Guthrie v. Osborn et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 11/2/2016: The Court will dismiss plaintiff's Claims by separate order. cc: Plaintiff (pro se), Defendants, DCA (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
RICHARD LEE GUTHRIE
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-P116-JHM

DAVID OSBORN et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Richard Lee Guthrie, pro se, has filed a complaint on this Court’s 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 form. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, the complaint will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Daviess County Detention Center (DCDC). He states that
he was sentenced to 30 years in prison for manufacturing meth, even though: 1) no drugs were
found on him; 2) his three co-defendants were given 3-10 year sentences; and 3) the residence
belonged to the codefendant who received the least time. He further states that the police chief
of Clinton County, Kentucky, had family directly involved in this case. He states that 15-18
months ago, he was shipped to DCDC by the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) and
that, because he is being held in a county jail, he has no access to a legal aide, a law book, a
pencil, or money to pay for postage or phone calls to seek qualified legal help. Plaintiff asserts
that his requests for a transfer to a KDOC facility have been denied.
Plaintiff alleges that it is fundamentally unfair to prosecute an uneducated, unprepared
impoverished person, “esentionaly giving him a life sentence, then locking him or her in a Ky.
D.O.C. jail, that is designed for strictly punitive, and security purposes, especially when the

police chief of county of conviction has family members involved.” He states that he seeks relief
to be moved immediately to a KDOC facility “that can meet his needs of simple fairness or
immediate release.”
Plaintiff names as Defendants in their individual and official capacities, Daviess County
Jailer David Osborn, DCDC Class D Coordinator Corporal Bennett, and KDOC Commissioner
LaDonna Thompson. As relief, he asks for “review and action of federal court.”
II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

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A. Claims regarding the fact or duration of his confinement
To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to challenge the validity of his state-court conviction in
this Court, he may do so in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
after he has fully exhausted his state court remedies. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973) (holding that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges
the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release). Therefore,
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims seeking to challenge his state-court conviction is appropriate.1 See
Barnes v. Lewis, No. 93-5698, 1993 WL 515483 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993) (holding that dismissal
is appropriate where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration of
confinement); King v. Moyes, No. 2:10-cv-234, 2010 WL 4705269, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12,
2010).
B. Claim seeking transfer
The law is clear that inmates have no constitutional right to be incarcerated in any
particular institution unless the state has created a liberty interest in remaining at a particular
institution. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874 (6th Cir.
1986). This is not the case in Kentucky where transfer of prisoners is within the discretion of the
corrections cabinet. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 197.065.
Further, the courts are ever cautioned to stay out of the business of micro-managing
prisons. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
Prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline
and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim

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The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed a habeas corpus action in this Court. Guthrie v. Guffie, 4:16-CV-P111JHM.

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that he should not be housed in a county facility and that he should be transferred fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted and must be disissed.
C. Remainder of claims
Additionally, the remainder of Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. The first inquiry in any § 1983 case is whether a deprivation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States has occurred. Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 140 (1979); Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 483, 485 (6th Cir. 1995).
The courts have recognized repeatedly that there is no constitutionally protected right of
access to a law library. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). Prisoners do have a First
Amendment right of access to the courts, but it does not guarantee access to a prison law library.
Id.; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 830-31 (1977); Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th
Cir. 1985). When an inmate claims his access to the courts was denied merely because he was
denied access to the prison library, or certain books, he fails to state a claim absent a showing of
prejudice to his litigation. Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d at 932.
Nor does Plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied a legal aide, standing alone, state a
cognizable claim under the First Amendment. Richardson v. Oldham, No. CIV.A.3:07CVP388H, 2007 WL 3251848, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 2, 2007). In order to state a claim for a denial
of access to the courts, a prisoner must demonstrate actual prejudice to pending litigation that
challenges his conviction or conditions of confinement. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 351 (“[A]n
inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library
or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.”).
Although Plaintiff alleges that he has no access to a legal aide, a law book, a pencil, or
money to pay for postage or phone calls to seek qualified legal help, he has made no specific

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allegation of actual prejudice to pending litigation. Additionally, the Court notes that he has
filed two lawsuits in this Court while incarcerated at DCDC. Consequently, his claims related to
the prison law library, legal aide, writing supplies, postage, and phone calls must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
Date:

November 2, 2016

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Daviess County Attorney
4414.009

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