Robinson v. Parker et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting 9 Motion to Amend/Correct; granting 10 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 9/11/2012. cc:counsel (KJA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
ANTHONY L. ROBINSON
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12CV-P45-R
PHILIP PARKER et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Anthony L. Robinson, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint (DN 1) and
an amended complaint (DN 8). On initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), the Court will dismiss in part and allow to proceed
in part.
Motions
After filing his amended complaint in compliance with this Court’s Order, Plaintiff filed
a motion entitled “Petition to Exclude a Relief in the Civil Complaint and to Amend or Added
to” (DN 9). He states that he is “requesting to exclude the amount that the plaintiff is seeking
under mental and emotional injuries due to the plaintiff is not required to do so and he should not
be held or not the label given to him due to being unlearned in law.” The Court interprets this
motion to be one to amend his complaint to change the damages he requests, which is
GRANTED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
Plaintiff also filed a “Petition to Amend Evidence to Incorporate” (DN 10), in which he
asks to submit additional evidence in support of his complaint. The Court interprets this
document to be a motion to amend. Given that no responsive pleading has yet been filed and this
case is still undergoing initial review, the Court finds that in the interests of justice this motion is
GRANTED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
I.
Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at the Kentucky State Penitentiary, initiated this action by
filing on his own paper what he titled a “Petition for Federal Charges.” He stated that he wished
to file and press federal charges against Warden Philip Parker, Deputy Warden Alan Brown, and
Chaplain Sheila Burnham. He alleged that these Defendants violated his Fifth, First, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. He alleged that he and his “Moorish American Brothers with the
Moorish Science Temple of American Islamism Faith” have been targeted for the use of their
tribal names, violating the Nationality Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA). He also alleged that racism and retaliation are taking place against them and that their
Eighth Amendment rights are being violated. He asked this Court to issue an order to the
Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) “requesting or demanding” that he be transferred
to another penitentiary because he fears for his life for filing these “charges.” He also asked this
Court to issue an Order recognizing certain prisoner names as containing “El” and “Bey” as part
of their names because it is required that “Moorish Americans use El and Bey as a birthright as
well as religious right.”
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff clarifies that he is suing all three Defendants in their
individual and official capacities. Plaintiff states that he brings his claims under the First, Fifth
and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and RFRA. In particular, he claims that Defendants
Brown and Burnham issued a disciplinary report against him causing him emotional distress and
stripping him of nine months of clear conduct that could have allowed Plaintiff to be transferred
closer to his sick mother. Among the attachments to his amended complaint is a KDOC
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Disciplinary Report Form regarding an incident on March 16, 2012, in which Plaintiff pleaded
guilty to refusing to obey an order when he signed an open records request with the title “El”
after his name which is not his KDOC recognized name. Plaintiff received a “Penalty of 15 days
D/S suspended for 90 days.” That form states:
We find Inmate Robinson guilty of 3-02 Refusing or failing to
obey an order based on his own admission that he did sign and
[sic] Open Records request with the title subfix EL-I after his
name, which is not his Department of Corrections recognized
Court Convicted name. He was been instructed not to sign his
name in this fashion.
In his amendment to his amended complaint (DN 10), Plaintiff states that he has new
evidence to support his claims. He asserts that his new evidence shows that Defendant’s claim
that no inmate of any religion has ever been allowed to sign in with any name other than their
institutional name is false. He also states in that attachment that Defendant Brown has taken a
job at another institution and that Defendant Parker is no longer warden but that he should be
held liable in his individual capacity. Attached is a “Religious Services Sign-Up Sheet” dated
December 2, 2011, on which the inmate name “A. Robinson, El” is entered. Also attached
thereto is a memorandum signed by Defendant Burnham regarding another inmate, Demarko
Berry dated January 30, 2012, and stating in pertinent part:
The official sign-in sheet kept in the Chapel files has never
allowed any inmate of any religion to sign in with any name other
than their institutional name under which they were convicted. If
inmate Berry has copies of sign in sheets that have any name other
than the inmates conviction name, that is exactly what they are,
“COPIES”, which have been kept by the MST[1] in their files, for
their use only.
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It appears from another attachment that “MST” refers to Moor Science Temple.
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Attached is a copy of the Chapel Rules which are posted in the
Chapel for all inmates to read. Number 11 is highlighted and
states that inmates must sign in with their institutional name only.
As relief, Plaintiff requests injunctive and monetary relief. He also seeks a transfer to
another institution.
Claims brought on behalf of others
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff may act as his own counsel in this matter. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654. However, he is not authorized to represent others in federal court. See, e.g., Shepherd v.
Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (“pro se” means to appear for one’s self; thus, one
person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause). Plaintiff may only assert
those claims, which are personal to him. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also
Coal Operators & Assoc., Inc. v. Babbitt, 291 F.3d 912, 915-16 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, to the
extent that Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of other people, he lacks standing to do so. Therefore,
any claim for relief on behalf of others will be dismissed as frivolous for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Babbitt, 291 F.3d at 915 (“[S]tanding to sue . . . is a jurisdictional requirement.”).
First Amendment free-exercise claim
The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion. Here, Plaintiff is not
complaining that he is not able to practice his religion. In fact, he states that except for a few
occasions when Defendant Burnham has changed Sunday school time and a couple of Friday
services without notice, he attends every service. His only complaint seems to be that the prison
will not let him use the “El” after his name with regard to their administrative functions, such as
making a records request.
“[I]t is established in this circuit that [a prisoner] has ‘no constitutional right to dictate
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how prison officials keep their prison records.’” Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir.
1999) (quoting Imam Ali Abdullah Akbar v. Canney, 634 F.2d 339, 340 (6th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam)). The Sixth Circuit held in Imam Ali Abdullah Akbar that “the present question of name
change usage relates to prison administration. Absent unusual allegations such matters are for
state prison officials to resolve. Intervention by the federal courts should only be in the very
unusual case.” Imam Ali Abdullah Akbar, 634 F.2d at 340. Thus, in Imam Ali Abdullah Akbar,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the prisoner’s complaint because there was no
constitutional basis to require prison officials to change their records when a prisoner chooses to
change his name. Id. Because Plaintiff’s only free-exercise claim pertains to prison
administrative functions involving his use of his religious name, the Court will dismiss this
claim.
Fifth Amendment claim
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which is part of the Bill of
Rights, provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. Const., Amend. V.
Plaintiff fails to explain how the Fifth Amendment applies to his claims. Based on the
facts as alleged by Plaintiff, the Court does not believe that Plaintiff has a cognizable Fifth
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Amendment claim against Defendants in this instance. Specifically, the Court notes that, to the
extent that Plaintiff is attempting to rely on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it
circumscribes only the actions of the federal government. See, e.g., Sturgell v. Creasy, 640 F.2d
843, 850 (6th Cir. 1981); Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1257 (6th Cir. 1977). Here, the
actions of state, not federal, officials are at issue, and the Court will dismiss the Fifth
Amendment claims.
Eighth Amendment claim
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. “Having shown no
denial of basic needs, Plaintiffs fail to state any Eighth Amendment claim.” Haight v.
Thompson, No. 5:11CV-P118-R, 2011 WL 4473143, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 26, 2011).
Fourteenth Amendment claim
To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that the disciplinary hearing resulting in 15 days of
segregation violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, his claim fails.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 556 (1974). “A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of
guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ or it may arise from an expectation or interest created
by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (internal citations
omitted). “But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while
not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
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(1995) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any state-created liberty interest, and to the extent Plaintiff
intended to plead that the Due Process Clause inherently gives rise to a protected liberty interest
in his freedom from administrative segregation, that argument fails as “the Due Process Clause
does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse
impact on the prisoner.” Id. at 478. The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has held that placement into
administrative segregation is not a qualifying hardship. Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 791
(6th Cir. 1995); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997). Consequently, this claim
will be dismissed.
RFRA claim
In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court struck down RFRA
as it applied to the states and their subdivisions, holding that RFRA exceeded Congress’
remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because RFRA proscribed state
conduct that the First Amendment does not itself proscribe. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s RFRA
claims must be dismissed.
Retaliation claim
Plaintiff asserts that “[t]his started over a grievance that was filed against the defendant
Sheila Burnham, Chaplain, who took it upon herself to retaliate against every member of the
Branch Temple #43.” He alleges that the disciplinary report against him for using the suffix
“El” on the records request form was initiated by Defendants Burnham and Brown. Elsewhere
he alleges that he was retaliated against for exercising his freedom of religion. He alleges that
Defendant Burnham “changed the Sunday school times without notice and a couple of fridays
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due to this Civil Complaint. Other than that, the plaintiff attends every services.”
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order
to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was
engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was
motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id.
Plaintiff does allege that he was engaged in protected conduct in practicing his religion
and filing a grievance and a lawsuit. Administrative segregation is an adverse action as
contemplated by the second prong of the test set forth above. Evans v. Vinson, 427 F. App’x
437, 446 (6th Cir. 2011); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2010). Further, Plaintiff
alleges that the disciplinary segregation was imposed after he pleaded guilty to the charge of
signing his name “A. Robinson-El” as his religion dictates. He also alleges that after filing his
lawsuit Defendant Burnham changed the time of his services. The Court will allow the
retaliation claim to go forward against Defendants Burnham and Brown in their individual and
official capacities.
RLUIPA claim
Under the RLUIPA,
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as
defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
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(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a). “The threshold inquiry under RLUIPA is whether the challenged
governmental action substantially burdens the exercise of religion. The burden of proving the
existence of a substantial interference with a religious exercise rests on the religious adherent.”
Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 124 (5th Cir. 2007). On initial review, the Court will allow
Plaintiff’s claim under the RLUIPA to go forward against all three Defendants in their individual
and official capacities.
However, state prison officials are immune from RLUIPA monetary-damages claims
under the Eleventh Amendment. Sossamon v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59
(2011) (holding that RLUIPA generally authorizes only injunctive relief and does not waive a
state’s sovereign immunity from suit for money damages); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289
(6th Cir. 2010); Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Eleventh
Amendment bars plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief under RLUIPA.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
claims for monetary damages under RLUIPA will be dismissed for seeking monetary damages
from Defendants who are immune from such relief. His claims for injunctive relief under
RLUIPA will be allowed to proceed past initial review.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on behalf of others
and his claims under the First Amendment free-exercise clause, the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the RFRA. The Court will allow the claims
regarding retaliation and his claim under the RLUIPA for injunctive relief to go forward. In so
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doing, the Court expresses no opinion on the ultimate merits of those claims. A separate
Scheduling Order will be entered to govern the development of those claims.
Date:
September 11, 2012
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4413.009
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