Gibson v. City of Sturgis, Kentucky et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 4/8/2017: The motion by Defendant, Sturgis, Kentucky Police Department, to dismiss is GRANTED. cc: Counsel(JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-00021-JHM
TONJA GIBSON

PLAINTIFF

V.
CITY OF STURGIS, KENTUCKY; STURGIS,
KENTUCKY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et. al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion by Defendant, Sturgis, Kentucky Police
Department to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [DN 1-5 at 38]. Fully briefed, this
matter is ripe for decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Tonja Gibson, filed a civil action on November 14, 2016, in the Union Circuit
Court against Defendants, City of Sturgis, Kentucky; Sturgis, Kentucky Police Department;
Duane Jackson, Chief of Police; Eric McCallister, Police Officer; Union County Sheriff’s
Department; Mickey Arnold, Sheriff; Lee Chandler, Deputy Sheriff; and Richard Jones, Union
County Dog Warden. (Complaint, DN 1-5 at 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges that she was arrested on
November 14, 2015, after a neighbor reported that her dogs were running loose in Sturgis,
Kentucky. (Complaint, DN 1-5 at 4.) Gibson avers that she was arrested by Union County
Deputy Sheriff Lee Chandler and Sturgis Police Officer Eric McCallister and was charged with
resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and violation of Union County Ordinance 06-01.
Additionally, Plaintiff states that her dogs were unlawfully seized.

Plaintiff asserts claims for

unlawful search and seizure, false imprisonment and arrest, negligence, infliction of emotional
distress, assault/battery, malicious prosecution, negligent hiring, supervision and retention, and

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vicarious liability against Defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that the Defendants violated her
rights pursuant to the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky law.

On December 6, 2016,

Defendant, Sturgis, Kentucky Police Department (hereinafter “Sturgis Police Department”),
moved to dismiss the complaint against it arguing that the Sturgis Police Department is not an
entity subject to suit.
On February 22, 2017, Defendants, City of Sturgis, Sturgis Police Department, and
Duane Jackson, removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). According to
Defendants, Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Defendants violated “clearly established
constitutional rights” and that “the search and seizure of the Plaintiff and her property constituted
a reckless and/or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights.” Given
these allegations, Defendants sent Plaintiff a Request for Admission asking her to admit that she
has “not brought any federal Constitutional claims or any other federal claims against these
Defendants.” On January 30, 2017, Plaintiff responded: “Plaintiff states the Complaint speaks
for itself; however, there is no question the conduct of the Defendants collectively and
individually, violated certain of Plaintiff’s rights protected by the United States Constitution as
well as federal statutes, including but not limited to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (DN 1 at ¶¶ 4, 5.) Given
this response, Plaintiff’s filed the notice of removal based on federal question jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss originally filed by the Defendant, Sturgis
Police Department, in the state court action.

Plaintiff filed a response. (DN 1-6 at 26.)

Defendant filed a reply. (DN 1-6 at 36.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
a court “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff,” League of United
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Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), “accept all
well-pled factual allegations as true[,]” id., and determine whether the “complaint states a
plausible claim for relief[,]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Under this standard,
the plaintiff must provide the grounds for his or her entitlement to relief which “requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff satisfies this standard only
when he or she “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint falls
short if it pleads facts “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” or if the alleged facts do
not “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 678, 679.
Instead, the allegations must “‘show[ ] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court will dismiss the claims against Sturgis Police Department because it is not an
entity subject to suit. Smallwood v. Jefferson County Government, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D.
Ky. 1990); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). Rather, the claims against
the police department are against the City of Sturgis as the real party in interest. Matthews, 35
F.3d at 1049 (“Since the Police Department is not an entity which may be sued, Jefferson County
is the proper party to address the allegations of Matthews’s complaint.”); Rhodes v. McDannel,
945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued under §
1983); Miller v. Bullitt County Fiscal Court, 2017 WL 380929, *5-6 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 26,
2017)(plaintiff’s state law claims against Bullitt County Fiscal Court are claims against the
county itself); Smith v. Flinkfelt, 2013 WL 5467618, *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2013) (dismissing
all claims against Henry County Animal Control because Henry County was the proper
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defendant); Bennett v. Radcliff Police Dept., 2013 WL 4456677, *5 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 16,
2013)(Kentucky case law treats police departments as mere divisions of the city government.
Court dismissed state law trespass claim against the Radcliff Police Department because
“[p]laintiffs should have sued the City of Radcliff, rather than the RPD, for recovery on its state
and federal law claims.”)

Accordingly, any claims asserted against the Sturgis Police

Department, including the failure to properly train and supervise its police officer, are deemed
asserted against the City of Sturgis.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Kindle v. City of Jeffersontown, Ky. does not warrant a
different conclusion. 374 Fed. Appx. 562, 570-571 (6th Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit in Kindle
addressed the issue of whether the Jeffersontown Civil Service Commission was a necessary and
indispensable party for purposes of affording complete relief to former Jeffersontown Police
Department employees who sought reinstatement to employment.

The Sixth Circuit

distinguished the holding in Mathews v. Jones and Smallwood v. Jefferson County Government
finding that neither case involved a suit against a civil service commission. As noted by the
Sixth Circuit, authority of Kentucky state courts indicates that a commission is a different type of
entity from a mayor sued in his official capacity or a police department, “and one that is properly
party to a suit.” Id. at 571.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion by
Defendant, Sturgis, Kentucky Police Department, to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
[DN 1-5 at 38], is GRANTED.

cc: counsel of record
April 6, 2017

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