Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America et al v. Rapid Power Corporation et al

Filing 65

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 2/25/2014; denying 53 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, Superior Graphite Company cc:counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-00038-TBR
TRAVELER’S PROPERTY CASUALTY
COMPANY OF AMERICA, as subrogee of
SUPERIOR GRAPHITE COMPANY

Plaintiff

v.
RAPID POWER CORPORATION and
DYNAPOWER COMPANY

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Travelers Property Casualty
Company of America’s, as subrogree of Superior Graphite Company, Supplemental
Brief on the Motion to Reconsider the Order at Docket No. 51 granting summary
judgment to Defendants Rapid Power Corporation and Dynapower Company. (Docket
No. 61.) Defendants have responded with their own Supplemental Brief. (Docket No.
64.) This matter is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons,
the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. (Docket No. 53.)
BACKGROUND
I.

Factual Background
A limited recitation of facts is helpful for understanding the issues involved in

this Motion for Reconsideration. These facts will be supplemented as appropriate in the
analysis below. The Defendants, Rapid Power Corporation and Dynapower Company

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(referred to collectively as “Dynapower”),1 design and manufacture power generation
equipment for industrial clients. Subrogor Superior Graphite Company (“Superior”)
manufactures a variety of graphite-derived products. During the period relevant to this
action, Subrogee Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”)
insured property located at Superior’s Hopkinsville, Kentucky production facility.
This action arises from the manufacture and sale of a rectifier transformer by
Dynapower to Superior and a subsequent, separate contract 2 for services. 3 These
services were primarily to assist with the “start up” of the rectifier transformer.4 The
transformer functioned without issue until February 1, 2011, when it was destroyed in a
catastrophic failure.
According to Travelers, the transformer catastrophically failed because
Dynapower did not incorporate or recommend that Superior incorporate a device known
as a “snubber” onto Superior’s vacuum breaker, or did not, at a minimum, recommend
that Superior install a snubber onto Superior’s vacuum breaker. The only remaining
claims by Travelers for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion and Order is that this
alleged omission was a breach of the “start up” contract for services and a negligent
1

During the periods relevant to this action, Defendant Rapid Power Corporation was a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Defendant Dynapower Company. Like the parties in their briefs, the Court refers to the
Defendants collectively as “Dynapower.”
2
As the parties have pointed out, “service contract” is a term of art describing a dedicated agreement
entered into between two entities, where one entity performs all of the service for a piece of equipment,
for a set period of time and for some pre-established financial arrangement. Here, there was no “service
contract”—only separate, as-needed contracts for services.
3
Superior solicited Dynapower to build the rectifier transformer at issue as a replacement for a
substantially similar transformer previously built by Dynapower for the Hopkinsville facility. On
February 18, 2008, Superior and Dynapower entered into a written contract for the purchase of the
transformer. Subsequently, in a completely separate contract, Dynapower agreed to “start up” this same
transformer.
4
Although the parties do not dispute this point, the Court notes that emails from Bruce Williams of
Superior and Mary Duncan of Dynapower, as well as the subsequent invoice, substantiate that there was a
separate contract for “start up assistance.” (See Docket No. 62-1.)

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action because Dynapower had a duty to either incorporate or recommend the
installation of components that could have prevented the transformer’s failure.5
II.

Procedural Background
After the transformer failure, Travelers paid Superior the proceeds of the policy

that covered the transformer. Travelers, acting as subrogee to Superior, sought to
recover those proceeds from Dynapower. Travelers pursued recovery on a number of
theories, including breach of contract, breach of express warranty, negligence, and strict
products liability. Dynapower moved for summary judgment on all counts. (Docket
No. 45.)
The Court previously granted summary judgment to Defendant Dynapower on
all claims. (Docket No. 51.)

Plaintiff Travelers moved for reconsideration of the

Court’s grant of summary judgment. (Docket No. 53.) Upon further review, the Court
found that it had misconstrued the factual background concerning Dynapower’s service
visits.

Specifically, the Court found it had incorrectly held that Dynapower’s

performance of services was “merely part of the design manufacture, or sale of the
transformer,” when those services were in fact performed pursuant to separate, asneeded contracts for services.
Nevertheless, upon considering the impact of the Court’s misconstruction of the
factual background of Dynapower’s service visits, the Court found no basis to
reconsider its grant of summary judgment with respect to the strict products liability and
express warranty claims. (Docket No. 58.) However, with respect to the breach of
contract and negligence claims based on Dynapower’s service visits, the Court ordered
5

The Court has already reaffirmed its ruling that Dynapower cannot be liable, in contract or in tort, for
this alleged “omission” based on the sale of the transformer. (See Docket No. 58.)

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further briefing on this issue. (See Docket No. 58, at 10-11.) This opinion only
considers Travelers’ claims of breach of contract and negligence with respect to the
service visits of Dynapower, and whether they can survive a motion for summary
judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.

Negligence Claim Based on “Start Up” Contract
Upon further review of the parties’ briefing and the applicable case law, the

Court finds the only viable claim Travelers has based on the separate, as-needed service
contract is one in contract. 6 The Court recognizes that its previous Memorandum
Opinion and Order implied a negligence claim was the only potentially viable claim
based on these service contracts. (Docket No. 58, at 10-11.) However, as Dynapower
recognizes in their reply, (Docket No. 64, at 4 n.4), in implying this the Court focused
exclusively on the economic loss rule and the case law holding it does not apply to
service contracts. It was not argued to the Court that the tort/negligence claim was
precluded based on the independent duty rule, which holds that a tort action arising
from a contractual relationship is precluded unless based on a tort duty that arises
independent of the contract. Lewis v. Ceralvo Holdings, LLC, 4:11-CV-00055-JHM,
2012 WL 32607, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Jan 6, 2012); see generally Mims v. Western-Southern
Agency, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 833, 835-36 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

6

Dynapower argues that Travelers did not plead breach of the “start up” agreement and has previously
admitted that it is left without a remedy in contract because there were no terms or conditions to this
agreement. (See Docket No. 53, at 5.) However, the Court disagrees with Dynapower’s assessment of
Travelers’ claims. The Court finds that Travelers is making claims for breach of contract and negligence
with respect to the “start up" agreement and notes that Dynapower specifically addressed the contractual
claim in its supplemental brief. (Docket No. 64, at 2-3.)

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In Lewis, the Plaintiffs granted Peabody Coal Company and their successors,
which included the Defendants, the right to conduct mining operations and a right of
ingress and egress to and from the demised premises or adjoining premises. Id. at *1.
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants were trespassing moving coal from foreign lands that
that weren’t adjoining the demised premises in violation of the lease. Because Plaintiffs
were also asserting a breach of contract claim based on the same conduct, the
Defendants argued the economic loss rule barred the trespass claim. The Court found
the economic loss rule did not provide a basis for dismissal. Id. at *3.
However, the Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs’ trespass claim was really a
breach of contract claim “in tort clothing” and should be dismissed because it is based
on the same duty created by the contract. Id. at *5. The Court found that Plaintiffs’
claim originated from the Defendants’ failure to perform the contract and was not based
on the existence of an “independent legal duty.” Id. Accordingly, the Court dismissed
the trespass claim as against the one Defendant that was a party to the contract. Relying
on Lewis and the “independent legal duty” requirement, Dynapower contends that
Travelers has failed to identify or assert a source of any independent duty in this case
and their “start up negligence” claim should be dismissed. (See Docket No. 64, at 5
n.4.)
A review of the full deposition testimony, the parties’ arguments, and other
evidence has made apparent that any tort claims by Travlers would not be independent
from the contract. As in Mims, the “threshold inquiry under either a negligence or
contract theory is essentially identical.” Mims, 226 S.W.3d at 836. Accordingly, the
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Court will DENY Plaintiff Travelers’ Motion for Reconsideration, (Docket No. 53), on
the negligence claim based on Dynapower’s performance of “start up” services.
II.

Breach of Contract Claim Based on “Start Up” Contract
While the parties agree that there was a separate contract for services for “start

up,” they disagree whether Dynapower’s failure to recommend or incorporate the use of
snubbers with Superior’s vacuum breaker was a breach of this contract.

The

documentation of this contract does not delineate what is encompassed in “start up.”
(See Docket 62-1.) The literal, common definition of the phrase “start up” denotes
services related to starting the transformer, which Defendant Dynapower did. 7
Accordingly, the Court holds that as a matter of law the contract for “start up” services
was not breached by Dynapower’s failure to recommend the use of snubbers with
Superior’s vacuum breaker. See, e.g., Royal Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas Container Line
Ltd., 514 F.3d 621, 634 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating ordinarily interpretation of a contract is
a question of law). Therefore, the Court will DENY Plaintiff Travelers’ Motion for
Reconsideration. (Docket No. 53), on the contract claim based on Dynapower’s
performance of “start up” services.

7

Although not determinative because the literal, common definition of the phrase “start up” guides the
Court’s analysis, the Court notes there is no evidence that Superior expected or intended for the “start up”
agreement to shift responsibility for potential problems with Superior’s own electrical system to
Dynapower. See generally Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 496 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1974)
(explaining that contract interpretation is only a question for the jury when it is ambiguous). In fact,
Steve Hargrove, Superior’s complex manager, stated he did not expect the Dynapower to inspect the
switch yard, to design any part of the electrical system at the plant that was external to the transformer
itself, or to inspect the entire electrical system. (Docket No. 45-10, at 15-16.) Furthermore, it would be
quite odd for Superior to have bargained for a sales agreement that precluded such significant financial
exposure and then—almost immediately thereafter—entered into a separate agreement accepting such
liability with no express terms and no additional consideration beyond the service charges.

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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and consistent with the Court’s conclusions above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Order at
Docket No. 51 granting summary judgment to Defendants, (Docket No. 53), is
DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:
cc:

February 25, 2014

Counsel

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