Dooley et al v. Byars et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER finding as moot 6 Motion to Dismiss; granting 12 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint; finding as moot 13 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 14 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 2/10/2012. cc:counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CASE NO. 5:11-CV-153
JOSEPH and JANET DOOLEY

PLAINTIFFS

V.
KEVIN BYARS, et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend their complaint
(DN 12). Defendants Kevin Byars, Jon Haden, Michael Wray, Kevin Mighell, and Samantha
Mighell have responded (DN 15). Defendant Scott Robbins has not responded within the time
allowed. Plaintiffs have replied (DN 19). This matter is now ripe for adjudication.1 For the
following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion (DN 12) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Joseph and Janet Dooley, operate a hotel facility located in Marshall County,
Kentucky. Beginning on May 1, 2010, Plaintiffs provided hotel services to employees of the
Shaw Company who were working at the Honeywell plant located in Metropolis, Illinois. These
employees were replacement workers for members of union Local 7-669 United Steel Workers
of Metropolis, Illinois, who had been locked out by their employer. Plaintiffs allege that in
August of 2010, they were the subjects of an undercover investigation conducted without
probable cause and motivated by their provision of hotel facilities to the Shaw Company
replacement workers. Plaintiffs further allege that an affidavit for a seizure warrant prepared by
Defendant Kevin Mighell included false information, concealed certain information, and did not

1

There are also several other pending motions that are related to, or will be affected by, this
motion, including a motion to dismiss and a renewed motion to dismiss (DN 6 and DN 14), and
Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension to respond to the motion to dismiss (DN 10).

establish probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs had committed any crime.2 In September of
2010, Plaintiffs were charged in Marshall County District Court with the illegal sale/give of
alcohol in a dry territory, a violation of KRS § 242.230(1), a Class B misdemeanor.
Plaintiffs filed their pro se complaint on September 9, 2011. In their complaint, Plaintiffs
asserted claims against the Sheriffs and Sheriff Deputies of Marshall and McCracken Counties,
and the Special Prosecutor of Marshall County, for violations of the Fourth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sheriff Defendants (Kevin Byars,
Jon Hayden, Kevin Mighell, Samantha Mighell, and Michael Wray) answered Plaintiffs’
complaint on September 29, 2011. Defendant Scott Robbins, the Special Prosecutor to Marshall
County and County Attorney of Graves County, filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims
against him on October 12, 2011 (DN 6).3 Plaintiffs have not responded to this motion to
dismiss and have moved for an extension of time in which to respond to the motion (DN 10).
Plaintiffs obtained counsel on November 18, 2011 and now move for leave of the Court
to file an amended complaint in order to clarify both the subject matter of the lawsuit and the
issues presented. After Plaintiffs’ filed their motion to amend the complaint, Defendant Robbins
filed a renewed motion to dismiss on December 27, 2011 (DN 14). Although Defendant
Robbins does not specifically state that his renewed motion to dismiss was filed in response to
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, that does appear to be the case as it refers to facts only alleged in

2

According to Defendant Robbins’s motion to dismiss (DN 6), the Sheriff’s Office confiscated
the alcohol and approximately $7,500.
3

In that motion to dismiss, Defendant Robbins argues that the claims against him should be
dismissed under the doctrines of sovereign and absolute immunity. Defendant Robbins further
argues that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim because Plaintiffs’ complaint made no specific
allegations that Robbins took any actions that violated Plaintiffs’ rights and because claims
against him in his official capacity are barred under the 11th Amendment. Finally, Defendant
Robbins argues that he was not properly served. Plaintiffs have not responded to this motion to
dismiss and have moved for an extension of time to respond to this motion to dismiss (DN 10).

the amended complaint. Plaintiffs have not responded to the renewed motion to dismiss. By
order dated January 25, 2012, this Court granted Plaintiffs an extension to respond to Defendant
Robbins’s renewed motion to dismiss until 21 days after the Court rules on Plaintiffs’ motion for
leave to amend the complaint.
STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” The rule directs that the
“court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This rule
gives effect to the principle that, as far as possible, cases should be determined on their merits
and not on technicalities. Cooper v. Am. Employers’ Ins. Co., 296 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 1961).
Denial of leave to amend may be appropriate “where there is undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility
of the amendment, etc.” Miller v. Champion Enters., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 690 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citations and quotation omitted).
ANALYSIS
The Sheriff Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint
because the amended complaint adds a claim against the defendants for violating Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment right to associate with persons with anti-union views. Plaintiffs’ amended
complaint also provides detail regarding Defendant Robbin’s conduct, which Plaintiffs assert
violated their First Amendment rights and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.

These additional claims arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out
in the original complaint. For this reason, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Therefore, this is not a sufficient reason to deny
Plaintiffs leave to file their amended complaint. Additionally, the Court finds that there has been
no undue delay in filing the amended complaint, no bad faith or dilatory motive by the moving
party, no repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, and no undue
prejudice to the defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs will be allowed to file the First Amended
Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended complaint (DN 12) is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
(1) Defendant Robbins’s motion to dismiss (DN 6) is now MOOT.
(2) Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to file a response to Defendant Robbins’s motion
to dismiss (DN 10) is now MOOT.
(3) Because Defendant Robbins’s renewed motion to dismiss (DN 14) was filed before this
Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint, that motion is
DENIED with leave to re-file.

February 10, 2012