Davis v. Southern Health Partners

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 2/3/2017: Defendant Gibbson and the claims against her are DISMISSED from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Lesley Gibbson as a Defendant from the docket of this action. The Court will enter a separate Scheduling Order directing service and governing the development of the continuing claims. cc: Plaintiff (pro se), Defendants, HCA (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER DAVIS

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16CV-P94-JHM

LEAH HUMPHRIES et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On November 29, 2016, the Court performed initial review of the complaint in this action
and dismissed the sole Defendant, Southern Health Partners (SHP), and the claims against it and
dismissed the claim for expungement or release (DN 8). Further, the Court allowed Plaintiff to
amend his complaint to name as Defendants the specific individual(s) who was/were responsible
for denying him medication and medical treatment.
Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint (DN 9), which is currently before the Court for
initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 594 U.S. 199 (2007). Upon
review, the Court will dismiss Defendant Gibbson and the claims against her and allow the
Fourteenth Amendment failure to treat and First Amendment retaliation claims to proceed
against Defendant Humphries in her individual capacity.
I.
In his amended complaint (DN 9), Plaintiff lists SHP and Leah Humphries as Defendants
in the caption of the complaint. In the “Parties” portion of the complaint, Plaintiff identifies
Leah Humphries, a nurse employed by SHP, and Lesley Gibbson, who Plaintiff states “[r]uns”
the Henderson County Detention Center (HCDC), as Defendants in this action. Plaintiff sues

Defendants Humphries and Gibbson in their individual capacities. As relief, Plaintiff states that
he is seeking monetary damages and “expungement of records.”
The Court previously dismissed SHP and the claims against it and dismissed the claim for
expungement or release. Plaintiff has presented no additional facts or arguments as to the
previously dismissed claims and Defendant; thus, their dismissed status remains unchanged, and
the Court will not address them herein. The Court considers the sole Defendants for purposes of
the amended complaint and its review to be Defendants Humphries and Gibbson and that
Plaintiff seeks only monetary relief.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff states as follows:
Around September 21, 2015 I became ill due to not receiving my medication for a
week in a half from Southern Health Partners for my High Blood Sugar. When I
asked for treatment Nurse Leah Humphries Denied Service. I asked Nurse
Humphries to take me to the hospital since I had my own insurance. But Leah
said no she was not going to take me to Hospital. Instead she Refused me
medical care and put me in the Jail’s hole for seven Day’s.
II.
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608.
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a
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claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Nat.
Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court’s duty “does not require [it]
to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create
a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential
claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.
1985).
III.
A. Defendant Gibbson
Plaintiff names Lesley Gibbson, who he identifies as the person who “[r]uns” the
HCDC, as a Defendant in his amended complaint. However, Plaintiff makes no
allegations against her in the amended complaint. “It is axiomatic that a complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show a causal connection between the named defendants and the
alleged constitutional deprivation; the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application

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thereunder.” Cox v. Barksdale, No. 86-5553, 1986 WL 18435, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 13,
1986) (citing Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984); Dunn v. Tennessee,
697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982)). The doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to
control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Cardinal v.
Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 802-03 (6th Cir. 2009); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d at 421.
Additionally, “simple awareness of employees’ misconduct does not lead to supervisor
liability.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lillard v. Shelby
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 1996)). Rather, “a plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Shehee v. Luttrell,
199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that supervisory liability “must be based on
active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon ‘a mere failure to act’”)
(quoting Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)). “Where a
complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the
complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the
complaint is properly dismissed . . . .” Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir.
1974); see also LeMasters v. Fabian, No. 09-702 DSD/AJB, 2009 WL 1405176, at *2
(D. Minn. May 18, 2009) (“To state an actionable civil rights claim against a government
official or entity, a complaint must include specific factual allegations showing how that
particular party’s own personal acts or omissions directly caused a violation of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”).

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There are no allegations in the amended complaint as to Defendant Gibbson. Having
failed to allege any conduct on the part of Defendant Gibbson that violates Plaintiff’s rights, the
individual-capacity claim against her will be dismissed. Further, there being no remaining
claims against her, Defendant Gibbson will be dismissed from this action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Defendant Humphries
1. Medical Claim
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, alleges that Defendant Humphries refused him medical care
when he became ill around September 21, 2015.
“The right to adequate medical care is guaranteed to convicted federal prisoners by the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and is made applicable to
convicted state prisoners and to pretrial detainees (both federal and state) by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005).
“In the context of medical care for prisoners and pretrial detainees, it is well established that
‘deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s [or detainee’s] serious illness or injury states a cause of
action under § 1983.’” Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)) (alteration in original).
Upon consideration, the Court will allow the Fourteenth Amendment claim against
Defendant Humphries in her individual capacity for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs to proceed.
2. Retaliation Claim
Not only does Plaintiff allege that Defendant Humphries refused him medical treatment,
but he also alleges that she put him “in the jail’s hole for seven Day’s” instead of treating him.

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Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Upon consideration, the Court will allow the First Amendment retaliation claim against
Defendant Humphries in her individual capacity to proceed.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons set forth more fully above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently
advised,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Gibbson and the claims against her are DISMISSED
from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Lesley Gibbson as a Defendant from
the docket of this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Fourteenth Amendment failure to treat and the
First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendant Humphries in her individual capacity will
proceed.
The Court will enter a separate Scheduling Order directing service and governing the
development of the continuing claims. In permitting these claims to continue, the Court passes
no judgment on the merits and ultimate outcome of the action.
Date:

February 3, 2017

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Henderson County Attorney
4414.003

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