Torres-Torres v. Washingting

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 8/10/2018: This action will be dismissed by separate order. cc: Plaintiff (pro se) (JM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
DANIEL TORRES-TORRES
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18CV-P50-JHM

ROY WASHINGTING

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
On April 25, 2018, the Clerk of Court issued a Notice of Deficiency (DN 8) to Plaintiff
directing him to file a certified copy of his jail trust account statement for the six-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. The Notice of Deficiency advised Plaintiff
that failure to comply within 30 days would result in this matter being brought to the attention of
the Court. On May 7, 2018, the copy of the Notice of Deficiency sent to Plaintiff at the Grayson
County Detention Center, where Plaintiff indicated he was incarcerated in his complaint, was
returned to the Court by the U.S. Postal Service marked “Return To Sender, Refused, and Unable
To Forward” (DN 9). Following return of the mailing, further review of the complaint revealed
that Plaintiff provided a mailing address at a seemingly residential location in Indianapolis,
Indiana. Consequently, the Clerk of Court re-mailed the Notice of Deficiency to Plaintiff at the
Indiana address. Plaintiff failed to respond to the re-mailed Notice of Deficiency within 30 days.
Accordingly, the Court entered an Order on June 15, 2018 (DN 10), directing Plaintiff to file a
certified copy of his jail trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the
filing of the complaint and warning him that his failure to comply within 30 days from entry of that

Order would result in dismissal of this action. The 30-day period has expired without
compliance by Plaintiff.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal
of an action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See Jourdan
v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the
district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). “[W]hile pro se litigants may be entitled
to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal
training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements
that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Id. “[T]he lenient treatment of pro se
litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily
understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than
a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Additionally,
courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases
that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief.”
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
Because Plaintiff failed to comply with a straightforward Order of this Court, despite
being warned that dismissal would occur without compliance, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action.
Therefore, this action will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:

August 10, 2018

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4414.005

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