Hermansen v. Thompson et al

Filing 91

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting 79 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 84 Motion for Attorney Fees; adopting 86 Report and Recommendations.. Signed by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 5/13/2016. cc: Counsel(KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-CV-00067-GNS-LLK

ERIC LLOYD HERMANSEN

PLAINTIFF

v.

LaDONNA THOMPSON, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objections (DN 89) to Magistrate Judge
Lanny King’s Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law (DN 86). The Court concurrently rules on
Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Attorney’s Fees (DN 84). For the reasons stated below
Defendant’s Objection is OVERRULED, and the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s
Recommendations. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 79) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Attorney’s Fees (DN 84) is DENIED AS
MOOT.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Eric Lloyd Hermansen (“Hermansen”) is a Jewish inmate at the Kentucky State
Penitentiary (“KSP”). (R. & R., 2, DN 84). Plaintiff filed this action shortly after being
transferred to KSP to the Kentucky State Reformatory (“KSR”). (R. & R. 1). Plaintiff believed
the meals at KSR were not kosher and demanded changes to the meals, which he had done
previously during his tenure at KSP. (R. & R. 1). Plaintiff and KSR are currently negotiating
these changes. The present case concerns Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injuries arising from
KSR’s inability to immediately placate his demands.

II.

JURISDICTION

Plaintiff alleges claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has “original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, which was
enacted by Congress to relieve the burden of Article III courts by permitting assignment of
certain duties to magistrate judges. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70 (1989).
Section 636(b) identifies the powers that may be assigned to magistrates by the district court.
Section 636(b) also establishes the applicable standard of review for objections to the ruling of a
Magistrate Judge on such assigned matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The Sixth Circuit has
explained:
Thus, § 636(b) creates two different standards of review for district courts when a
magistrate court's finding is challenged in district court. A district court shall apply a
clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard of review for the nondispositive,
preliminary measures of § 636(b)(1)(A). Conversely, dispositive motions accepted from §
636(b)(1)(A), such as motions for summary judgment or for the suppression of evidence,
are governed by the de novo standard.
United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(internal citations omitted) (citation omitted).
IV.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings on two grounds. First, Plaintiff alleges
that the Magistrate Judge improperly ruled that Plaintiff was seeking damages under the
Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) instead of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Pl.’s Objs. 1, DN 89). Second, Plaintiff alleges that the Magistrate Judge improperly ruled that
Defendants were protected by qualified immunity. (Pl.’s Objs. 2). Neither argument has merit.
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First, the Magistrate Judge did not base his opinion entirely on the RLUIPA. Instead, the
Magistrate Judge merely stated that a RLUIPA violation does not necessarily mean a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 violation occurred. (R. & R. 9). This does not mean, as Plaintiff suggests, that the
Magistrate Judge did not address Plaintiff’s constitutional claims. The Magistrate Judge correctly
found that this matter does not involve a clear violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights that a
reasonable person would have known and, therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity. (R. & R. 5).
The record reflects that the meals served to Plaintiff were in fact kosher and KSR
officials went beyond what was required to prepare kosher meals by installing a separate cooking
source. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 5, DN 79-1). Plaintiff’s expert, Rabbi Baruch Susman
(“Susman”), indicated that issues with the meals at KSR were relatively minor and did not
indicate that Jewish law regarding food (“kashrut”) was being violated.1 Susman’s
recommendations primarily dealt with food preparation, rather than the food itself. (Susman
Report 1, DN 64). Susman’s report does not indicate Hermansen was actively refused kosher
food. Instead, the report indicates KSR officials made good faith efforts to ensure kosher cooking
practices rather than any clear violations of Jewish law. (Susman Report 1-2). In addition,
Plaintiff has failed to establish the inadequacy of the food served to him. The Sixth Circuit has
held “that prison administrators must provide an adequate diet without violating the inmate’s
religious dietary restrictions.” Alexander v. Carrick, 31 F. App’x 176, 179 (6th Cir. 2002).
Further, “[f]or the inmate, this is essentially a constitutional right not to eat the offending food

“Kashrut is the body of Jewish law dealing with what foods can and cannot be eaten and how
those foods must be prepared. The word ‘Kashrut’ comes from [] Hebrew meaning fit, proper or
correct.” JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, Jewish Dietary Laws (Kashrut): Overview of Laws &
Regulations, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/kashrut.html (last visited,
April 7, 2016).
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item. If the prisoner’s diet, as modified, is sufficient to sustain the prisoner in good health, no
constitutional right has been violated.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has not established a
genuine issue of material fact that the meals served to him were so inadequate that he was unable
to sustain good health or that KSR undertook any blatant violations of kashrut food preparation.
Therefore, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (DN 86) is
ACCEPTED AND ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY, and Plaintiff’s Objections (DN 89) are
OVERRULED. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 79) is
GRANTED. As such, Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Attorney’s Fees (DN 84) is DENIED AS
MOOT.

Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court
May 13, 2016

cc:

counsel of record

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