wingo v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“Verbal harassment or idle threats by a state actor do not create a constitutional violation and
are insufficient to support a section 1983 claim for relief.”); Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357
F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that “harassment and verbal abuse . . . do not
constitute the type of infliction of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits”); Violett v.
Reynolds, 76 F. App’x 24, 27 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[V]erbal abuse and harassment do not constitute
punishment that would support an Eighth Amendment claim.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Miles made fun of his disability will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons set forth more fully above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently
advised,
IT IS ORDERED as follows: (1) the individual-capacity claims against Defendants
HCDC and SHP are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a
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claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) all of the official-capacity claims against Defendant
HCDC, with the exception of the polyester-uniform claim, are DISMISSED pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (3) all of
the official-capacity claims against Defendant SHP are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (4) the
individual-capacity claim against Defendant Miles for verbal harassment is DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that SHP is DISMISSED from this action. The Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to remove SHP as a Defendant from the docket of this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following claims shall proceed: (1) the Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendants Kendra and Gibson in their individual capacities for
failure to provide Plaintiff with a handicap cell; (2) the Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendants Kendra, Miles, Lea, Gibson, and Henrietta in their individual capacities for failure to
provide Plaintiff with a wheelchair; (3) the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Gibson
in her individual capacity for failure to provide Plaintiff with a shower chair; (4) the Eighth
Amendment claims for failure to treat Plaintiff’s knee injuries against Defendants Miles, Lea,
and Gibson in their individual capacities; (5) the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants
Kendra and Lea in their individual capacities for failure to treat Plaintiff’s seizures; (6) the
Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Kendra and Lea in their individual capacities for
failure to treat Plaintiff’s open wounds and itching; (7) the Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendant Kendra in her individual capacity for failure to treat Plaintiff’s reflux; and (8) the

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Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant HCDC regarding the failure to provide Plaintiff
with a non-polyester uniform.
The Court will enter a separate Scheduling Order directing service and governing the
development of the continuing claims. In permitting these claims to continue, the Court passes
no judgment on the merits and ultimate outcome of the action.
Date: October 5, 2016

cc: Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4414.003

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