Martinez v. White et al
Filing
273
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 12/21/2018. Denying 257 Motion for this Court to Reject Defendants for Bringing False Claims ; denying 258 Motion for Default Judgment; denying 259 Motion for Sanctions. cc: Counsel, plaintiff pro se(KJA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-CV-053-TBR
LEONEL MARTINEZ,
PLAINTIFF
v.
RANDY WHITE, Warden, et al.,
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon three motions by Plaintiff Leonel Martinez: a
Motion for this Court to Reject Defendants for Bringing False Claims, [R. 257]; a Motion for
Default Judgment, [R. 258]; and a Motion for Sanctions, [R. 259]. The Defendants responded,
[R. 260.] This matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein, Martinez’s Motion
for this Court to Reject Defendants for Bringing False Claims, [R. 257], is DENIED; Martinez’s
Motion for Default Judgment, [R. 258], is DENIED; and Martinez’s Motion for Sanctions, [R.
259], is DENIED.
On May 15, 2018, this Court ordered the Defendants to make three surveillance videos
requested by Martinez available to him for viewing. [R. 253 at 3-4.] On June 5, 2018, the
Defendants responded to the order, stating that the videos requested “either never existed or have
been overwritten during the normal security operations of the Kentucky State Penitentiary.” [R.
254 at 5.] The Defendants filed an affidavit from the Deputy Warden of Security at Kentucky
State Penitentiary, Steven Ford, explaining that without a reason to store the video footage, the
data would have been overwritten within thirty days or less. [R. 254-1 at 1.] Subsequently,
Martinez filed three motions in response to the Defendants’ inability to produce the video
footage. [See R. 257; R. 258; R. 259.] Essentially, these motions amount to a request for the
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Court to sanction the Defendants for failing to provide the video footage that he previously
requested.
Specifically, in Martinez’s third motion, [R. 259], he asks the Court to sanction the
Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e). [R. 259 at 1.] Rule 37(e) states:
(e) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information. If electronically stored
information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of
litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and
it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information,
may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive
another party of the information's use in the litigation may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information
was unfavorable to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
In deciding whether to assess sanctions for spoliation, the Court conducts a two-step
inquiry. In re Black Diamond Min. Co., 514 B.R. 230, 237 (E.D. Ky. 2014). First, the Court must
determine whether sanctions are appropriate at all. Id. A spoliation sanction is warranted where
the moving party establishes:
(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it
at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed “with a culpable
state of mind”; and (3) that the destroyed evidence was “relevant” to the party's
claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would
support that claim or defense.
Beaven v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 622 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Residential Funding
Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Adkins v. Wolever, 692
F.3d 499, 504 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding all three-factors must be satisfied before spoliation
sanction is permitted). Second, upon finding that sanctions are warranted, the Court enjoys
considerable discretion in fashioning a suitable remedy. See Adkins v. Wolever, 54 F.3d 650,
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652–53 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 177–78 (6th Cir. 2013).
An obligation to preserve evidence only arises “when a ‘party has notice that the evidence is
relevant to litigation or . . . should have known that the evidence [might] be relevant to future
litigation.’” O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 587 (6th Cir. 2009) (omission in
original) (quoting John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008)), abrogated on other
grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016); see also
Beaven, 622 F.3d at 553 (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Here, Martinez argues that it is the prison’s policy to preserve such videos for two years;
thus, the prison allegedly still had custody of the video by the time this suit was filed. [R. 259 at
3.] In support of this argument, Martinez attached CPP 15.6, [R. 259-1]. This section of the
prison’s policy is titled “Functions of the Adjustment Committee, Adjustment Officer and Unit
Hearing Officer” and describes the committee’s duty to conduct hearings. [Id. at 2.] Specifically,
the portion highlighted by Martinez states:
The institution shall preserve the audio tape recording of the hearing for a period
of two (2) years from the date of the Warden’s review. If, through any mechanical
malfunction, the recording is lost, nothing shall effect [sic] the ultimate decision
of the committee or officer, pending the Warden’s review.
[Id. at 3 (emphasis added).] As pointed out by the Defendants, this policy governs the
preservation of the audio tape recording of a hearing in front of the Adjustment Committee,
Adjustment Officer, or Unit Hearing Officer, not the preservation of security footage.
Furthermore, Steven Ford averred that “the camera surveillance system recycles the video
overwriting the previous data” and “[u]nless KSP is given a specific reason or qualifying event,
for instance a prison riot, to save the stored data, the video would have been overwritten with
subsequent recordings within a short period of time, 30 days or less.” [R. 254-1 at 1.] The
footage requested depicted events involving officers Amber Bray and Mary Herrell on February
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3, 2015 and April 13, 2015, respectively. [R. 47 at 1-2.] However, Martinez’s motion to add
Bray and Herrell as parties to the law suit was filed over a month later, on May 18, 2015. [R. 47.]
Thus, the Defendants were not put on notice that the surveillance footage was relevant to the
litigation until after the footage was destroyed in the course of regular business. See O'Brien, 578
F.3d at 587. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendants did not have an obligation to
preserve the footage in question.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Martinez’s Motion for this
Court to Reject Defendants for Bringing False Claims, [R. 257], is DENIED; Martinez’s Motion
for Default Judgment, [R. 258], is DENIED; and Martinez’s Motion for Sanctions, [R. 259], is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 21, 2018
cc: Counsel of Record
Leonel Martinez, pro se
216925
LITTLE SANDY CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX
505 Prison Connector
Sandy Hook, KY 41171
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