Crosby v. McCracken County, Kentucky
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell; For the reasons stated, the action will be dismissed. cc:Plaintiff, pro se; McCracken County Attorney (ERH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
RONNIE EARL CROSBY
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13CV-P118-R
MCCRACKEN COUNTY, KY.
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Ronnie Earl Crosby filed this pro se action proceeding in forma pauperis. This
matter is now before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the instant action will be
dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff filed the complaint on a general complaint form naming “McCracken County,
Ky.” as the only Defendant. As grounds for filing this case in federal court, Plaintiff states that
he has “served out a 14 month sentence now I face a year over an A.I. which I was released after
8 hours. It is destroying my income and a place to reside.” For his statement of the claim,
Plaintiff states as follows:
After spend 14 months to get off Probation and serving out. Judge Hollowell and
District Attorney after charged with an AI sent my case upper or to trail. My
incarsiration has totally or will totally destroy my place of residence and my V.A.
Pension. The charge they brought before me was supposely drop for a guilty plea
on a 3rd D.U.I. I Ronnie E. Crosby petition for a motion of certarario.
As his prayer for relief, Plaintiff states, “A.I. is no violate crime and I would like to seek closure
on my VA Pension.”
II.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this Court must review the instant
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); McGore, 114 F.3d at 608-09. Upon review, the Court must dismiss
a case at any time if it determines that an action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are
to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). However, the
duty “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19
(1st Cir. 1979).
Here, Plaintiff essentially requests this Court to stop the state-court criminal case against
him for A.I., which the Court presumes is a charge of Alcohol Intoxication. The Supreme Court
made clear in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that “a federal court should not interfere
with a pending state criminal proceeding except in the rare situation where an injunction is
necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury.” Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740,
743 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). “Younger abstention in civil cases requires
the satisfaction of three elements. Federal courts should abstain when (1) state proceedings are
pending; (2) the state proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state
proceedings will afford the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.”
Hayse v. Wethington, 110 F.3d 18, 20 (6th Cir. 1997).
The state has an important interest in adjudicating the criminal case. In light of the
available avenues through which to raise a constitutional challenge in the pending case, this
Court will not interfere with an on-going Kentucky state court proceeding. While federal court
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relief might be a possibility in the future should state court remedies prove unavailable, Plaintiff
has failed to show that the state courts are unable to protect his interests at this time. Therefore,
Younger abstention is appropriate with respect to Plaintiff’s complaint, and the action will be
dismissed. Tindall v. Wayne Cnty. Friend of the Court, 269 F.3d 533, 538 (6th Cir. 2001)
(Younger abstention counsels federal court to refrain from adjudicating matter otherwise
properly before it in deference to ongoing state criminal proceedings).
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff may have already been convicted of the charged
crime, his claim would be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994), wherein
the Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff may not mount a constitutional challenge to his
conviction or sentence if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render the conviction or
sentence invalid, until and unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by Executive Order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Plaintiff has not alleged that any conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.
Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks “closure on my VA Pension,” this District
Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim concerning Veterans Administration
benefits. “Congress intended to preclude district court jurisdiction over VA decisions relating to
benefits claims, including decisions of constitutional issues.” Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965,
974 (6th Cir. 1997). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim seeking action by this Court with respect to his
VA benefits will be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
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The Court will enter an Order dismissing the action consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion.
Date:
December 4, 2013
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
McCracken County Attorney
4413.010
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