Harvey v. Carr

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 9/18/2014; re 32 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Darryl Carr ; an appropriate order shall issue.cc:counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-CV-00116-TBR

CHRISTOPHER HARVEY

Plaintiff

v.
DARRYL CARR

Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Darryl Carr’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, (Docket No. 32).

Plaintiff Christopher Harvey has responded.

(Docket No. 36). Defendant has replied. (Docket #56). Accordingly, these matters now
are ripe for adjudication.

For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion will be

GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Christopher Harvey alleges that Defendant Darryl Carr committed
battery and violated Harvey’s Constitutional rights by arresting Harvey. Carr is a police
officer with the City of Benton Police Department. At this stage, “all evidence must be
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 261 FN 2 (1986).
On July 12, 2012, Harvey was working as the manager of the Benton City Pool.
Harvey’s son Hunter Harvey was behind the counter in the concession stand, although
Hunter was not an employee. Hunter spilled a soft drink and refused to clean up the spill.
Karly Watkins, a pool employee, went to find Harvey and brought him to the concession
Page 1 of 8

stand. Harvey told Hunter to clean up the spill. Hunter refused. Harvey insisted that
Hunter clean up the spill. Hunter went “berserk,” flipping his father off and shouting
“Fuck You.” (Docket #36). Harvey slapped Hunter in the face. (Docket #36). Harvey
then put Hunter in a bear hug and the two wrestled, with Hunter going to the ground.
(Docket #36). Watkins and Jeff Carroll, another pool employee, “closed the doors and
pulled the blinds in the office so that the other customers would not see or hear what was
going on.”

(Docket #36).

A customer called the incident into the Benton Police

Department.
Upon his arrival, Carr separately interviewed Harvey, his son Hunter, and
Watkins. Harvey admitted to Carr that he had slapped Hunter in the face. (Docket #36).
Hunter confirmed that his father had slapped him and put him in a bear hug. Hunter said
that the slap “doesn’t hurt anymore, it hurt for a couple of seconds when he slapped me
though.” (Docket #36). Watkins confirmed that Harvey had slapped Hunter. Carr also
took a picture of Hunter’s face. Harvey strongly argues that this picture is misleading
because it shows the wrong side of Hunter’s face and any redness on Hunter’s face was
due to acne.
Carr informed Harvey that he was charging him with fourth degree assault, a
Class A misdemeanor. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 508.030. Carr handcuffed Harvey and put him in
Carr’s vehicle. Harvey alleges that Carr did not secure Harvey with a seatbelt.
Harvey’s criminal case was brought before the Marshall County District Court.
Before trial, Harvey moved to dismiss the assault charge for lack of probable cause. The
court stated it could not rule on the motion to dismiss without first holding an evidentiary

2

hearing, which the court declined to do. (Docket #32, Ex. 6). A jury trial was held on
November 15, 2013. After the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Harvey moved for
a directed verdict.

That motion was denied.

(Docket #32, Ex. 3). After Harvey

presented his defense, the jury found him not guilty of fourth degree assault.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is available under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) if the moving party
can establish that the “pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In determining
whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw
all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
“[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of
material fact.” Street v. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989). The test is
“whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each
element in the case.” Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must
present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. To support this position, he must present
evidence on which the trier of fact could find for the plaintiff. See id. (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat
a motion for summary judgment: “[t]he mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will
not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute
between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to render summary judgment

3

inappropriate.” Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir.
1996).
DISCUSSION
I.

Probable Cause and Qualified Immunity.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a wrongful arrest claim if
the officer had probable cause at the time of the arrest. Avery v. King, 110 F.3d 12 (6th
Cir. 1997); Voyticky v. Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 676 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (“Even law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably but
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present’ are entitled to immunity) (citation
omitted). The doctrine “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.’” Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1104 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Hunter,
502 U.S. 224). Qualified immunity exists to “protect public officials “from undue
interference with their duties from potentially disabling threats of liability by providing
them breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments.” (citations and
punctuation omitted). Lerner v. Shinseki, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58678 *18 (W.D. Ky.
2013).
A police officer has probable cause to arrest a person “if the facts and
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense
has been committed.” Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). “The inquiry
depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the
arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” (citation and punctuation omitted) Logsdon v.
Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2007). The officer is not required to “investigate
4

independently every claim of innocence” before making an arrest. Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). However, the officer must not “turn a blind eye toward
potentially exculpatory evidence known to them.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 372
(6th Cir. 1999).
If an affirmative defense to the crime exists, the officer “may not ignore
information known to him which proves that the suspect is protected by an affirmative
legal justification.” Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 (6th Cir. 1999). However,
he is also not required to “conduct quasi-trials as a necessary predicate to the warrantless
arrest of perpetrators.” Id. at 571, n. 21. The officer “lacks a legal foundation” only if a
“reasonable police officer would conclusively know that an investigative target’s behavior
is protected by a legally cognizable affirmative defense.” (emphasis in original) Id.;
Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2002).
Carr interviewed the suspect, the victim, and an independent witness. Each
confirmed that Harvey had slapped Hunter across the face. These undisputed facts show
that Carr had probable cause to believe Harvey committed fourth degree assault. Harvey
argues this probable cause should have been offset by the parental discipline justification
found in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.110. However, Carr could not have conclusively known at
the time of the arrest that Harvey’s use of force was “necessary to promote the welfare”
of his son and was not designed to cause extreme pain or mental distress. Ky. Rev. Stat. §
503.110; see Rhodes v. Pittard, 485 Fed. Appx. 113, 116 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Here there is
no reason to believe Scott should have ‘conclusively known’ that Pittard posed such a
threat of trespass as to justify the violent shove from the porch that Rhodes admittedly
delivered”); Gooden v. City of Brunswick, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48338 *44 (N.D. Ohio
5

2014) (“Although Mummert may have been aware that Ms. Gooden had trespassed when
she entered Plaintiff's home without permission, a reasonable officer in Mummert's
position could not have conclusively known that Plaintiff was entitled under the Castle
Doctrine to use physical force to remove his wife from the property”).
II.

Collateral Estoppel.

The Court has determined that Carr is entitled to qualified immunity because Carr
had probable cause to arrest Harvey. Carr alternatively argues that Harvey’s claims are
barred by collateral estoppel. Harvey has raised a factual dispute which prevents Carr’s
second argument from being resolved on summary judgment.
Carr argues that the Marshall County District Court found probable cause to arrest
Harvey when it denied Harvey’s motion for a directed verdict in his criminal case. 1 “In
determining whether a state court's adjudication of an issue has preclusive effect for an
action under § 1983, the Court must apply the collateral-estoppel law of that state.” Butts
v. Deibler, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94430 *19 (W.D. Ky. 2013). “Kentucky law provides
that collateral estoppel applies to issues actually litigated in a prior action where there is
identity of the parties, identity of the issues, and the prior action was tried on the merits.”
Id. Kentucky courts have not directly addressed the preclusive effect of a judge’s denial
of a motion for directed verdict. Id. In a recent case, this Court adopted the persuasive
authority of the Georgia Supreme Court:

1

Carr also argues that the Marshall County District Court found probable cause in a
hearing prior to trial. The Court agrees with Harvey that the Marshall County District
Court stated it could not consider the matter unless an evidentiary hearing was held,
denied Harvey’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and told the parties to raise the issue
again on a motion for directed verdict. (Docket #36, Ex. 6).
6

the Georgia Supreme Court held that ‘when the trial judge rules that the evidence
is sufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction (that is, is sufficient to
enable a rational trier of fact to find each and every element of the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt), . . . such a holding – unreversed and in the
absence of fraud or corruption – should . . . suffice as to the existence of probable
cause’ for purposes of collaterally estopping a later § 1983 action for malicious
prosecution. Butts, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94430 *20 (citing Monroe v. Sigler,
256 Ga. 759 (Ga. 1987)).
This case is distinguishable from Butts because Harvey has strenuously argued
that Carr supplied false information in his police report which contributed to Harvey
losing his motion for a directed verdict. Harvey supports this argument with affidavits
from Harvey and Hunter. Accordingly, Harvey has raised a factual dispute which
prevents the Court from addressing Carr’s collateral estoppel argument.
III.

Battery.

Finally, Harvey alleges that Carr committed battery when he transported Harvey
without securing his seatbelt. Harvey does not allege that Carr drove recklessly or
otherwise endangered Harvey while transporting him.
The failure to fasten an arrestee’s seatbelt, even following a request to do so, does
not violate a person’s Constitutional rights absent other risk-enhancing factors. Compare
Lefler v. Unknown Party, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97901 *10 (W.D. Mich. 2010); Turner
v. Unknown Parties, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16674 *15 (W.D. Mich 2012); and Vinson v.
United States Marshals Serv., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100371 *15 (D.S.C. 2011)
(collecting cases) (“[T]he failure to restrain a prisoner with a seatbelt alone does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation.”) with Brown v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 353 F.3d
1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding prisoners had a claim when correctional officers
refused to fasten seatbelts, drove recklessly, and crashed).
7

Harvey’s mere allegation that Carr failed to secure Harvey with a seatbelt is
insufficient to support a claim of battery.
CONCLUSION
Carr has moved for summary judgment on Harvey’s claims. For all of the
foregoing reasons Carr’s motion is GRANTED. A separate order and judgment shall
issue.

September 18, 2014

cc:

Counsel

8