Hopson et al v. CSX Transportation

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 3/5/2013; re 41 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by CSX Transportation ; an appropriate order shall issuecc:counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-00056
NATASHA HOPSON and
CARL HOPSON

Plaintiffs

v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION

Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant CSX Transportation’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 41.) Plaintiffs Natasha Hopson and Carl Hopson, who
were represented by counsel at the time they filed this action but are now proceeding pro
se, have not responded. Defendant’s instant Motion was filed January 4, 2013. (Docket
No. 41.) Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c), Plaintiffs’ response memorandum in opposition
was due 21 days thereafter. The time to file such a response has passed, and this matter is
now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds no genuine issue
of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As such,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Docket No. 41), will be GRANTED, and
an appropriate Order of dismissal will issue separately with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
This litigation arises from the collision of Plaintiff Natasha Hopson’s (Hopson)
vehicle with a train operated by Defendant CSX Transportation (CSX) on the night of
January 14, 2010. While Hopson was driving her white Chevrolet Tahoe westbound on

Page 1 of 7

1st Street in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, at approximately 8:00 p.m., CSX train Q51514 was
traveling southbound toward the 1st Street crossing. When Hopson attempted to cross
the tracks, her vehicle was struck by the CSX train.
The 1st Street crossing is equipped with multiple flashing lights positioned at
approximately eye level on both sides of the street as well as directly above the crossing.
A total of eight lights face approaching traffic in either direction, situated in pairs on the
right and left at eye level and also above the crossing. The lights are set so that each pair
alternates flashing. The crossing is also equipped with a bell that signals the approach of
trains. (See Docket No. 41-7.)
Hopson lives in Hopkinsville and responded to CSX’s interrogatories that she had
crossed the tracks at the 1st Street crossing “hundreds of times” during the five years
prior to the accident. (Docket No. 41-2, at 5.) In that same response, Hopson stated that
the “[c]rossing lights [were] not operating,” and that she “couldn’t hear [the] train horn.”
(Docket No. 41-2, at 9.)
CSX, in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, has submitted video
recording and event recorder data from the lead locomotive on the Q51514 train. (See
Docket No. 41-3 to -6.) According to CSX, the video evidence and event recorder data
from the Q51514 train refutes Hopson’s assertion that the crossing lights were not
flashing and shows that the train’s horn was sounding both well before and at the moment
Hopson attempted to cross the tracks. Thus, according to CSX, Hopson’s negligence
claim fails as a matter of law because she cannot establish that CSX breached any duty to

Page 2 of 7

her. CSX further reasons that because Carl Hopson’s (Mr. Hopson) claim for loss of
spousal consortium is derivative of Hopson’s claim, his claim also must fail.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). “[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue
of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989).
The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as
to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The
plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of her position;
she must present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find for her. Id.
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Mere speculation will
not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment: “[T]he mere existence of a
colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to
render summary judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition
Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012).
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Still, “[a] party
asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . .
Page 3 of 7

citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials cited
do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in
the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
Finally, while the substantive law of Kentucky is applicable here pursuant to Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court sitting in diversity applies the
standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, not “Kentucky’s summary judgment standard as
expressed in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W2d 476 (Ky. 1991).”
Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 165 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds
by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
DISCUSSION
I.

Hopson’s Negligence Claims
Hopson alleges that CSX was negligent because the lights at the crossing were not

operating and because she could not hear the train’s horn. (She does not specifically
allege that the train’s horn was not sounding, only that she could not hear it.) Under
Kentucky law, a plaintiff must establish duty, breach, causation, and damages to prevail
on a negligence claim. E.g., Osborne v. Keeney, __S.W.3d__, 2012 WL 6634129, at *10
(Ky. 2012); Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88-89 (Ky. 2003); Waldsachs v.
Inland Marine Serv., Inc., 2011 WL 3813093, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2011) (citing
Boland-Maloney Lumber Co. v. Burnett, 302 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009)). The
failure to establish any of these requisite elements “is fatal to the claim.” Ill. Cent. R.R. v.
Vincent, 412 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1967).

Page 4 of 7

The lead locomotive on the Q51514 train was equipped with video recording
equipment that captured the collision between the train and Hopson’s vehicle. CSX
downloaded this recording immediately after the accident and has shown this recording to
Hopson. CSX submitted a compact disc containing these recordings to the Court as an
exhibit to its instant Motion, (Docket No. 41-3), and the Court has carefully reviewed
these recordings.

The recording depicts the forward-looking view from the lead

locomotive as it travels down the tracks. The recording begins well before the train
reaches the 1st Street crossing and clearly shows Hopson’s vehicle at the moment of
impact. The Court finds that the recording unquestionably shows that the crossing lights
were operating well in advance of the train reaching the 1st Street crossing and that they
continued to operate as the train entered the crossing and struck Hopson’s vehicle.
The train is also equipped with an event recorder that shows such information as
the train’s speed, time of day, and GPS coordinates—more importantly, it also shows
whether the bell is ringing and whether the train’s horn is sounding. (See Docket No. 413.) The event recorder shows that the bell was ringing well in advance of the train
reaching the crossing. The recorder also shows that the train’s horn sounded in a series of
long and short intervals before the train entered the crossing and that the horn was
sounding at the moment of the train’s impact with Hopson’s vehicle.
CSX also argues that the audio recording indicates that the train’s horn was
sounding as it approached the crossing. The Court has been unable to locate these audio
recordings on the compact disc exhibit submitted by CSX. However, the Court has
reviewed the submitted affidavits of Danny Horne and Tony Holmes, the train’s

Page 5 of 7

conductor and engineer, in which both affiants state that the horn was sounding before
and during the train’s impact with Hopson’s vehicle. (Docket Nos. 41-9, -10.)
The Court finds that CSX has come forth with considerable evidence to refute
Hopson’s statements that the crossing lights were not operating. Regardless whether
Hopson could hear the crossing bell or the train’s horn, CSX has presented evidence that
both were sounding in advance of and also at the moment of impact. Although the Court
must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against CSX, see
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, “[a] party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or
showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Hopson has offered no such response.
Accordingly, the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact whether CSX
breached a duty to Hopson and, thus, Hopson cannot prevail as a matter of law on her
negligence claim. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate.
II.

Mr. Hopson’s Loss of Consortium Claim
Mr. Hopson has asserted a claim for loss of consortium, which under Kentucky

law is derivative of Hopson’s negligence claim. See Daley v. Reed, 87 S.W.3d 247, 24849 (Ky. 2002) (“We note at the outset that virtually every jurisdiction that has addressed
this issue has concluded that loss of consortium is not a separate ‘bodily injury’ but is
derivative of the injured party’s bodily injury claim . . . .”). Because summary judgment
is appropriate on Hopson’s negligence claim, Mr. Hopson’s loss of consortium claim
must also be dismissed.

Page 6 of 7

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate
and, therefore, will GRANT Defendant CSX Transportation’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Docket No. 41.) An appropriate Order dismissing this action will issue
separately with this opinion.
Date:

cc:

March 5, 2013

Counsel for Defendant CSX Transportation
Natasha Hopson and Carl Hopson, pro se
P.O. Box 205
Hopkinsville, KY 42240

Page 7 of 7