Davis v. Southern Health Partners

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 11/29/2016: The claims against SHP and the claims seeking expungement of Plaintiff's records or Plaintiff's release are DISMISSED; SHP is DISMISSED as a Defendant fr om this action since there are no remaining claims against it. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to remove SHP as a Defendant from the docket of this action. Within 30 days of entry of this Order Plaintiff may amend his complaint; The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send to Plaintiff a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint form with this case number and the word AMENDED affixed thereto for Plaintiffs use should he wish to amend the complaint. cc: Plaintiff (pro se) w/ Complaint form, defendant (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
CHRISTOPHER DAVIS

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-P94-JHM

SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Christopher Davis, a pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Henderson County
Detention Center (HCDC), filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has
granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The complaint is before the Court for
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,
608-09 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For
the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss Southern Health Partners (SHP) and the claims
against it, dismiss the claim for expungement or release, and allow Plaintiff to amend his
complaint.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff names one Defendant in this action, SHP. Plaintiff identifies SHP as “a Private
entity that Provides Medical Services to Prison inmates under color of state law.” As relief,
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and “expungement of records or Release.”
In his complaint, Plaintiff states that around September 21st,1 he became ill due to not
receiving his medication for “a week in a half from Southern Health Partners for [his] High
Blood Sugar.” Plaintiff states that when he asked for treatment, Nurse Leah Humphries “Denyed
Service.” According to Plaintiff, he asked Nurse Humphries to be taken to the hospital since he
had his own insurance, “but Leah said to [him] that she was not going to take [him] to the
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Plaintiff fails to state the year in which the alleged violations occurred.

Hospital. Instead she Refused [him] medical care and put [him] in the Jail’s hole for seven
Days.” Plaintiff states that he “was in so much pain [he] though [he] was going to Die.”
According to Plaintiff, when he got ill he “called for the guard for over and Hour when a guard
Underwood came and sat [him] down in the Jail hallway for over and Hour with no help.”
Plaintiff states that on September 22nd, SHP “was giving [him] medication that was not
Prescribe to [him] by [his] Doctor while all the time [he] had [his] medication from [his] Doctor
that [his] wife sent in But the Nurse said it was lost.”
Plaintiff further states that in May 2016, he ran out of the blood sugar medication that his
wife had “sent in . . . and the nurse at Southern Health Partners tryed to gived [him] medication
that was not Prescribe to [him] by [his] Doctor.” Plaintiff states that he refused this medication
and “didn’t have any medication for three weeks.” He asserts that he “was sick and went for
three weeks with no medication.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a district court must dismiss a case at any
time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may,
therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory
or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for
failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

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“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Nat.
Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court’s duty “does not require [it]
to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create
a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential
claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
“The Sixth Circuit has held that the analysis that applies to a § 1983 claim against a
municipality applies to a § 1983 claim against a private corporation such as Southern Health
Partners.” Detwiler v. S. Health Partners, No. 3:16-cv-P343-DJH, 2016 WL 4083465,
at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2016) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978) (“Monell involved a municipal corporation, but every circuit to consider the issue has
extended the holding to private corporations as well.”)). SHP cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior basis for the actions of its employees. Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc.,
7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001); Ruley v. S. Health Partners, No. 4:10-CV-P34-M,

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2011 WL 2214998, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2011). A private corporation such as SHP is liable
under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged
deprivation of the constitutional right. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 817
(6th Cir. 1996). Simply stated, “a plaintiff must ‘identify the policy, connect the policy to the
city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that
policy.’” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v.
City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill.
of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of
the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under
§ 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). “The ‘official policy’ requirement was
intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is
actually responsible.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
Plaintiff makes no allegation that the alleged constitutional deprivation resulted from a
policy or custom of SHP. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against SHP, and SHP
and the claims against it will be dismissed.
Further, part of the relief Plaintiff seeks is for the Court to expunge his records or release
him. He, therefore, seeks an immediate or speedier release from imprisonment. “[W]hen a state
prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he
seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez,

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411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). The § 1983 claim for equitable relief, therefore, cannot lie and will be
dismissed.
Rather than dismissing this entire action at this time, the Court will allow Plaintiff to
amend his complaint. Plaintiff alleges that he was given the incorrect medications and denied
medication and medical treatment. However, he fails to name as Defendants any individuals he
alleges were responsible for the claimed violations. “[U]nder Rule 15(a) a district court can
allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under
the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act].” LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir.
2013). The Court will allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint to name as Defendants the specific
individual(s) who was/were responsible for denying him medication and medical treatment and
for giving him medication not prescribed for him.
IV. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the claims against SHP and the claims seeking expungement of
Plaintiff’s records or Plaintiff’s release are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that SHP is DISMISSED as a Defendant from this action since there
are no remaining claims against it. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to remove SHP as a
Defendant from the docket of this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days of entry of this Order Plaintiff may
amend his complaint to name, in their individual capacity, the specific individual(s) who
was/were responsible for denying him medication and medical treatment and for giving him
medication not prescribed for him, if he so chooses. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send

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to Plaintiff a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint form with this case number and the word
“AMENDED” affixed thereto for Plaintiff’s use should he wish to amend the complaint. Once
received, the Court will perform screening of the amended complaint.
Should Plaintiff file no amended complaint within 30 days, the Court will enter a
final Order dismissing the entire action for the reasons stated herein.
Date:

November 29, 2016

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4414.003

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