Wells v. Daviess Co. Detention Center
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., finding that because Plaintiff has failed to comply with a straightforward Order of this Court (DN 5) or taken any action in response to the Court's Order, he has abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendant (RR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
JAMES ADAM WELLS
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-00084-JHM
DAVIESS COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 5, 2016, Plaintiff James Adam Wells initiated the instant 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action by filing a pro se complaint (DN 1) and a prisoner application to proceed without
prepayment of fees (DN 3). By Order entered on July 6, 2016, the Court denied as moot
Plaintiff’s prisoner application to proceed without prepayment because Plaintiff was no longer a
prisoner (DN 5). The Court then directed Plaintiff to either pay the filing fee or file a nonprisoner application to proceed without prepayment of fees within 30 days from entry of the
Order. The Order warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Order would result in
dismissal of this action. Over 30 days have passed since the entry of the Order, and Plaintiff has
not responded to the Order or taken any action in this case.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal
of an action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See Jourdan
v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the
district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). Although federal courts afford pro se
litigants some leniency on matters that require legal sophistication, such as formal pleading rules,
the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and other procedures readily
understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay or failure to pursue a
case. Id. at 110. “As this court has noted, the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se
litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily
understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than
a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d at 110). “Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that courts
have an inherent power to manage their own affairs and may dismiss a case sua sponte for lack
of prosecution.” Lyons-Bey v. Pennell, 93 F. App’x 732, 733 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with a straightforward Order of this Court
(DN 5) or taken any action in response to the Court’s Order, the Court concludes that he has
abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the action by
separate Order.
Date:
September 14, 2016
cc: Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4414.011
2
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