Lauderdale v. Brady et al

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 5/18/2023: Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint 38 is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS ORDERED that the following claims are added to this action Fourteenth Amendment medical care claims against Lamar and Harris in their individual capacities; Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims against Vaught, Hendricks, and Gibson in their individual capacities; Fourteenth Amendment excess ive-force claims against Jay and Brickner in their individual capacities; and Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-intervene and due process claims to proceed against Major Payne in his individual capacity. In allowing these claims to proceed, the Court p asses no judgment upon their merit or upon the ultimate outcome of this action. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to add the following Henderson County Defendants to this action - Colonel Gibson, Major William Payne, Andrew Brickner, Rickey Jay, and th e following QCC Defendants to this action - Nurse Lamar and Arvel Jeffery Harris. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel shall notify the Court within 30 days ofentry of this Order whether they waive service for the added Defendants.The Clerk of Court is further DIRECTED to change the name of Defendant Weber toMitzi Weber and the name of Dr. Troost to Dr. Neil Troost on the docket sheet.cc:counsel; Plaintiff, pro se (EAS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
LAMONE LAUDERDALE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-P117-JHM

AMY BRADY et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil-rights action. This matter is before the Court
upon a motion for leave to amend the complaint (DN 38). For the reasons set forth below, the
motion will be denied in part and granted in part.
I.
Plaintiff Lamone Lauderdale initiated this action on August 24, 2022, when he was
incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at Henderson County Detention Center (HCDC). In the
complaint, Plaintiff sued Quality Correctional Care (QCC), HCDC Jailer Amy Brady, HCDC
Colonel Hendricks, Mitzi Weber, and Dr. Neil Troost. Plaintiff sued Defendants Brady,
Hendricks, Weber, and Troost in both their official and individual capacities. Upon initial review
of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court construed the complaint as asserting
Fourteenth Amendment claims for inadequate medical care against Defendants QCC, Troost, and
Weber (“the QCC Defendants”); a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a
First Amendment freedom-of-religion claim, and a claim under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against Defendant Brady; and a Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process claim against Defendant Hendricks. The complaint also set forth state-law claims
against Defendants Brady and QCC. Upon review, the Court allowed these claims to proceed
against Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. By subsequent Order, the

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Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to substitute HCDC Jailer Eddie Vaught as a party for
Defendant Brady in her official capacity (DN 21).
II.
In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add nine Defendants and several
new claims. In their response to the motion to amend, Defendants Brady, Vaught, and Hendricks
(hereinafter the “Henderson County Defendants”) argue that “justice does not require”
amendment because the claims asserted against the new Henderson County Defendants could
have been included in the complaint (DN 42). The Henderson County Defendants also argue
that the motion to amend should be denied because Plaintiff did not attach “evidence” in support
of his new claims.1 In their response to the motion for leave to amend, the QCC Defendants
argue that Plaintiff has failed to identify the reason for lhis ate amendment and that Plaintiff’s
claims against QCC CEO Lisa Scroggins are without merit (DN 44).
In Plaintiff’s reply, he observes that “the claims asserted in [his] original complaint were
ongoing or new claims arose after his filing.” (DN 43). In a supplemental reply, Plaintiff states,
“Let the record reflect that the Plaintiff’s original complaint alleged claims from May 2022 up to
late August 2022. The Plaintiff’s amended complaint states the original claims were ongoing
and new claims that arose from late August 2022 up to December 2022 when the Plaintiff was
transferred to another institute.” (DN 53). He then writes, “Let the record reflect that the
Plaintiff was unaware on how to amend his complaint or allege his new claims. He received
assistance from another inmate. Also upon discovery is where Plaintiff has obtained relevant
facts and names to properly amend his complaint.”

1

The Court does not understand this argument. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that a
complaint or amended complaint be supported by “evidence.”

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III.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) allows a party to amend its pleading once as a
matter of course within 21 days of serving it or within “21 days after service of a motion under
Rule 12(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(1)(A)-(B). All other amendments must be made with the
consent of the opposing party or leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The grant or denial of
a motion to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 is within the discretion of the district court. Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
Rule 15(a)(2) embodies a permissive policy toward amended pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”); Brown v. Chapman,
814 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2016). A district court may deny a motion to amend because of
(1) undue delay, (2) “bad faith or dilatory motive” by the party seeking to amend, (3) “repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,” (4) undue prejudice to the
opposing party, or (5) futility of amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The
Sixth Circuit has stated that “[t]he thrust of Rule 15 is . . . that cases should be tried on their
merits rather than the technicalities of pleading.” Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d
419, 425 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982)).
At the outset the Court observes that neither set of Defendants explicitly references this
standard. However, both responses seem to implicitly address undue delay and futility. Thus, it
is these factors that the Court will also address.
A. Undue Delay
“Ordinarily, delay alone, does not justify denial of leave to amend.”

Morse v.

McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 2002). However, at some point, “‘delay will become
undue, placing an unwarranted burden on the court, or will become prejudicial, placing an unfair

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burden on the opposing party.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. Gould, 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir.
1984)).
The party opposing the amendment has the burden of demonstrating that it would be
prejudicial. See Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 562 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit
has found undue delay in cases that are post judgment and in cases where discovery has closed,
or where dispositive motion deadlines have passed. See e.g., Duggins v. Steak ‘N Shake, Inc.,
195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that allowing amendments “after discovery had
passed, and a motion for summary judgment had been filed . . . would create significant
prejudice to the defendants”); Morse, 290 F.3d at 800 (“in the post-judgment context, we must be
particularly mindful of not only potential prejudice to the non-movant, but also the movant’s
explanation for failing to seek leave to amend prior to the entry of judgment”); Szoke v. United
Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 398 F. App’x 145, 153 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Corning v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co., 257 F.3d 484, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2001)) (“a defendant suffers substantial prejudice
when a plaintiff waits until after the filing of a summary judgment motion to file a motion to
amend”).
Plaintiff filed the motion for leave to amend prior to the close of discovery and prior to
the filing of a summary judgment motion. He also explains that he filed his motion to amend
after learning additional information through discovery. Thus, the Court finds no undue delay.
B. Futility
“[F]utility of amendment . . . is simply defined as an amendment to the complaint that
would not survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss.” 500 Assocs., Inc. v. Vt. Am. Corp., 496
F. App’x 589, 593 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601
F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010)). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a

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complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett
v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin,
551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res.,
Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court recognizes that pro se
pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.
1991), the “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up
unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff seeks to add the following Henderson County Defendants in both their official
and individual capacities – Colonel Gibson, Major William Payne, Megan McElfresh, Lt. Rickey
Jay, and Officer Andrew Brickner.
Plaintiff seeks to add the following QCC Defendants both their official and individual
capacities – CEO Lisa Scroggins, Nurse Amanda Lamar, and Mental Health Provider Arvel
Jeffery Harris.
Because Plaintiff organizes his proposed amended complaint by claims, that is how the
Court will organize its analysis.
1. “Respondeat Superior”/Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff indicates that his first claims are based upon the doctrines of “respondeat
superior” and “supervisory liability.” Plaintiff states that he is bringing these claims against

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QCC, QCC CEO Scroggins, Dr. Troost, HCDC Jailer Vaught, Colonel Gibson (“the second in
command” at HCDC), Colonel Hendricks (the “third in command” at HCDC), Major Payne, and
Major McElfresh.
At the outset, the Court observes that these doctrines are one and the same. Moreover,
the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does not apply in § 1983
actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978)); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995);
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Rather, to establish supervisory liability
in a § 1983 action, there must be “a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident
of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff
must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” Bellamy, 729 F.2d at
421 (citing Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 872-74 (6th Cir. 1982)). Thus, because
Plaintiff does not allege that that any of the above-named Defendants official implicitly
authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending
subordinate, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s attempt to add these claims is futile.
Moreover, although Plaintiff also summarily asserts that these Defendants should be held
liable for failure to train staff, failure to discipline staff, and failure to enforce policies and
procedures, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not supported by factual content that allows
the court “to draw the reasonable inference that [Defendants are] liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions,

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and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the
Court also finds that these claims are futile.
However, in so doing, the Court observes that to the extent the Court allowed officialcapacity claims to proceed against an individual QCC or Henderson County Defendant, it has
already allowed claims based upon QCC’s and Henderson County’s customs and policies
to proceed. And because Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants
are actually against QCC or Henderson County, the addition of any official-capacity claim would
be redundant and, therefore, futile.

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)

(“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
2. Medical Care
As indicated above, in its initial review of the complaint, the Court allowed Fourteenth
Amendment medical care claims to proceed against QCC, Troost, and Weber in their individual
capacities. In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff also asserts this claim against Lamar
and Harris.
Upon review of the allegations set forth in the proposed amended complaint, the Court
will allow Plaintiff to add Fourteenth Amendment medical care claims against Lamar and
Harris in their individual capacities.
3. Conditions of Confinement
In its initial review of the complaint, the Court allowed Fourteenth Amendment
conditions-of-confinement claims to proceed against the former HCDC Jailer, Defendant Brady,
in both her official and individual capacities. As noted above, the Court subsequently granted

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Plaintiff’s motion to substitute current HCDC Jailer Vaught as a party for Defendant Brady in
her official capacity.
Upon review of Plaintiff’s allegations pertaining to his conditions of confinement in the
proposed amended complaint, including claims based upon the results of overcrowding and the
lack of recreation at HCDC, the Court will allow these claims to proceed against Vaught,
Hendricks, and Gibson in their individual capacities.
4. Denial of Grievances
Plaintiff also asserts claims against Vaught, Hendricks, Gibson, Payne, and McElfresh for
the denial of grievances “without investigating.” The “denial of administrative grievances or the
failure to act’ by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under § 1983.” Grinter
v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th
Cir. 1999)). Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to add these
claims as futile.
5. Denial-of-Access to the Courts
In this section, Plaintiff also states that McElresh was involved in the denial of his access
to the courts. It is well-established that prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the
courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). To state a viable claim, however, an
inmate must demonstrate he suffered “actual injury” as a result of particular actions of prison
officials. Id. at 351; Winburn v. Howe, 43 F. App’x 731, 733 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The United States
Supreme Court has established that, in order to have standing to bring a claim for denial of
access to the courts, the inmate must establish that he suffered an actual injury as a result of the
alleged denial.”).

In other words, a plaintiff must plead and demonstrate that the actions

complained of hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-

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53; see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff has not
alleged that any action taken by McElfresh caused any actual injury to his ability to pursue a
non-frivolous legal claim, the Court finds that the addition of this claim would be futile.
6. Excessive Force
In this section of the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Ricky Jay
and Officer Brickner used excessive force against him and that Major Payne watched the alleged
use of excessive force but did not intervene. Based on these allegations, the Court will allow
Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claims to proceed against Jay and Brickner and a
Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-intervene claim to proceed against Payne.
The Court, however, finds that allowing Plaintiff to amend the complaint to add failureto-intervene claims against Gibson, Hendricks, McElfresh, and Vaught would be futile since
these claims appear to be based upon their supervisory roles at HCDC.
7. Freedom of Religion/RLUIPA
In its initial review of the complaint, the Court allowed a First Amendment freedom-ofreligion claim to proceed against Defendant Brady in both her official and individual capacities,
as well as a RLUIPA claim.

In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks to sue

Defendant Vaught, Colonel Gibson, and Colonel Hendricks for the same claims. Plaintiff,
however, makes no specific allegations against Defendant Vaught, Colonel Gibson, or Colonel
Hendricks, but only seeks to add them based upon their supervisory roles at HCDC. Thus, for
the reasons already stated, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s attempt to sue them in the individual
capacities for the alleged violations of his rights to freedom of religion under the First
Amendment is futile.

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As to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims, because a prisoner can only seek injunctive relief under
RLUIPA, and because Plaintiff has been transferred from HCDC, the Court finds that adding any
RLUIPA claims would be futile. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d, 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that inmate’s RLUIPA claims and other claims for injunctive relief were moot because he had
been transferred to a different facility); Berryman v. Granholm, 343 F. App’x 1, 3 (6th Cir. 2009)
(holding that inmate’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, including his RLUIPA
claim, were rendered moot by his transfer to a different prison) (citations omitted)).
8. Failure to Protect
Upon initial review of the complaint, the Court did not allow any Fourteenth Amendment
failure-to-protect claims to proceed. In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he
was “assaulted and battered over tablet” usage at HCDC due to Major Payne denying a grievance
Plaintiff submitted allegedly complaining about the “hostile environment the table usage was
causing in the unit due to overcrowding and pod boss behaviors.” As explained above, the
“denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act’ by prison officials does not subject
supervisors to liability under § 1983.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d at 576 (quoting Shehee v.
Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295 at 300. Thus, adding this claim would be futile, as would be adding any
failure-to-protect claim against Vaught, Hendricks, or Gibson based upon their supervisory roles
at HCDC.
9. Due Process
In its initial review of the complaint, the Court allowed a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process claim to proceed against Defendant Hendricks. Based upon the allegations set forth in
the proposed amended complaint, the Court will also allow a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process claim to proceed against Major Payne.

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The other allegations set forth by Plaintiff in this section of the proposed amended
complaint pertain to claims addressed by the Court above.
10. Injunctive Relief
In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he seeks various forms of
injunctive relief. However, since Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at HCDC, theses claim are
moot. See, e.g., Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that inmate’s
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were rendered moot upon inmate’s transfer from the
prison about which he complained); Henderson v. Martin, 73 F. App’x 115, 117 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“[A] prisoner’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against certain prison officials
[becomes] moot once the prisoner [is] transferred from the prison of which he complained to a
different facility.”).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave
to amend the complaint (DN 38) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the following claims are added to this action –
Fourteenth Amendment medical care claims against Lamar and Harris in their individual
capacities;

Fourteenth

Amendment

conditions-of-confinement

claims

against

Vaught,

Hendricks, and Gibson in their individual capacities; Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force
claims against Jay and Brickner in their individual capacities; and Fourteenth Amendment
failure-to-intervene and due process claims to proceed against Major Payne in his individual
capacity. In allowing these claims to proceed, the Court passes no judgment upon their merit or
upon the ultimate outcome of this action.

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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to add the following Henderson County Defendants
to this action - Colonel Gibson, Major William Payne, Andrew Brickner, Rickey Jay, and the
following QCC Defendants to this action - Nurse Lamar and Arvel Jeffery Harris.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel shall notify the Court within 30 days of
entry of this Order whether they waive service for the added Defendants.
The Clerk of Court is further DIRECTED to change the name of Defendant Weber to
“Mitzi Weber” and the name of “Dr. Troost” to “Dr. Neil Troost” on the docket sheet.
Date:

May 18, 2023

cc: Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of Record
4414.011

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