Robinson v. Parker et al
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying 19 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 8/2/2013. cc:counsel (KJA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-00045-TBR
ANTHONY L. ROBINSON
Plaintiff
v.
PHILIP PARKER, et al.
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the parties’ competing motions for
summary judgment. Plaintiff Anthony L. Robinson has filed a “Motion/Petition for
Summary Judgment,” (Docket No. 19), to which Defendants have responded, (Docket
No. 20), and Defendants also have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (Docket No.
22), to which Plaintiff has responded, (Docket No. 23), and Defendants have replied,
(Docket No. 24). These matters are now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that
follow, the Court will GRANT the Defendants’ Motion, and, because the resolution of
the Defendants’ Motion is dispositive of this matter, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s
competing Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate currently confined at the Kentucky State Reformatory
(KSR), brings this pro se civil action against former Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP)
Warden Phillip Parker, former KSP Deputy Warden Alan Brown, former KSP Chaplain
Sheila Burnham, and the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC). In his original
Complaint, Plaintiff alleged violations of a number of constitutional rights.
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According to his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that he is a member of the
Moorish Science Temple of America, which he describes as an “Islamic/Islamism
Religion.” (Docket No. 8, at 6.) Plaintiff insists that it is “his religious right to use ‘El’
behind his name” and that many Moorish Americans similarly use “El” or “Bey” as
suffixes to their surnames. (Docket No. 8, at 4.) Plaintiff further asserts that his
religion requires its adherents “to keep their birth given name and not change their
names, in this case their incarcerated names.” (Docket No. 8, at 6.) In essence, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants took disciplinary action against him in retaliation for exercising
his religious beliefs. The specific disciplinary action taken was a 15-day assignment to
disciplinary segregation following a prison disciplinary proceeding on March 20, 2012.
The “Disciplinary Report Form” relative to that proceeding indicates that Plaintiff
pleaded guilty to “[r]efusing or failing to obey an order based on his own admission that
he did sign an[] Open Records Request with the title su[f]fix EL-I after his name, which
is not his Department of Corrections reco[g]nized Court Convicted name. He was
instructed not to sign his name in this fashion.” (Docket No. 22-5, at 1.)
Following an initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), the Court dismissed the bulk of Plaintiff’s
Complaint but allowed two claims to proceed: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendants Burnham and Brown, and (2) Plaintiff’s claim for
injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act against
Defendants Parker, Brown, and Burnham. (Docket Nos. 12; 13.)
Page 2 of 15
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine
issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.
1989). The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury
question as to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir.
1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
his position; he must present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find
for him. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). “[T]he
mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported
motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of
material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Elec.
Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by
Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012).
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve
all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party.
See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Still, “[a]
party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider
other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
DISCUSSION
Defendants now move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claim and RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief. The Court will address each
in turn.
I.
First Amendment Retaliation Claim
In order to state a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an
adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness
from continuing to engage in that conduct, and (3) there is a causal connection between
elements (1) and (2), meaning that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by
the plaintiff’s protected conduct. King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)). Here, the adverse
action alleged is the 15-day assignment to disciplinary segregation following the March
20, 2012, disciplinary proceeding.
Defendants Burnham and Brown argue that
summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiff can show neither that he was engaged
in constitutionally protected conduct nor that there is a causal connection between his
allegedly protected conduct and the adverse action taken against him. Burnham and
Brown also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
A.
Plaintiff was not engaged in protected conduct.
The record does not indicate that Plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally
protected conduct. Plaintiff’s court-convicted surname is “Robinson,” and, as such,
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“Robinson” is the surname recognized by KDOC.
The initial March 16, 2012,
disciplinary write-up charged Plaintiff with “[r]efusing or failing to obey an order,” after
he was instructed not to sign his name in a manner inconsistent with his KDOCrecognized name. (See Docket No. 22-7, at 1.) On March 20, 2012, Plaintiff pleaded
and was found guilty of the charged offense, and the penalty assessed was 15 days in
disciplinary segregation. Despite his guilty plea, Plaintiff maintains that the disciplinary
action taken and penalty assessed against him were in retaliation for his filing
grievances against the prison chaplain, Defendant Burnham.
In the Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on September 11,
2012, the Court noted that Plaintiff alleged he was engaged in two forms of protected
conduct: (1) filing grievances against Defendant Burnham, and (2) signing an open
records request with surname “Robinson-El-I.”
First, Plaintiff has submitted no
evidence of any grievance filed by him against Defendant Burnham prior to the initial
disciplinary write-up on March 16, 2012. In fact, the only grievances submitted by
Plaintiff were either filed after both the March 16 write-up and March 20 disciplinary
hearing, or were filed not by Plaintiff but by another inmate. Plaintiff appears to
concede as much in his Response, stating he “is asking this honorable court to allow the
grievance by another inmate a Moorish member to be allowed.” (Docket No. 23-1, at
3.) Thus, there is no evidence that Plaintiff, himself, was engaged in any protected
conduct by filing grievances against Defendant Burnham.
Second, by signing an open records request, Plaintiff was not engaged in the
exercise of his religion—he was simply engaged in filing a records request.
In
dismissing Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claim, this Court noted that “it is
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established in this circuit that [a prisoner] has no ‘constitutional right to dictate how
prison officials keep their prison records.’” Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 406 (6th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Imam Ali Abdullah Akbar v. Canney, 634 F.2d 339, 340 (6th Cir.
1980)). In Imam Ali Abdullah Akbar, the Sixth Circuit held that: “As we see this issue,
the present question of name change usage relates to prison administration. Absent
unusual allegations such matters are for state prison officials to resolve. Intervention by
the federal courts should only be in the very unusual case.” 634 F.2d at 340. Imam Ali
Abdullah Akba is largely on point with the issue presently before the Court. In that
case, a prisoner had adopted the Sunni Muslim faith and changed his name from Ronald
Scheels to Ali Abdullah Akbar. Id. at 340. The court began by noting that the issue was
not whether a prisoner had a right to change his name but instead “whether prison
officials must change all their records to reflect the newly adopted name of a prisoner
who has changed his name upon acceptance of the Sunni Muslim religion.” Id. at 340.
The court answered that question “No” and affirmed the district court’s ruling that there
was no constitutional basis to require prison officials to change their records whenever a
prisoner chooses to change his name. Id.
Though Plaintiff here does not ask that KDOC change its records to reflect the
addition of the suffix “El,” he effectively asks that he be allowed to use that suffix when
signing his name on official prison forms. But Plaintiff has not sought to formally
change his name. (Indeed, he essentially presents himself as faced with a catch-22,
asserting that his religion requires him to use the suffix “El” but also prohibits him from
formally changing his name.) Much like the Sixth Circuit did in Imam Ali Abdullah
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Akba, this Court sees this issue as relating primarily to prison administration. See id.
As the district court in that case reasoned:
Prison administration presents unique difficulties and the burden
imposed on the plaintiff in the instant case by the defendants' use
of his non-Muslim name clearly is outweighed by the
administrative difficulties and confusion which would confront
prison officials in attempting to amend commitment papers of
every prisoner who embraces the Islamic faith and changes his
name.
Id. Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiff argues he was engaged in religious conduct by
signing an open records request with the suffix “El” affixed to his name, the Court finds
no constitutional basis to consider such conduct as protected under the First
Amendment. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim fails as a
matter of law.
B.
Plaintiff has not established the requisite causal connection.
Furthermore, even assuming Plaintiff had shown that he was engaged in
protected conduct, he nonetheless has failed to establish a causal connection between
that conduct and the adverse action suffered. To show causation in a retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must show (1) that the adverse action was proximately caused by an individual
defendant’s acts, and (2) that the defendant taking those acts was “motivated in
substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.”
King, 680 F.3d at 695 (quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 386) (citing Siggers-El v.
Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2005)). Both the Sixth Circuit and the lower courts
of this circuit have recognized that, with respect to causation, “retaliation is ‘easy to
allege’ and ‘can seldom be demonstrated by direct evidence.’” Catanzaro v. Mich.
Dep’t of Corr., 2011 WL 7113245, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2011) (quoting Huff v. Rutter,
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2006 WL 2039983, at *7 (W.D. Mich. July 19, 2006)). The Sixth Circuit has noted,
however, that “conclusory allegations of temporal proximity are not sufficient to show
retaliatory motive.” Skinner v. Bolden, 89 F. App’x 579, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing
Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 2001); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172,
175-76 (6th Cir. 1996)). “A claim of retaliation must include a chronology of events
from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” Desmone v. Adams, 1998 WL
702342, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 1998). Accordingly, “bare allegations of malice would
not suffice to establish a constitutional claim.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399.
Then,
“[o]nce the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected conduct was a
motivating factor behind any harm, the burden of production shifts to the defendant. If
the defendant can show that he would have taken the same action in the absence of the
protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.” Desmone, 1998 WL
702342, at *3. For several reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish
the causation element of his retaliation claim.
First, the record reflects that Plaintiff pleaded and was found guilty of the charge
of refusing or failing to obey an order. The Sixth Circuit addressed an analogous
scenario in Jackson v. Madery, a case in which a prisoner alleged that false disciplinary
reports were filed against him in retaliation for his engaging in protected conduct. 158
F. App’x 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005). There, the Sixth Circuit held that “[a] finding of
guilty based upon some evidence of a violation of prison rules ‘essentially checkmates
[a] retaliation claim.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Henderson v. Baird,
29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994)). Here, there was certainly evidence to support the
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charges, and there was a finding of guilty based on Plaintiff’s guilty plea. For this
reason, Plaintiff cannot establish the causation element of his retaliation claim.
Second, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Defendant Burnham was in any
way involved in the March 16 disciplinary write-up or March 20 disciplinary hearing.
Defendants, on the other hand, have offered evidence that Burnham did not bring the
open records request to Defendant Brown’s attention, that Burnham was not involved in
the March 16 write-up or March 20 disciplinary hearing, and that Burnham was not a
member of the three-person adjustment committee panel that found Plaintiff guilty. For
this reason also, at least with respect to Burnham, Plaintiff cannot establish the
causation element of his retaliation claim.
Finally, even assuming Plaintiff had met his burden of showing that he was
engaged in protected conduct and that his protected conduct was a motivating factor
behind any harm, Defendants have satisfied their burden of coming forward with
evidence that they would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected
activity. The record reflects that the decision to charge Plaintiff was simply due to his
refusal or failure to obey an order. The rule requiring prisoners to use their recognized
KDOC names was not specific to Plaintiff or members of his religion and had long been
the policy of the institution. Defendants have offered evidence that regardless of a
prisoner’s reason for attempting to use another name, the directive and penalty for
failure to obey an order would have been the same. For this reason also, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
***
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
establish two of the three required elements for a First Amendment retaliation claim.
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Because this claim fails as a matter of law, summary judgment is warranted, and the
Court need not address whether Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity.
II.
RLUIPA Claim
For his remaining claim, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief pursuant to the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which provides that:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . .
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
government interest.
42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a).
A.
Plaintiff’s RLUIPA Claim was mooted by this transfer to KSR.
When Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint were filed, he was
incarcerated at the KSP in Eddyville, Kentucky. (See Docket Nos. 1; 8.) Plaintiff since
has been transferred to the KSR in LaGrange, Kentucky. (See Docket No. 17.) The law
of this circuit is clear that a prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief under the RLUIPA may
be mooted by his transfer to a different facility. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282,
289 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding an inmate’s RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief, which was
targeted at a particular institution’s policies and procedures and not those of the state’s
department of corrections as a whole, mooted by his transfer out of that facility);
Berryman v. Granholm, 343 F. App’x 1, 5 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding, in regard to inmate’s
RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief, that “the district court correctly held that because
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[the inmate] had been transferred from the St. Louis facility, the claim had become
moot”); Kensu, 87 F.3d at 175 (finding that a prisoner’s request for injunctive relief
from inspection of his mail was moot because he had been transferred to a different
facility that did not search his mail).
Here, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is targeted
specifically at the policies and procedures of the KSP, and the Court allowed this claim
to proceed against the three named Defendants, none of who remain in their former
positions at the KSP. As such, his RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief has been mooted
by his transfer to the KSR.
B.
Even if Plaintiff’s claim was not mooted by his transfer, he is not
entitled to relief under the RLUIPA.
The purpose of the RLUIPA is to “protect[] institutionalized persons who are
unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the
government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). “However, ‘prison security is a compelling state
interest” and “deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.’” Hayes
v. Tennessee, 424 F. App’x, 554 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n. 13).
Accordingly, the RLUIPA does not “elevate accommodation of religious observances
over an institution's need to maintain order and safety.” Cutter, at 722. Defendants
argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the RLUIPA because no substantial
burden is imposed on the exercise of his religion. Defendants further argue that to the
extent any challenged practice does burden Plaintiff’s religious exercise, that burden
furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. (Docket No. 22-1, at 12-15.) The Court agrees.
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“An inmate asserting a claim under the RLUIPA must first produce prima facie
evidence demonstrating that his religious exercise was substantially burdened.” Hayes,
424 F. App’x at 554; see also Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App’x 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2010);
Haight v. Thompson, 2013 WL 1092969, at *10 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2013). Thus, as this
Court previously noted:
“The threshold inquiry under RLUIPA is whether the
challenged governmental action substantially burdens the exercise of religion. The
burden of proving the existence of a substantial interference with a religious exercise
rests on the religious adherent.” (Docket No. 11, at 9 (quoting Baranowski v. Hart, 486
F.3d 112, 124 (5th Cir. 2007)).) The RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
Although not specifically defined by the
RLUIPA, the Sixth Circuit has characterized a “substantial burden” as one that places
“substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
Hayes, 424 F. App’x at 555; Barhite, 377 F. App’x at 511; Living Water Church of God
v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App'x 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2007). In Living Water
Church, the Sixth Circuit explained:
In the “Free Exercise” context, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the “substantial burden” hurdle is high . . . .
In short, while the Supreme Court generally has found that a
government’s action constituted a substantial burden on an
individual’s free exercise of religion when that action forced an
individual to choose between “following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits” or when the action in question
placed “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs,” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
717–18 (1981), it has found no substantial burden when, although
the action encumbered the practice of religion, it did not pressure
the individual to violate his or her religious beliefs. See Lyng v. Nw.
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Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (2007);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–06 (1961).
Id.
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that a substantial burden is imposed on his right to
freely exercise his religious beliefs by the prison requiring him to sign prison forms
using his official KDOC-recognized name. There is no evidence that the KSP policy
requiring inmates to use their court-convicted name when signing records requests
somehow pressured Plaintiff to violate his beliefs. While he may desire to be referred
to and recognized by the name “Robinson-El” or “Robinson-El-I,” he has at best shown
an incidental burden on the practice of his religious beliefs. As such, this burden is
insufficient to meet the “substantial burden” threshold of the RLUIPA.
Still, even assuming Plaintiff had shown that the burden was substantial, he
would not be entitled to relief under the RLUIPA. Once a plaintiff makes the requisite
prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the state “to prove that any substantial
burden on the inmate’s exercise of his religious beliefs was ‘in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest’ and imposition of the substantial burden on the
inmate is ‘the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.’” Hayes, 424 F. App’x at 555 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)(1)–(2)) (citing
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2(b)). Here, the Court is satisfied that Defendants have met their
burden of persuasion.
As Defendants point out, requiring inmates to use the name under which they
were convicted furthers the state’s interest both in terms of prison security and prison
administration. Prison record-keeping is not limited to records of inmates’ open records
requests. On the contrary, prisons maintain an array of records for their inmates,
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including records of grievances, disciplinary issues, inmate classification, property
records, mail logs, medical records, and so on.
Requiring all administrative matters to
be handled and addressed by the name under which an inmate was convicted assists in
maintaining accurate and complete records for all concerned, which in turn helps ensure
that the prison’s security needs are met as well. To allow inmates to use varying names
as they please would undoubtedly compromise the prison’s ability to maintain order and
security.
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 (“We do not read RLUIPA to elevate
accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order
and safety.”); Hayes, 424 F. App’x at 550 (“As maintaining security, order, and
discipline are essential goals of a corrections system, prison officials are accorded wide
latitude in the adoption and application of prison policies and procedures.”).
Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that Defendants have shown that any burden imposed
furthers a compelling government interest.
Finally, Defendants must show that any burden imposed is through the least
restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling interest. Defendants have
offered evidence that while prison policy requires inmates to use their court-convicted
names, inmates are permitted to go through the process of a legal name change, after
which, an inmate is allowed to use his new legal name. Defendants insist that “the rule
is not that an inmate is not allowed to use a name based upon religious preference, but
rather that an inmate must use his legal name and that if an inmate legally changes his
name, his new name will be recognized.” (Docket No. 22-1, at 14.) Although Plaintiff
insists that his religious beliefs also prohibit him from legally changing his name, the
Court is satisfied that the Defendants have shown that any burden imposed on Plaintiff
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is through the least restrictive means of furthering the state’s compelling interests in
maintaining administrative order and institutional security.
For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if not mooted by his transfer from
KSP to KSR, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim nonetheless fails as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s remaining First
Amendment retaliation claim and RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief both fail as a
matter of law.
As such, summary judgment is appropriate.
Therefore, having
considered the parties’ respective arguments and being otherwise sufficiently advised;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion/Petition for Summary
Judgment,” (Docket No. 19), is DENIED;
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, (Docket No. 22), is GRANTED. An appropriate Order of final
judgment will issue concurrently with this Opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
cc:
August 2, 2013
Counsel for Defendants
Anthony L. Robinson, pro se
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