Keim v. Mazza et al
Filing
75
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 12/30/2021 - For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Lessye Crafton's Motion for summary judgment 53 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for summary judgment or default 37 is DENIED. cc:counsel; Plaintiff, pro se (EAS)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-00190 -JHM
GARY KEIM
PLAINTIFF
V.
KEVIN MAZZA, et al.,
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DN 53].
Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at Green River Correctional Complex
(“GRCC”), staff members at the jail ignored his medical needs as it relates to an ACL issue in his
right knee and asthma/COPD.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants changed his housing
assignment as retaliation for informing his family of COVID-19 issues at the jail. In addition to
retaliation, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs and equal protection violations.
A. Plaintiff’s medical history
Plaintiff reportedly had tearing in his knee as far back as 1991 and has received various
treatments for it throughout the years. In 2009, while in the custody of the Kentucky Department
of Corrections, Plaintiff requested a wheelchair even though he was observed by multiple medical
staff walking around without difficulty. [DN 56]. The medical provider at the time did not find a
wheelchair to be appropriate, but Plaintiff was provided a knee sleeve for stability after
complaining of a torn meniscus and ACL. [Id.]. In 2010, an MRI revealed that Plaintiff had torn
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menisci and a cruciate ligament at that time. [Id.]. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff consulted with an
orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Anbu Nadar, M.D., and Dr. Nadar suggested various treatment options,
including arthroscopy and an ACL repair, could benefit Plaintiff if he experienced ongoing
instability and discomfort. [Id.]. As Defendant notes, there is no record that Plaintiff underwent
the procedure or that there was any authorization or further recommendation for surgery. [DN 53
at 4]. Apparently, Plaintiff refused to be transported for an appointment with Dr. Nadar in June of
2011. Instead, Plaintiff followed up with a nurse practitioner, who, rather than recommend
surgery, instructed him to use a knee sleeve and cane and to strengthen the muscles around his
knee by using weights. [Id.]. In July of 2020, after requesting X-rays, a radiologist confirmed
both of Plaintiff’s knee joints were in alignment. Only mild osteoarthritis was detected in both
knees, and no fractures or dislocations were found. [Id.]. Another X-ray in April of 2021
confirmed the same. [DN 56].
Plaintiff was given a nursing care plan for asthma in 2017, and his asthma/COPD was noted
to be in good control at that time. [Id.]. In 2018, when Plaintiff was at GRCC, he was prescribed
an inhaler and his asthma/COPD was again noted to be in good control. [Id.]. In June of 2020,
Plaintiff’s asthma was described as “mild/intermittent” and in good control. [Id.].
B. Plaintiff’s allegations
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lessye Crafton allowed him to be placed on a top bunk,
which caused re-injury to his right knee; refused to follow the treatment plan and schedule the
surgery recommended by Dr. Nadar; refused to provide him with a knee brace for stability and to
help prevent further injury; refused to give Plaintiff a wheelchair to get to the chow hall, resulting
in 4 days of missed meals; failed to treat his COPD as she did for other similarly situated inmates;
and not scheduling an MRI when he needed it. [DN 1; DN 60].
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On March 31, 2021, this Court allowed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Crafton in her
individual capacity to proceed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must find that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the basis
for its motion and identifying that portion of the record that demonstrates the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party
satisfies this burden, the non-moving party thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
Although the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some “metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986). Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the non-moving party to
present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of
a genuine dispute[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which
the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to Exhaust
The Sixth Circuit has explained that a prisoner ordinarily does not exhaust his remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) when he does not specify the names of each person
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from whom he seeks relief. Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2017); see ReedBey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324–25 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Requiring inmates to exhaust prison
remedies in the manner the State provides—by, say, identifying all relevant defendants— …
furthers [the PLRA’s] objectives …”). In this case, GRCC had such a procedural rule in place at
the time of Plaintiff’s allegations with rule CPP 14.6(II)(K)(1)(a)(4), requiring that a grievance
“identify all individuals”. [DN 53-4]. Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to comply with CPP
14.6 and identify Defendant Crafton, but instead argues that he lacked all the information to name
Defendant Crafton. This rule serves the purpose of placing all relevant Defendants on notice of
any actions or grievances pending against them.
Plaintiff cites Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller in arguing that an exception to this rule should apply
because GRCC officials responded to his grievances by addressing them on the merits and not
dismissing the grievances according to their own procedural rules. But GRCC officials did
respond by citing the various procedural rules that Plaintiff did not follow—for example, by raising
the same claims within six months of each other and failing to submit a grievance within five days
of the alleged incident. See DN 53-4 at 24, 35–38; DN 65 at FN 2. That Defendant did not raise
the issue of failing to specifically mention Crafton until after the lawsuit was filed against her does
not warrant applying the Reed-Bey exception; Defendant had no way of knowing Defendant
Crafton was previously the subject of Plaintiff’s grievances due to Plaintiff’s omission of her name.
The record shows that GRCC officials denied Plaintiff’s grievances on applicable procedural
grounds or that they were not fully exhausted through appropriate channels, so Defendant has not
forfeited that right here. See DN 53-5.
Because Plaintiff failed to identify Defendant Crafton in any of his initial grievances and
has not demonstrated any “affirmative efforts” to comply with CPP 14.6 as required by Mattox,
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851 F.3d at 590, Defendant Crafton was not placed on fair notice of these actions. Accordingly,
there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies, and Defendant Crafton is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Deliberate Indifference
A prisoner bringing a claim of deliberate indifference must satisfy two requirements to
succeed. First is the objective requirement, in which he must show that his allegedly deprived
medical needs were “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The
second requirement, the subjective one, requires the Plaintiff to show that the Defendant Crafton
acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. Mere negligence, or a doctor’s errors in
medical judgment, is not enough to constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment. See Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 736–38 (6th Cir. 2018). Rather, the state of
mind required is “equivalent to criminal recklessness” and exempts good faith attempts to provide
reasonable medical care. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2013). Under the
subjective standard, a prison official cannot be liable unless he or she “knows of and [consciously]
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
In this case, Plaintiff does not contest that he was provided some treatment for his physical
ailments. He was given steroid injections and pain medication, which he admitted helped to
alleviate some of the pain in his knee, but he complained that it was not strong enough. He wanted
a surgical procedure on his knee that was unnecessary from recent X-rays and evaluations given
to him. He was provided multiple pulmonary care plans which included medication for his
asthma/COPD. Plaintiff also alleges that there were delays in receiving treatments. But because
Plaintiff received treatment for his condition, he must show that the treatments were “so woefully
inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x. 602, 604–05
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(6th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff cannot meet this standard simply by lodging his disagreement with the
types of treatment he received and complaining that he did not receive alternative treatments that
he preferred. See, e.g., Daniel v. Harper, 2017 WL 6522090, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2017)
(finding that when an inmate’s primary issue with defendants was the “manner in which they
provided medical care to him”—that the medication being given for his back troubles was
inadequate in plaintiff’s view—summary judgment was appropriate for defendants because
plaintiff “presented nothing more than a disagreement” about the appropriate course of treatment.).
There is no indication that the various treatments Plaintiff received were inadequate for his
conditions, much less amounting to “cruel and unusual punishment.” Medical records indicate
that he was walking and moving about capably, and diagnostic imaging confirmed that no major
procedures were warranted. As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendant Crafton acted with deliberate indifference to any substantial risk to Plaintiff’s medical
condition.
C. Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Crafton housed him with another inmate who tested
positive for COVID-19 and removed his bottom bunk restriction in retaliation for Plaintiff
reporting to his family alleged COVID-19 noncompliance at the facility. However, in addition to
showing (1) he engaged in protected conduct and (2) that an adverse action was taken against him
that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing such conduct, Plaintiff must show
(3) that there was a “causal connection” between his reporting of the noncompliance with
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Defendant Crafton’s housing decisions—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part
by his protected conduct. Evans v. Vinson, 427 Fed. App’x. 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any evidence that Defendant Crafton was involved
with the decision to house Plaintiff with an inmate who tested positive for COVID-19, but even if
he had, there is certainly no evidence establishing a causal link between his reporting of alleged
COVID noncompliance at the facility and his housing placements. Because there is nothing in the
record to suggest that these decisions were motivated by Plaintiff’s protected speech, there is also
no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
D. Equal Protection
Plaintiff makes conclusory equal protection claims, arguing that other inmates and groups
at GRCC were given treatments that he had requested for himself, like knee surgeries and nebulizer
treatments. He claims that Defendant Crafton discriminated against him by helping other inmates
receive the same type of medical care that he was requesting. In support of these claims, Plaintiff
has provided unsworn statements by himself and others attesting that other inmates received these
treatments. But to prove an equal protection violation, Plaintiff must show that a discriminatory
intent or purpose based upon his membership in a suspect class played a factor in an action or
decision taken against him by a public official, or that a public official intentionally treated him
differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference. TriHealth,
Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, Hamilton County, Ohio, 430 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff cannot show either direct evidence or a prima facie case of discrimination. He has
not shown that he is a member of a protected class, and he has offered no evidence that the
treatments withheld from him were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In addition, although
he cites instances of other inmates receiving knee surgeries and other treatments, he has given no
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evidence showing that these inmates are similarly situated to him. Nor has he shown that
Defendant Crafton was the person who performed the surgeries for the other inmates. He has not
attempted to describe what those inmates’ conditions were and has not compared the severity of
their injuries to his own. The record shows that Plaintiff’s symptoms were well controlled with
the treatments provided by Defendant Crafton, and Plaintiff has not shown that the medical care
he requested was necessary for his situation. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish differential
treatment to similarly situated inmates or discriminatory intent, Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment. See Robinson v. Jackson, 615 F. App’x. 310, 315 (6th Cir. 2015).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [DN 53] is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or
default [DN 37] is DENIED.
December 30, 2021
cc:
Counsel of Record
Plaintiff, pro se
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