Ridgeway v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 4/18/2012; a separate order shall issue dismissing casecc:counsel (KJA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
THOMAS RIDGEWAY
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11CV-P198-R
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court for screening of the pro se action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons that
follow, this action will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff is an inmate currently housed at the Laurel County Detention Center. He initiated
this action by filing a hand-written document asserting violations of his constitutional rights. The
Court entered an Order (DN 3) directing Plaintiff to re-file his complaint on a Court-approved
form. That Order also directed Plaintiff to state specifically the facts of his case, to state how he
believed his constitutional rights were violated, to describe how each Defendant violated his
rights, and to set forth the dates on which each event took place.
In response to the Order, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (DN 5) naming the
Commonwealth of Kentucky as the sole Defendant. The amended complaint states, “Violation of
U.S. Constitut. civil liberties and civil rights have occured from the date stated unlawfully
detaining citizen and unlawful seizure of property and animal. Unlawful arrest wrongful
imprisonment inhumane treatment to present.” He states that the incidents have occurred
“continually the entire time. Specific dates are not calculable.” He states that he was denied due
process and medical aid. He also states, “unlawful use of force causing injury and unlawful use of
religious practice.” Plaintiff further states, “The Commonwealth of Kentucky and/or agents
employed by/or in association with has engaged in activities that are unlawful, and in violation of
the civil liberties/rights/freedoms guaranteed myself a natural born citizen.” He also states, “They
have committed acts beginning in July 2009 that have physically injured me caused me the loss of
personal liberties/freedoms.” He states, “Right to freedom, liberty freedom from religious pract
right to due process . . . persecution, harrassment, right to safety . . . tasered/without cause denied
aid services humanitarian aid/medical.” Further, Plaintiff states:
The state has committed violent and dangerous acts against me
without cause in the past, and it is reasonable to suspect there is a
possibility they may act violently towards me in the future possibly
as retaliation for this case. I request these risks be assessed and
thoroughly considered by the Court.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks “Civil Justice.”
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer,
or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of it, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light
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most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v.
M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551
F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare
assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v.
Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the
duty “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19
(1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d
1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court
from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest
arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.
Although the Court must construe pro se complaints liberally, Plaintiff is not absolved of
his duty to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by providing Defendants with “fair
notice of the basis of [his] claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). To
state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must show how each Defendant is accountable because the
Defendant was personally involved in the acts about which Plaintiff complains. See Rizzo v.
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Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976). “It is not enough for a complaint . . . to contain mere
conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under color of state law.
Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the pleadings.” Chapman v. City of
Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986) (dismissing a complaint brought under § 1983). A
complaint must contain “‘either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.’” Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745
F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). This means that Plaintiff must “allege ‘with particularity’ all
material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has violated a
constitutional right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834 (6th Cir.
2002). The Court is not required to accept non-specific factual allegations and inferences or
unwarranted legal conclusions. Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001).
Here Plaintiff alleges violations of his civil rights and liberties; unlawful detention, seizure
of property, and arrest; denial of due process; denial of medical aid; inhumane treatment; unlawful
use of force; “unlawful use of religious practice”; physical injury; persecution; harassment; and
unlawful tasing. However, Plaintiff’s complaint contains no more than conclusory allegations. It
does not contain the required “further factual enhancement” to support his allegations. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). The Court notes that in the Order directing Plaintiff to re-file
his complaint on a Court-approved form, the Court directed Plaintiff to state specifically the facts
of his case, to state how he believed his constitutional rights were violated, to describe how each
Defendant violated his rights, and to set forth the dates on which each event took place. Plaintiff
failed to do so.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Furthermore, Plaintiff names only the Commonwealth of Kentucky and not any individual
responsible for the alleged constitutional violations. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold the
Commonwealth of Kentucky liable as the employer of any individuals who committed any
unconstitutional act, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, does
not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 691 (1978); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir.
1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
Finally, the Commonwealth of Kentucky is immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment and is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, further warranting dismissal of the
action. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 169 (1985).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:
April 18, 2012
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4413.010
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