Moore v. Hopkins County Jail

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. Upon initial screening, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Hopkins County Jail are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 14 days from the entry date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint with respect to his claims of denied medical and dental treatment. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants (ERH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16CV-P65-JHM
RICHARD EDWARD MOORE III

PLAINTIFF

v.
HOPKINS COUNTY JAIL

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Richard Edward Moore III filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is now before the Court on initial review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Hopkins County Jail (HCJ) and allow Plaintiff to amend the complaint.
I.
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at HCJ. He names HCJ as the only Defendant. Plaintiff
states, “I currently have a health condition that is causing serious damage to my short term and
long term health unnecessarily.” He maintains that he has been diagnosed with “pulmonary
hypertension, congestive heart failure, endocarditis, and pericarditis or heart infection.” He
states, “The jail is attempting to treat me with oral amoxacillian. This is grossly incorrect and
causing major scar tissue inside my heart valve resulting in me needing a new heart valve
because I continue to go untreated. The correct treatment is I.V. antibiotics such as
vancomyesin.” Plaintiff maintains that “[t]his lack of treatment is causing me, severe
unnecessary pain, anxiety, and permanent damage to my body’s vital organ (heart).” He
continues, “I am currently under professional referral by U of L hospital to seek immediate help
from a heart specialist which I am being denied this right.”

In addition, Plaintiff states that he has “severe dental caries and decay which is also
causing short term and long term damage to my health unnecessarily. As well as severe pain and
anxiety.” Plaintiff states, “I am currently suffering of (severe) chest pain, difficulty breathing,
dizziness, rapid pulse, shaking, elevated blood pressure, weakness, pale, cold sweats, and more
than 4 weeks of diarreah, and body pains.” Plaintiff continues, “In the event I do not survive my
illness, I wish attorney Richard Peyton to represent me and any judgment to be awarded” to two
named individuals.
Plaintiff further states, “My symtoms could be just a result of needing a heart valve
replacement. I’m not sure. I just know it is severe and I must finish my appointments with my
heart doctor . . . immediatly.” Plaintiff reports, “I also suffer severe jaw pain due to needing to
see a oral surgeon. Because jail will not give me medical they are repeating antibiotics to treat
recurring infections which is putting my health at risk.”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a
claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a
pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

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III.
Plaintiff only sues HCJ. However, HCJ is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983
because municipal departments, such as jails, are not suable under § 1983. Marbry v. Corr. Med.
Servs., No. 99-6706, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28072, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that a
jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983); see also Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117,
120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued under § 1983). In this
situation, Hopkins County is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson Cty. Gov’t, 743
F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). Further, Hopkins County is a “person” for purposes of
§ 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The Court therefore will construe the claims against HCJ as claims against Hopkins
County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two
distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if
so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will first address the second issue, i.e., whether the
municipality is responsible for the alleged constitutional violations.
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is
a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th
Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal
policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular
injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The policy or
custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the

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liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied treatment for a heart ailments
and dental problems. However, nothing in the complaint indicates that he was denied treatment
pursuant to a municipal policy or custom implemented or endorsed by Hopkins County.
Plaintiff’s complaint appears to allege isolated events affecting only him. See Fox v. Van
Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1999) (“No evidence indicates that this was anything
more than a one-time, isolated event for which the county is not responsible.”). As such, the
complaint fails to establish a basis of liability against the municipality and fails to state a
cognizable § 1983 claim against it.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against HCJ must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
However, upon review of the allegations, the Court will afford Plaintiff an
opportunity to file an amended complaint to name any specific individual(s) who is/are
responsible for the alleged denial of treatment for his heart ailments and dental problems.
See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[U]nder Rule 15(a) a district court
can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal
under the PLRA.”). Plaintiff having failed to identify any policy or custom that was the moving
force behind his alleged injuries, the Court finds that any official-capacity claims against any
newly named Defendants would be futile; therefore, Plaintiff must sue any newly named
Defendants in their individual capacities.

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IV.
For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant HCJ Jail are DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 14 days from the entry date of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint with respect to
his claims of denied medical and dental treatment. Plaintiff shall name as Defendants the
individuals whom he alleges are responsible for his injuries with respect to these claims and state
specifically the factual allegations against them. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place the
case number and word “Amended” on a § 1983 complaint form and send it, along with three
summons forms, to Plaintiff for his use should he wish to amend the complaint.
Plaintiff is WARNED that should he not file an amended complaint within the
allotted time, the Court will enter an Order dismissing the action.
Date:

June 6, 2016

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4414.010

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