Price v. Kentucky Department of Corrections Commissioner et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 3/30/2018: The official-capacity claims for damages against all Defendants are DISMISSED; The claims for declaratory relief and the individual capacityclaims against Defendants K DOC Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, WardenSmith, and Captain Williams and the Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Grooms and Ball are DISMISSED; The Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE Defendants KDOC Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, Warden Smith, and Captain Williams as parties. cc: Plaintiff (pro se), defendants, JPSC (JM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
MARK A. PRICE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-P152-JHM

KY. DEPT. OF CORR. COMMISIONER et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Mark A. Price, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed in part and
allowed to continue in part.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff, who was incarcerated at the Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR) at the pertinent
time, names as Defendants the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) Commissioner; the
KDOC Deputy Commissioner; KSR Warden Aaron Smith; and Michael D. Williams, John R.
Grooms, and Jeremy Ball, all with KSR Internal Affairs. Plaintiff alleges that on December 7,
2016, he notified Defendants Grooms and Ball that a group of inmates had approached him with
shanks to extort him and his friend. He states that Defendants Grooms and Ball walked away,
with Defendant Grooms stating “‘Welcome to KSR.’” He states that they ignored his request to
see “Capt. Mike Williams (their boss).” Plaintiff further states that approximately ten minutes
later, he was approached by the inmates with shanks who demanded that he pay them “25
[dollars] a week extortion fee.” He states that when he refused, he was cut across the neck by
inmate Andrews. He alleges that he “ran to medical bleeding bad in fear for my life. Medical
fixed me. Staff placed me in seg.” Plaintiff alleges that the KDOC Commissioner and Deputy

Commissioner are responsible for the safety and security of Kentucky prisoners, but that
prisoners are not safe. He alleges that they fail to provide a secure environment and that they are
well aware of the problem. He alleges that it is Warden Smith’s responsibility to protect the
KSR inmates, but KSR is understaffed and dangerous. He further alleges that Defendants
Williams, Grooms, and Ball are internal affairs investigators, but they failed to protect him.
Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants Grooms and Ball “did the disciplinary report on
inmate Andrews. In the report [Defendant] Grooms implicated Plaintiff’s name multiple times.
Prison staff are forbidden by due process and equal protection not to be grossly negligent in
prison disciplinary reports.”
The complaint refers to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments “and unknown state laws
and guidelines that were violated.”
Plaintiff attaches several documents to his complaint, including a grievance and an
incident report summary about the incident on December 7, 2016. He also includes a grievance
information form in which he grieves the fact that his name was included in another inmate’s
paperwork. That form states that Defendants Grooms and Ball work in the internal affair office
under Defendant Williams. In that form, Plaintiff accuses Defendants Grooms and Ball of
falsifying a report and states:
These officers[’] actions are a clear violation of Ky DOC policies & procedures
and violation of other constitutional laws. Mr. Groom and Mr. Ball put my life in
danger while at KSR where I was almost killed and have put my life in danger or
harm while incarcerated in Ky. DOC by their actions. Copies of the report are
being passed out like candy.
As relief, Plaintiff requests declarative relief and punitive and monetary damages against
Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

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II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may,
therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory
or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a
plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the
complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true.
Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must
liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam),
to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A. Official-capacity claims
Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely
provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. As such, it has two basic
requirements: (1) the deprivation of federal statutory or constitutional rights by (2) a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in
their official capacities must be dismissed. “Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent []
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v.
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Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Because Defendants are officers of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, the claims brought against them in their official capacities are deemed claims against
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. State officials sued
in their official capacities for damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. at 71. Thus, because Plaintiff seeks damages from state
officers in their official capacities, he fails to allege cognizable claims against them under
§ 1983. Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to claims for damages against all
Defendants in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169. For these reasons,
the official-capacity claims for damages against all Defendants will be dismissed.
B. Declaratory relief
Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at KSR, his request for declarative relief is
moot. See, e.g., Parks v. Reans, 510 F. App’x 414, 415 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A prisoner’s request for
injunctive and declaratory relief is moot upon his transfer to a different facility.”); Kensu v.
Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that inmate’s claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief were rendered moot upon inmate’s transfer from the prison about which he
complained). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for declarative relief will be dismissed as well for failure to
state a claim.
C. Individual-capacity claims against Defendants KDOC Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioner, Smith, and Williams
The complaint describes no actions taken personally by Defendants KDOC
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, Warden Smith, or Captain Williams. Instead,
Plaintiff seeks to hold these Defendants liable based on their supervisory positions of being
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KDOC Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, KSR Warden, and Captain with supervisory
position over Grooms and Ball, respectively. However, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or
the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto
supervisors. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor v. Mich.
Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th
Cir. 1984). “Likewise, simple awareness of employees’ misconduct does not lead to supervisor
liability.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003). Rather, “a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199
F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that supervisory liability “must be based on active
unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon ‘a mere failure to act’”) (quoting Salehpour
v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff’s complaint does not do so with
regard to these Defendants, and Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against them.
D. Individual-capacity claims against Defendants Grooms and Ball
1. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Grooms and Ball “did the disciplinary report on inmate
Andrews” which implicated “Plaintiff’s name multiple times. Prison staff are forbidden by due
process and equal protection not to be grossly negligent in prison disciplinary reports.”
Allegations of gross negligence do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See
Lewellen v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 34 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“Gross negligence is not actionable under § 1983, because it is not ‘arbitrary in the
constitutional sense.’”) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992));
see also Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1066 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[G]ross negligence is
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not the type of government action needed to support a Section 1983 claim”). Plaintiff “may have
a state law claim for gross negligence against the[se] [D]efendants, but these facts do not give
rise to a constitutional tort under Section 1983.” Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d at 1065.
Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment claims against these Defendants will be dismissed.
2. Failure to protect
The Court will allow the Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against Defendants
Grooms and Ball to go forward. The Court also will allow Plaintiff’s state law claims regarding
gross negligence against these Defendants to proceed.
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the official-capacity claims for damages against all Defendants
are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and for seeking monetary damages from Defendants
immune from such relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims for declaratory relief and the individualcapacity claims against Defendants KDOC Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, Warden
Smith, and Captain Williams and the Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Grooms
and Ball are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE Defendants KDOC Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioner, Warden Smith, and Captain Williams as parties.

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A separate Scheduling Order will be entered to govern the development of the remaining
claims, i.e., the individual-capacity Eighth Amendment claims for failure to protect and state law
claims regarding gross negligence against Defendants Grooms and Ball.
Date:

March 30, 2018

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4414.009

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