Watts v. Lyon County Ambulance Service et al

Filing 65

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 6/23/2014 - Plaintiff Kenneth Watts Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 64 is DENIED. cc: Counsel(DAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-00060-TBR

KENNETH WATTS

Plaintiff

v.
LYON COUNTY AMBULANCE SERVICE, et al.

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Kenneth Watts’ Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment. (Docket No. 64.) Defendants have not yet responded, and the time
to do so has not yet passed. However, the Court need not await Defendants’ response to
consider Watts’ Motion.
On June 2, 2014, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and separate
Judgment granting Defendants’ Motion for summary Judgment and entering judgment
in their favor on each of Watts’ remaining claims. (Docket Nos. 61 & 62.)

In

specifically addressing Watts’ tortious-interference-with-a-contract claim, the Court
wrote:
Watts alleges that Murphy, acting alone or in concert with the
other Defendants, “intentionally, unlawfully, and without privilege
interfered with Plaintiff’s contract of employment.” (Docket No.
58.) In support of this claim, Watts does little more than rehash his
allegations relative to Murphy’s phone conversation with Maki.
(See Docket No. 58, at 49-52.)
Kentucky law is clear that a tortious interference claim requires
interference and improper conduct by a third party—that is, a party
or its agent cannot interfere with that party’s own contract. See
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Harstad v. Whiteman, 338 S.W.3d 804, 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011)
(“Agents of a party to a contract . . . cannot interfere with that
party’s contract.”); see also AMC of Louisville, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Milacron Inc., 2000 WL 33975582, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 2000)
(“Kentucky’s courts have not recognized a claim against a
Defendant for interfering with its own contract . . . .”). It is
undisputed that Watts was employed by the Ambulance Service
Board. It also is undisputed that Murphy was the Board’s chairman
and Defendants Young, Gilland, Denney, and Sims were members
of the Board. As such, Murphy and the other Defendants clearly
were agents of the Board, the party to Watts’ claimed contract of
employment. It follows that Defendants could not have tortiously
interfered with any contract between Watts and the Board. Thus,
no claim for tortious interference exists.
(Docket No. 61, at 31-32.)
Watts now moves the Court to reconsider that its decision relative to his tortiousinterference-with-a-contract claim against Defendant Rod Murphy, individually.
(Docket No. 64, at 1.) Watts does not identify the basis for his instant Motion. Given
that this Motion was filed less than two weeks after the Court entered Judgment on June
2, the Court will construe it as seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e).
The Sixth Circuit its lower courts have consistently held that a Rule 59 motion
should not be used either to reargue a case on the merits or to reargue issues already
presented, see Whitehead v. Bowen, 301 F. App’x 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Sault
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)), or
otherwise to “merely restyle or rehash the initial issues,” Derby City Capital, LLC v.
Trinity HR Servs., 949 F. Supp. 2d 712, 746 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (quoting White v. Hitachi,
Ltd., 2008 WL 782565, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008)). “It is not the function of a
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motion to reconsider arguments already considered and rejected by the court.” Id.
(citing White, 2008 WL 782565, at *1). As this Court has recognized on numerous
occasions, “Where a party views the law in a light contrary to that of this Court, its
proper recourse is not by way of a motion for reconsideration but appeal to the Sixth
Circuit.” E.g., id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit instructs that a
motion for reconsideration should only be granted on four grounds: “Under Rule 59, a
court may alter or amend a judgment based on: ‘(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly
discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to
prevent manifest injustice.’” Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616
F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620
(6th Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, because there is an interest in the finality of a decision,
this Court and other district courts have held that “such motions are extraordinary and
sparingly granted.” Derby City Capital, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 747 (alteration omitted)
(quoting Marshall v. Johnson, 2007 WL 1175046, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2007)); see
also Encompass Indem. Co. v. Halfhill, 2014 WL 1343392, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 3,
2014); Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 669 (N.D.
Ohio 1995)); Rottmund v. Cont’l Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa.
1992).
Watts’ Motion does not warrant relief under Rule 59. The argument presented in
Watts’ instant Motion is lifted word-for-word from the argument he presented in his
Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Compare Docket No. 64, at
2-5, with Docket No. 58, at 49-52.) As such, he merely renews a line of argument that
the Court already has considered and rejected. (See Docket No. 61, at 31-32.) As noted
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above, “[w]here a party views the law in a light contrary to that of this Court, its proper
recourse is not by way of a motion for reconsideration but appeal to the Sixth Circuit,”
Derby City Capital, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 746, and, under the well-settled law of this
Circuit, a Rule 59 motion should not be used either to reargue a case on the merits or to
reargue issues already presented, e.g., Whitehead, 301 F. App’x at 489; Engler, 146 F.3d
at 374, or otherwise to “merely restyle or rehash the initial issues,” Derby City Capital,
949 F. Supp. 2d at 746. Quite simply, “[i]t is not the function of a motion to reconsider
arguments already considered and rejected by the court.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to grant Watts the relief he presently seeks.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, having considered Watts’ Motion and being otherwise sufficiently
advised;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Kenneth Watts’ Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment, (Docket No. 64), is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:

cc:

June 23, 2014

Counsel

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