Jones v. Unknown Kentucky Department of Corrections Employees

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Chief Judge Thomas B. Russell on 05/02/2011; separate order of dismissal to enter. cc:plaintiff, defendants, General Counsel (CSD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
ALLEN JONES
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:10CV-P221-R

DR. HILLEND et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Allen Jones, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (DN 1). This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons set forth below, the
action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP), sues in their official
capacities the following KSP employees: “Scot Hase ‘A.K.A. Harris,” Dr. Hillend, Nurse
Shannon Hillend, and Nurse Jones. He states that, about six months after he was sent to KSP, he
started having a tingling feeling from his chest to his feet. He states that he went to the “medcall window” and Nurse Hillend took blood work but that “medical” never did anything for this
problem. He states that he then saw Nurse Jones and more blood work was done. He asserts that
he “went to the hole” and that he saw nurses three or four more times while he was in the hole.
He also alleges that while in the hole he saw Dr. Hillend, who prescribed some medication that
made him sick. He further alleges that medical gave him some kind of medicine, which he was
told was for high cholesterol, that made him feel like “someone was sticking a rod threw my
head and hurt relly bad.” Plaintiff alleges that he then went to medical and told Nurse Hillend
that he was tingling and she replied that that was not a diagnosis.

Plaintiff next asserts that “[t]hey are also denied me the same job opportunity that
everybody else is rec[e]iving here at KSP” because he “filed paper work” regarding a
correctional officer at Green River Correctional Complex. He contends that they know he is in
pain, that they will not let him work, and that they keep him locked in a cell.
As relief, Plaintiff wants monetary and punitive damages. He also states that he feels
Defendants will retaliate against him, so he asks the Court to prevent that.
II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. While a reviewing court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacity. Because he sues the employees in
their official capacity, the claims brought against them are deemed claims against the
Commonwealth of Kentucky itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). To
state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that a “person” acting under color of state law

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deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. See § 1983. States,
state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are not
“persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims for money damages from these state officers in their official
capacities fail to allege cognizable claims under § 1983. Moreover, Defendants are immune
from monetary damages under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. The Court will dismiss the
claims for monetary relief pursuant to §§ 1915A(b)(1) and (b)(2).
However, in Will, the Supreme Court noted that officials still may be sued for injunctive
relief under § 1983 because “‘official capacity’ actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the State.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. The Sixth Circuit, in McKay v. Thompson,
226 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000), followed this approach. There, the Sixth Circuit noted, “the
Eleventh Amendment permits prospective injunctive relief, but not damage awards, for suits
against individuals in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 757. Along with
monetary damages, Plaintiff’s complaint requests prospective injunctive relief in the form of
asking the Court to prevent retaliation against him because he feels like they will retaliate against
him.1
Plaintiff’s request that he not be subject to retaliation in the future for filing this claim
must be denied. Any such threat is speculative and at this time merely hypothetical, which is
insufficient to warrant injunctive relief. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494-96 (1974).

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Plaintiff states, in support of this request for relief, in toto: “I fell they will retal[i]ate on
me so I ask you to not let them do this.”
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed by separate Order for
failure to state a claim and for seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
Date:

May 2, 2011

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4413.009

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