Haight et al v. Thompson et al

Filing 7

ORDER denying 3 Motion declaring jurisdiction and venue under 28 USC 1331 ; denying 4 Motion to Certify Class; denying 5 Motion for Entry of Default. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas B. Russell on 9/22/2011. cc:counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11CV-P118-R
RANDY HAIGHT et al.

PLAINTIFFS

v.
LADONNA THOMPSON et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs filed three motions which are addressed below.
A.

Motion for class certification
Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification in which they seek to include all inmates

housed at Kentucky State Penitentiary as class plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are pro se prisoners without
legal training and are therefore not able adequately to represent the proposed class. Heard v.
Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1, 15 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Oxendine v. Williams, 509
F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Ability to protect the interests of the class depends in part on
the quality of counsel, and we consider the competence of a layman representing himself to be
clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.”) (citation omitted)); Palasty v.
Hawk, 15 F. App’x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2001) (“No representative party was available because pro
se prisoners are not able to represent fairly the class.”); Giorgio v. State of Tennessee, Dep’t of
Human Servs. of Nashville and Jefferson Cnty., No. 95-6327, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22574, at
*1 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996) (“Because a layman does not ordinarily possess the legal training and
expertise necessary to protect the interests of a proposed class, courts are reluctant to certify a
class represented by a pro se litigant.”). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for class certification (DN 4) is DENIED.

B.

Motion declaring jurisdiction and venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Plaintiffs filed a motion declaring jurisdiction and venue along with their pro se

complaint. By separate Order entered this date, the Court conducted the initial review of the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997) and allowed part of Plaintiffs’ claims to go forward. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion declaring jurisdiction and venue (DN 3) is
DENIED as moot.
C.

Motion for entry of default
Finally, Plaintiff Haight filed a motion for entry of default. In the motion, Haight states

that the record shows that Defendants were served with process by the United States Marshal’s
Office on July 7, 2011. This is not the case. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore, 114
F.3d at 613, the Court is required to screen the complaint before Defendants are served with
process. By separate Scheduling Order entered this date, the Court directed that Defendants be
served and ordered that Defendants file an answer in an allotted time. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for entry of default (DN 5) is DENIED.
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that “[e]very pleading, written
motion, and other paper must be signed by . . . a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). “The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly
corrected after being called to the . . . party’s attention.” Id. Haight, as a non-lawyer, may not
assert any claim or file any motion on behalf of other Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Wellman,
313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (“pro se” means to appear for one’s self; thus, one person may
not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause). Therefore, Plaintiffs are WARNED

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that all motions or other filings seeking relief on behalf of all Plaintiffs must be signed by all
Plaintiffs, or the filing is subject to being stricken from the record.
Date:

September 22, 2011

cc:

Plaintiffs, pro se
Defendants
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4413.010

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