Ridgeway v. Commonwealth of Kentucky et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 2/6/2013; an appropriate order shall issuecc:counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
THOMAS RIDGEWAY

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-P186-R

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Thomas Ridgeway initiated this pro se civil-rights action by filing a complaint
on his own paper. He neither paid the $350 filing fee nor filed a prisoner application to proceed
without prepayment of fees. Accordingly, the Court entered an Order that within 30 days
Plaintiff submit his complaint on a Court-approved complaint form and either pay the $350 filing
fee or submit a prisoner application to proceed without prepayment of the fee. The Clerk of
Court was directed to send to Plaintiff a Court-approved 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint form and a
prisoner application to proceed without prepayment of the fee, both with this case number
affixed thereto.
More than 30 days have passed since entry of that Order. Plaintiff has neither filed a
complaint on the Court-approved form, paid the fee, nor submitted his completed prisoner
application to proceed without prepayment of the fee. Plaintiff was warned in the Court’s
previous Order that failure to comply fully with the Order would result in dismissal of the
action.1
Upon filing the instant action, Plaintiff assumed the responsibility to actively litigate his
claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the Court to dismiss the action “[i]f the

1

The Court notes that Plaintiff is not unfamiliar with filing requirements in this Court as
he has filed 15 different actions since 2011.

plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Although federal
courts afford pro se litigants some leniency on matters that require legal sophistication, such as
formal pleading rules, the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and other
procedures readily understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay or
failure to pursue a case. See Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). “[T]he lenient
treatment of pro se litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with
an easily understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more
generously than a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)
(citing Jourdan, 951 F.2d at 110). Courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative,
to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or
dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
Upon review, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s Order shows a failure to
pursue his case. Therefore, by separate Order, the Court will dismiss the instant action. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (governing involuntary dismissal).
Date:

February 6, 2013

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4413.009