MacGlashan v. ABS Lincs KY, Inc.
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying 21 Defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 10/7/2014. cc: Counsel(JBM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-CV-00135-TBR
MARGARET MACGLASHAN
Plaintiff
v.
ABS LINCS KY, INC. D/B/A
CUMBERLAND HALL HOSPITAL
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant ABS Lincs KY, Inc.’s motion for
partial dismissal. (Docket #21). Plaintiff Margaret Macglashan’s has responded. (Docket
#25). Defendant has replied. (Docket #34). These matters now are ripe for adjudication.
For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion for partial dismissal (Docket #21) will be
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the termination of Margaret MacGlashan as an employee of
ABS Lincs KY, Inc., doing business as Cumberland Hall Hospital (“Cumberland Hall”).
On June 6, 2013, MacGlashan was working as a nurse manager when she was
notified that a patient with a known sulfa allergy had been given multiple doses of a
sulfa-based antibiotic.
(Docket #1).
MacGlashan had the patient transferred to
Blanchfield Army Community Hospital (“Blanchfield Hospital”) for immediate medical
care. MacGlashan then met with Cumberland Hall’s CEO Jim Spruyt and Director of
Nursing Sharon Shemwell to discuss the medical error. Spruyt instructed MacGlashan to
Page 1 of 6
check on the Plaintiff’s status at Blanchfield Hospital. That evening, MacGlashan called
Blanchfield Hospital and texted Spruyt what she had learned. (Docket #1).
The parties disagree about what occurred next. MacGlashan alleges she carried
out Spruyt’s order to investigate by taking the patient’s medical records home to study
and then personally visiting the patient the next day at Blanchfield Hospital. She claims
Spruyt and Cumberland Hall became concerned about the negative attention her
investigation might attract and suspended her. Plaintiff claims she was fired on the false
allegation that she violated HIPAA. (Docket #24, 25). Conversely, Cumberland Hall
argues that MacGlashan was only authorized to call Blanchfield Hospital on the evening
of June 6, 2013. Cumberland Hall claims MacGlashan unilaterally chose to personally
visit the patient and that Blanchfield Hospital complained about this visit to Cumberland
Hall. Cumberland Hall also says that MacGlashan had taken portions of the patient’s
medical records without authorization.
Cumberland Hall argues that MacGlashan
violated HIPAA and Cumberland Hall fired her for this reason. (Docket #21, 35).
Cumberland Hall suspended MacGlashan on June 7, 2013.
On June 13,
MacGlashan received a call from Shemwell and Human Resources Manager Kelly Hagy.
Hagy informed MacGlashan that Cumberland Hall had decided to fire MacGlashan on
the grounds that she violated HIPAA. (Docket #1).
MacGlashan subsequently filed for unemployment benefits.
Her claim was
denied after Cumberland Hall disputed the unemployment claim by stating MacGlashan
had been fired for violating HIPAA. (Docket #1).
2
MacGlashan claims that Cumberland Hall wrongfully terminated her and defamed
her by saying she violated HIPAA.
Cumberland Hall has moved to dismiss
MacGlashan’s defamation claim.
STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings, including
complaints, contain a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a claim or
case because the complaint fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must
presume all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc., 552
F.3d at 434 (citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir.
1983)). “The court need not, however, accept unwarranted factual inferences.” Id.
(citing Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)).
Even though a “complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). Instead, the plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). A
complaint should contain enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. A claim becomes plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
3
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). If, from the well-pleaded facts, the court cannot “infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “Only a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Under Kentucky law, a cause of action for defamation requires (i) defamatory
language; (ii) about the plaintiff; (iii) which is published; and (iv) which causes injury to
the plaintiff’s reputation. Columbia Sussex Corp. Inc. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky.
App. 1981). Cumberland Hall argues that MacGlashan’s complaint is insufficient to
demonstrate the first and third elements of a defamation claim.
I.
MacGlashan has sufficiently pled “defamatory language.”
Kentucky courts hold that language is defamatory for purposes of the first element
of this test “if it tends to (1) bring a person into public hatred, contempt or ridicule; (2)
cause him to be shunned or avoided; or (3) injure him in his business or occupation.”
McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Ky. 1981);
Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 793 (Ky. 2004) (“Defamatory
language is broadly construed as language that tends so to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).
The defamatory language in this case is Cumberland Hall’s statement that
MacGlashan violated HIPAA. An allegation that a nurse violated an important health
4
care law is detrimental both to that nurse’s employment prospects and her general
reputation. Accordingly, MacGlashan has sufficiently pled that Cumberland Hall used
defamatory language.
II.
MacGlashan has sufficiently pled that defamatory language was
published to a third party.
Defamatory language is “‘published’ when it is intentionally or negligently
communicated to someone other than the party defamed.” Stringer, 151 S.W. 3d at 794
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977)).
Cumberland Hall published defamatory language when it informed the Kentucky
unemployment office that MacGlashan had been fired for violating HIPAA. Cumberland
Hall also published defamatory language to at least two of its employees. Cumberland
Hall directed Hagy to fire MacGlashan “due to a HIPAA violation.” (Docket #1).
Shemwell was listening when Hagy terminated MacGlashan. Both Hagy and Shemwell
heard Cumberland Hall’s defamatory language that MacGlashan violated HIPAA.
III.
MacGlashan has pled malice sufficient to overcome qualified
privilege.
“Kentucky courts have recognized a qualified privilege for defamatory statements
relating to the conduct of employees.” Stringer, 151 S.W.3d at 796; see also Hawkins v.
Miller, 301 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Ky. App. 2009) (holding statements made in an
unemployment hearing were protected by a qualified privilege). The qualified privilege
rebuts the presumption of malice, “‘but still leave the party responsible for both falsehood
and malice if affirmatively shown.’” Stringer, 151 S.W.3d at 796 (quoting Baskett v.
Crossfield, 228 S.W. 673, 675 (Ky. App. 1920)).
Cumberland Hall’s statements to its employees and the Kentucky unemployment
5
office are protected by a qualified privilege. However, presuming the facts of
MacGlashan’s complaint are true, she has pled malice by claiming Cumberland Hall’s
statements were false and driven by retaliation against MacGlashan. See
Stringer, 151 S.W.3d at 797 (“the existence of a qualified privilege merely places a
‘technical burden of proof’ regarding malice upon the plaintiff”) (collecting cases).
Finally, to the extent Cumberland Hall argues its statements are protected by
absolute immunity, Cumberland Hall is incorrect. Kentucky has expressly rejected
absolute “intra-corporate immunity” for defamatory statements. Biber v. Duplicator
Sales & Serv., 155 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Ky. App. 2004) (“We can see no reason to insulate a
corporation, its officers, or employees from liability for defamation simply because the
statements were made exclusively to corporate officers or employees.”). Similarly,
Kentucky provides qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, to statements made in an
unemployment hearing. Compare Hawkins, 301 S.W.3d at 509 with Begley v. Louisville
Times Co., 115 S.W. 2d 345 (Ky. App. 1938) (granting absolute privilege to a
newspaper’s republication of the record of an administrative proceeding).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant ABS Lincs KY, Inc.’s motion for partial
dismissal (Docket #21) is DENIED.
cc:
Counsel
October 7, 2014
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?