Stallins v. City of Princeton et al
Filing
39
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 10/9/2014; re 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Timothy Merrick, City of Princeton Police Department, City of Princeton ; an appropriate order shall issuecc:counsel (KJA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-CV-00157 -R
DENNIS STALLINS,
Plaintiff
v.
CITY OF PRINCETON,
CITY OF PRINCETON POLICE DEPARTMENT AND
TIMOTHY MERRICK,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Docket No. 16). Plaintiff Dennis Stallins has responded, (Docket No. 25) and Defendants have
replied. (Docket No. 31). This matter is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. For the
following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has alleged various claims stemming from his August 20, 2012 arrest: that the
Defendants 1) used excessive force during his arrest; 2) used cruel and unusual punishment by
placing Plaintiff, a disabled man, in Caldwell County jail following his arrest; and 3) were
negligent. The characterization of what happened on that evening is contested by the parties,
however Defendants have provided video and audio recordings of the arrest.
Plaintiff Stallins is a quadriplegic. Additionally, he underwent a surgery in March of
2012 that removed his right hip, leg, and foot after suffering from a severe infection. On August
20, 2012, Stallins rode as a passenger to the Dollar General in Princeton, Kentucky. His son’s
wife, Tonya Adams, drove the vehicle.
When they arrived, she entered the store and he
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remained in the vehicle. Police officers, including Defendant Timothy Merrick, were called to
the scene after receiving a report that Stallins had an outstanding state court arrest warrant, and
that he may be armed. (Docket No. 25). Officers approached Stallins while he was in the
vehicle.
At this point, the parties’ stories diverge. According to Defendants, Officers asked
Stallins to keep his hands up on the dashboard, but Stallins dropped his hands to his lap area and
placed his left hand on a rifle. Officer Merrick handcuffed Stallins’ hands behind his back, while
Officer Hardin secured the rifle and asked if Stallins had any more weapons. Stallins replied that
he did not, and Officer Merrick removed the handcuffs so that Stallins could assist the Officers
in getting into his wheelchair. Officers then noticed a shotgun in the back seat. After securing
the shotgun, Officers saw Stallins holding a handgun. Officers pulled Stallins from the vehicle
and onto the pavement, handcuffing him behind his back. As they did this, another handgun fell
from the waistband of his shorts. In all, Officers found four guns, and determined that all were
loaded and chambered. Stallins indicated that he had a concealed weapons license but Officers
confirmed on the scene that he did not have one. Officers put Stallins in his wheelchair and
offered him medical treatment, which he refused. A family member on the scene insisted, and
Officers called an ambulance.
Stallins was transported to the Caldwell Medical Center in Princeton, Kentucky, where he
was examined by a nurse and the emergency room doctor, Dr. Michael Howard. (Docket No.
16; Howard Dep.). He was treated for a superficial abrasion and bruising to his knee. An X-ray
of his ribs and knee came back normal. His other ailments, pressure ulcers, were deemed
chronic as a result of his amputation and confinement to a wheelchair and were not caused by the
events of the evening. Dr. Howard indicated that Stallins was acceptable for admission to jail on
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the Prisoner Medical Clearance Report with no special suggestions for his care. Stallins was
then transported to the Caldwell County Jail. Nicholas Dickerson, the deputy jailer on duty,
booked Stallins under standard operating procedures. (Docket No. 16; Dickerson Dep.). Stallins
signed an intake form indicating that he was not in need of medical attention. Dickerson placed
Stallins into a separate cell with its own shower and bathroom because Stallins was in a
wheelchair. Dickerson stated that nothing occurred while Stallins was at the Jail that required
medical attention. A friend picked Stallins up the next morning, and he did not request an
ambulance.
Stallins paints a different picture of events, starting with his arrest. Stallins claims to
have handed two guns out the window to the Officers. He agrees that Officer Merrick first
handcuffed him in the truck with his hands behind his back, before removing the handcuffs and
replacing them with his hands in front of his body. But Stallins alleges that Officer Merrick put
him in a headlock and threw him onto the pavement of the parking lot. The affidavit of Donna
Davis, Assistant manager of the Dollar General, states that she saw officers “throw [Stallins]
onto the blacktop.” (Davis Aff.). Next, Stallins alleges that all three Officers pinned him down
and kicked and hit him, and that Officer Merrick told Stallins he wished he could kill him. Lindy
Rogers, who was in a different vehicle parked at the Dollar General, claims to have heard this
statement as well. (Rogers Dep.). Plaintiff attaches the Affadavit of his expert witness, Jim
Blackburn.
Blackburn, a former police officer, reviewed the videos and believes that the
Officers used excessive force in this case. (Blackburn Aff.).
Additionally, Stallins claims that the Caldwell County Hospital personnel were not
prepared to care for a disabled inmate and that it was “cruel and unusual” to place him there
when the jail was not equipped to care for him. He also alleges that he “did not receive at least
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twelve (12) medications when he was in jail” and that he was “subjected to unbearable
conditions in jail and he could not control his nervous stomach and his bowels and he was dirty
during the night until he left.” (Docket No. 25).
Defendants have provided three audio/visual recordings from the vehicles of Officers
Trent Hardin, Timothy Merrick, and Logan Payne. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
and Reply Supporting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment refer extensively to the audio
and video recordings of the arrest, but Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
does not mention the recordings. The Court has reviewed the videos in this case. Officer
Merrick’s recording does not show video of the scene, but it captures the audio.
In this
recording, an Officer asks Stallins if he has any other weapons and whether he has any weapons
in his pockets. Stallins responds “no.” Officers ask him if he can lean forward on his own will
without hurting himself, and offer to help. Next, Officers can be heard finding additional
weapons. At the end of the encounter, Officers ask whether Plaintiff needs emergency medical
treatment or an ambulance and confirm that he is refusing medical treatment. Officers call an
ambulance in spite of his refusal.
Officer Logan Payne’s recording provides the Court a visual of the arrest. In this video,
the Officers approach Stallins in the truck. The Officers repeatedly tell Stallins to keep his hands
on the dashboard. They tell him twice, “hands on the dash,” then find another weapon in the
vehicle. An Officer states that it is loaded and chambered. Stallins is then told again three times
to keep his hands on the dashboard. At this point, an Officer removes Stallins from the vehicle.
Around this time, Officer Merrick can be heard yelling at Stallins, “We asked if you had any
more guns in the car, do you not know what that means? You could have got yourself killed.”
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STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve
all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
“[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material
fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989). The test is whether
the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case.
Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the plaintiff must present evidence on which the
trier of fact could reasonably find for the plaintiff. See id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). The plaintiff may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts
of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence ...
of a genuine dispute....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat a
motion for summary judgment; “the mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat
a properly supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on
an issue of material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Elec.
Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lews v.
Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012). When opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 1776 (2007).
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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has alleged various claims stemming from his August 20, 2012 arrest: that the
Defendants 1) used excessive force during his arrest; 2) used cruel and unusual punishment by
placing Plaintiff in Caldwell County jail following his arrest; and 3) were negligent.
I.
Excessive force
In order to prevail on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for Officers’ use of excessive force,
Stallins must establish that a constitutional violation occurred and that Defendants are not
entitled to qualified immunity. Slusher v. Carson, 540 F. 3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2008). Because
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court will first determine
whether Defendants’ actions were unconstitutional before turning to whether Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity for any such violation.
A. Constitutional Violation
There is no dispute as to whether Stallins was “seized” for purposes of triggering the
Fourth Amendment's protections. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to determine whether the
force used was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In making this determination, courts
employ an “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 391 (1989).
“Relevant factors to consider in evaluating what level of force is reasonable include the ‘severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.’” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F. 3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Still, the Sixth Circuit advises that “[t]hese factors are not an
exhaustive list, and the ultimate inquiry is whether the seizure was reasonable under the ‘totality
of the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2006)).
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Additionally, the “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than with the benefit of hindsight. Caie v.
W. Bloomfield Twp., 485 F. App'x 92, 95 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). This
means that courts must take into account “the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at
397).
“Ultimately, however, the ‘reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an
objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).
The first factor identified in Graham is the severity of the crime at issue. Here, Officers
were called to investigate someone with an outstanding warrant who was identified as being
armed. (Docket No. 25). Stallins was ultimately charged with Carrying a Concealed Weapon,
KRS 527.020, a Class A misdemeanor. (Docket No. 16). The Supreme Court has consistently
held that where the underlying crime is only a nonviolent misdemeanor, a lesser degree of force
is authorized. Tennessee v. Garner, 417 U.S. 1, 12, 94 S.Ct. 2074, 40 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985).
Generally, a misdemeanor violation of carrying a concealed weapon is not considered “notably
severe criminal activity.” Sheffey v. City of Covington, 564 Fed. Appx. 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2014).
However the Court must examine the totality of the circumstances, which can turn even a
misdemeanor into a “serious and immediate threat.” Id.. Here, the underlying crime charged
was a relatively minor misdemeanor. However, it appears from the video recording that Stallins
did not comply with Officers’ requests to keep his hands on the dashboard. Additionally, he can
be heard responding “no” when asked if he had any additional weapons.
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The second factor identified in Graham is the potential threat to officers or others.
Stallins states that “the guns in the truck were not guns for the plaintiff to be ‘armed’” and that
“[t]he plaintiff was not a threat of harm to the three (3) officers and the guns were not a threat of
harm to the three (3) officers.” (Docket No. 25). Defendants note that Stallins “reached for a
weapon on multiple occasions in spite of the officers’ clear instructions; lied to the officers about
the presence of additional weapons in the vehicle; induced the officers to uncuff him to move to
his wheelchair and then reached for a weapon; placed the officers in justifiable fear of the
discharge of weapons (as can be heard in their reactions) . . . .” (Docket No. 16).
Here, Officers were confronted with an individual who was not forthcoming about the
number of weapons in the vehicle. The video recording shows confusion and fear on the part of
the Officers, as they discovered more weapons throughout the stop. Additionally, Stallins
alleges that Defendants locked down the Dollar General, which further indicates that they
considered Stallins to be a threat to others in the area.
The third factor in Graham is whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight. There is no indication that Stallins attempted to evade arrest. However,
it is notable that Officers had to repeatedly tell him to leave his hands on the dashboard, before
finding additional guns and removing him from the vehicle.
The video recording of the arrest shows that the force used consisted of Stallins being
removed from his vehicle and brought to the ground of the parking lot. While the video appears
to corroborate some of Defendants’ version of events, it is not entirely clear what transpired as
Stallins was removed from the vehicle and while he was on the ground. Stallins provided the
affidavits of two witnesses at the scene, Donna Davis and Lindy Rogers, who corroborate parts
of his story. The reasonableness of the Officers’ behavior is a genuine issue of material fact
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precluding summary judgment on this claim. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment as to the excessive force claim is DENIED.
II.
Deliberate indifference
Stallins alleges that the Defendants engaged in cruel and unusual punishment by taking
him to the county jail, where he was denied adequate medical care. With regard to prisoners'
claims of denial of medical care, “‘[d]eliberate indifference’ by prison officials to an inmate's
serious medical needs constitutes ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ in violation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Miller v. Calhoun
Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct.
285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)).
A claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment has both an objective
and a subjective component. The objective component requires the existence of a sufficiently
serious medical need. Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 646 (6th Cir. 2005). To satisfy the
subjective component, the defendant must possess a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” rising
above negligence or even gross negligence and being “tantamount to intent to punish.” Horn v.
Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994). Put another way, “[a] prison
official acts with deliberate indifference if he knows of a substantial risk to an inmate's health,
yet recklessly disregards the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Taylor v.
Boot, 58 F. App'x 125, 126 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–47
(1994)).
Stallins alleges that he did not receive certain medications while in jail, and that he could
not control his bowels and was dirty through the night. However, he fails to specify what
medical attention he needed and fails to allege any detrimental effect resulting from the lack of
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care while in jail. After his examination, Dr. Howard indicated that Stallins was acceptable for
admission to jail on Prisoner Medical Clearance Report with no special suggestions for his care.
Stallins was then transported to the Caldwell County Jail where he signed an intake form
indicating that he was not in need of medical attention. He did not request an ambulance when
he left the jail.
Stallins did not include a report from a doctor or expert witness detailing any medical
needs that went unaddressed, or illustrating any ill effects of his treatment while in jail.
Additionally, aside from his own claims, he has not presented “more than a scintilla of evidence”
regarding the Defendants’ required culpable state of mind for this claim.
Therefore, the
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the deliberate indifference claim is GRANTED.
III.
Negligence
Plaintiff also appears to allege a state law claim of negligence. Under Kentucky law, to
sustain a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff;
he/she breached that duty; and an injury to the plaintiff resulted due to the actions of the
defendant. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Vincent, 412 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1967). An absence of any
of these elements leads to the failure of the claim. Id.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions in
arresting Stallins were discretionary and undertaken in good faith.
Under Kentucky law,
qualified official immunity affords protection to public officers sued in their individual capacity
from “damages liability for good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.”
Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky.2001). Specifically, the defense “applies to the
negligent performance by a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e.,
those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and
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judgment; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee's authority.” Id. (internal
citation omitted). Though the Defendants argue that Officer Merrick is entitled to qualified
immunity for the state law negligence claim because he was acting in a discretionary manner in
making the arrest of Stallins, this immunity does not apply if it is determined that Officer
Merrick acted in bad faith. Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184, 188-89 (Ky.1992). Bad
faith “can be predicated on a violation of a constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established
right which a person in the public employee's position presumptively would have known was
afforded to a person in the plaintiff's position, i.e., objective unreasonableness; or if the officer or
employee willfully or maliciously intended to harm the plaintiff or acted with a corrupt motive.”
Smith v. Nesbitt, 2003 WL 22462413, at *3-4 (Ky. App. 2003).
Because Defendant’s defense of qualified immunity requires a jury to resolve underlying
disputed facts regarding the manner of Plaintiff’s arrest, summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
negligence claim is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 16), is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. An appropriate order shall issue.
October 9, 2014
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