Moore v. Hopkins County Jail

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. All claims against the named Defendant have been dismissed, and Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court's Order directing him to file an amended complaint within the time allotted. Accordingly, this matter must be dismissed. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendant (ERH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16CV-P65-JHM
RICHARD EDWARD MOORE III

PLAINTIFF

v.
HOPKINS COUNTY JAIL

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Richard Edward Moore III, filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
proceeding in forma pauperis naming the Hopkins County Jail as the only Defendant. On
June 7, 2016, upon initial screening of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order (DN 16) dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against
the Hopkins County Jail pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. However, the Court gave Plaintiff a 30-day period in which he
could amend his complaint with respect to his claims of denied medical and dental treatment and
to name as Defendants the individuals whom he alleges are responsible for his injuries and state
specifically the factual allegations against them. That 30-day period expired, and Plaintiff filed
no amendment despite the Court’s specific warning that: “Plaintiff is WARNED that should he
not file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Court will enter an Order dismissing the
action.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Upon filing the instant action, Plaintiff assumed the responsibility to actively litigate his
claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the Court to dismiss the action “[i]f the
plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Although federal
courts afford pro se litigants some leniency on matters that require legal sophistication, such as

formal pleading rules, the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and other
procedures readily understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay or
failure to pursue a case. See Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). “[T]he lenient
treatment of pro se litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with
an easily understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more
generously than a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)
(citing Jourdan, 951 F.2d at 110). Courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative,
to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or
dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
All claims against the named Defendant have been dismissed, and Plaintiff failed to
comply with the Court’s Order directing him to file an amended complaint within the time
allotted. Accordingly, this matter must be dismissed. The Court will enter a separate Order of
dismissal.
Date:

August 3, 2016

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4414.010

2