Lasseter v. U.S. Government

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 12 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 2/10/2015. cc: Counsel(KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-00002

CHAD LASSETER

Plaintiff,

v.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
Government. (Docket No. 12.) Plaintiff Chad Lasseter has filed no response, and the
time for doing so has elapsed. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for adjudication.

Factual Background
Lasseter alleges that although he was charged with a crime for which the
maximum sentence was fourteen months, he was imprisoned for nineteen months and
sixteen days—five months and sixteen days beyond the authorized amount. According to
Lasseter, a judge admitted that “he and the rest of the court was wrong.” (Docket No. 1
at Paragraph 1.) In support of this claim, Lasseter cites a page from the transcript of a
competency hearing conducted by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois. (See Docket No. 12-2, Transcript of Competency Hearing (Civil
Action No. 4:02-cr-40067, S.D. Ill., Docket No. 84).) In the instant action, Lasseter
seeks an award of $100,000,000 in damages for the unlawful imprisoned that he alleges.

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The underlying Southern District of Illinois Criminal case resulted from a
November 2002 indictment charging Lasseter with being a felon in possession. (Civil
Action No. 4:02-cr-40067 (S.D. Ill.), Docket No. 1.) Lasseter pleaded guilty to this
charge in April 2003 and was sentenced to fifteen months of incarceration and three years
of supervised release. (Civil Action No. 4:02-cr-40067 (S.D. Ill.), Docket No. 16.) He
appealed neither his sentence nor his conviction.
In October 2004, the Government moved to revoke Lasseter’s supervised release.
(Civil Action No. 4:02-cr-40067 (S.D. Ill.), Docket No. 32.)

Lasseter remained in

custody until the competency hearing on the revocation motion. (Civil Action No. 4:02cr-40067 (S.D. Ill.), Docket No. 84; see Docket No. 12-2.) Upon determining that
Lasseter was competent, the district court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss its
motion to revoke supervised release. The court released Lasseter and ordered that his
supervision be terminated. (See Docket No. 12-2.)

Analysis
The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes plaintiffs from suing the United
States of America without the government’s consent. The terms of such consent define a
federal court’s jurisdiction to hear a suit. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 515 (6th Cir. 1974).
Without a “clear relinquishment” of governmental immunity, a court has no jurisdiction
overt tort actions against the United States. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31
(1953). Among the limited waivers of the government’s sovereign immunity is the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which supplies a remedy against the United States
for the torts of its officers and employees. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813

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(1976). The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity for claims brought
against it

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
This broad waiver of sovereign immunity, however, is not without exceptions.
See Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 1994). The terms of the
government’s waiver of sovereign immunity establish and define a court’s jurisdiction
over a lawsuit against the United States. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 58788 (1941) (“Except as Congress has consented there is no jurisdiction . . . to entertain
suits against the United States, or for the review of its decisions by appellate courts.”).
The Supreme Court has “frequently held . . . that a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Dep’t of the Army v.
Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999).
The FTCA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing
suit, and no federal jurisdiction may attach absent compliance with the exhaustion
requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Executive Jet Aviation, 507 F.2d at 514-15. Congress
has delineated an administrative procedure that FTCA claimants must follow so as to
permit an agency to receive a claim, investigate it, and perhaps settle the matter before a
lawsuit is filed. A plaintiff may institute a lawsuit in federal court only where the claim
has been “finally denied by the agency in writing” or when there has been a “failure . . .
to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed.” 28 U.S.C. §

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2675(a).1 Finally, the statute of limitations established in § 2401(b) requires a plaintiff to
both file his administrative claim within two years after accrual of the claim and file his
action in district court within six months of the agency’s final action. Ellison v. United
States, 531 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2008).

Lasseter confronts a number of procedural obstacles to his claim. As stated
above, his claim asserts false imprisonment, which consists of “detention without legal
process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). “Limitations begin to run against
an action for false imprisonment when the false imprisonment ends.” Id. (quoting 2 H.
Wood, Limitation of Actions § 187d(4), p. 878 (rev. 4th ed. 1916)). At the latest, then,
Lasseter’s claim would have accrued on June 20, 2006, when his counsel informed him
of the potential injustice. (See Docket No. 1 at Paragraph 4 (“[O]n June 20, 2006, I was
told by Melissa Day after the judge admitted he was wrong about me ‘the government
has a responsibility to compensate people that we are wrong about . . . .’).) Accordingly,
Lasseter’s administrative claim came due on June 20, 2008. However, Lasseter filed no
administrative tort claim with the Bureau of Prisons or any other agency, either before or
after this deadline. Because Lasseter has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

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Section 2675(a) reads, in relevant part:
An action shall not be instituted on a claim against the United States for
money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim
to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally
denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.
The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six
months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time
thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this
section.

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prior to filing the instant lawsuit, his claims against the United States must be dismissed
due to lack of federal jurisdiction.2

Conclusion and Order
Therefore, in accordance with the above discussion, the Government’s Motion to
Dismiss, (Docket No. 12), shall be GRANTED.

All remaining motions shall be

DISMISSED as moot.

February 10, 2015

cc: Chad Lasseter, pro se
Counsel

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In addition to the procedural barriers to Lasseter’s claim, the Court further notes that the transcript of the
antecedent proceeding appears to provide little support for his claim. Although Lasseter alleges that “the
judge admitted that he . . . was wrong about me,” the district court for the Southern District of Illinois did
not make a finding that Lasseter had been wrongfully imprisoned. “[I]n order to recover damages for an
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment . . . the plaintiff must show that the conviction has
been reversed on appeal, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.”
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Although Lassiter initiated an action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, Judge Phil Gilbert of the Southern District of Illinois dismissed Lasseter’s motion as timebarred. (See Docket No. 12-3, Civil Action No. 3:06-cv-00479 (S.D. Ill).

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